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Abstract
In recent times religion minorities all over the world have been facing existential threats,
which seriously compromise their social inclusion and the survival of their cultural
heritage.
In 2016, hundreds of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and intellectuals met in
Marrakesh to discuss about religion tolerance, interfaith dialogue and the treatment
of religious minorities in predominantly Muslim countries. The gathering ended with
the drafting of a new Declaration, which aims to restore the principles of the ancient
Charter of Medina, to the benefit of all religious groups in the Middle East. This
dissertation analyses the declaration of Marrakesh on both a linguistic and a legal level,
providing information on why it was considered as an urgent necessity and defining
possible predictions regarding its future implementations and its legal value in modern
Arab societies.
Finally, this thesis will analyse the relationship between religious minorities and
the media, focusing on how smaller religious groups are perceived from the general
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This dissertation analyses the birth, consequences and possible future implementa-
tions of the declaration of Marrakesh on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Muslim
countries, providing also a general idea of how religious minorities are portrayed and
perceived in international media production.
The first chapter will mainly focus on the general context in which the declaration
was born, who took part to it, when, where and why. King Mohammed VI of Morocco
hosted, with the cooperation of other organizations and political figures, from the 25th
to the 27th January 2016 in Marrakesh, a conference entitled “Religious Minorities in
Muslim Lands: Legal Framework and a Call to Action”, which led to the Marrakesh
Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Commu-
nities. The need for such a document has reached its peak in recent years, considering
what religious minorities are currently suffering violent attacks, since the presence of
a weak global legal system, which seems to be incapable to grant them their funda-
mental rights. Even if this declaration represent a pivotal point in the history of the
protection of religious minorities, it surely was not the first example of legal document
which attempted to put a spotlight on this social issue.
The first document ever redacted to bring peace between Jews and Muslim com-
munities in Middle East was the Charter of Medina (VII cen.), symbol of brotherhood
and promoter of peaceful relationships, drafted by prophet Muhammad himself and
some of his most faithful supporters. One of the main goal of this gathering in Mar-
rakesh, was to re-establish the principles of the Charter in modern Arab societies,
since its provisions contained a number of fundamental principles, such as freedom
of movement, property and ownership and equality before the law, which needs to be
reconsidered in these dark times. The production of legal documents on minorities and
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their rights has definitely seen a decrease in most recent times. This work will also
deal with the most prominent modern documents on minorities in the Arab world, and
discuss if they suffice in terms of specificity and validity. Most examples will show
that that in almost all mayor Islamic legal document, references to religious minorities
are either nonexistent or not specific enough to ensure concrete results. In the effort
to understand which could possibly be the future of the declaration of Marrakesh and
if implementations can actually be considered as doable in every Muslim countries,
predictions will be attempted, based on what different scholars and intellectuals have
said and written on the document itself and particularly on its proper legal validity.
The second chapter is entirely dedicated to the analysis of the condition of different
religious minorities in some of the most controversial Muslim countries from a religious
freedom perspective, in the attempt to understand why this document turned out to
be so necessary right in this century. Firstly, the situation of religion minorities in
Morocco will be tackled: the Moroccan Government, under the guide of King Muham-
mad VI, has achieved a lot in social, economical and educational fields. The condition
of minority communities in Morocco still remains in need of much discussion and more
legal support, even if its entire political system has put a lot of effort in studying,
understanding and protecting the heritage of certain minorities by providing annual
funds for schools and religious education.
The second chapter will also deal with the conditions of the Kurdish Yezidi commu-
nity of Iraq, of Christians in Pakistan, of the Baha’i in Iran, of religious minorities in
Turkey and with the dilemma of religious harmony and religious freedom in Indonesia.
The discourse will take into consideration the fact that religious discrimination can
arise from two different social conditions. On one side, the presence of an extremist
group on national territory, can lead to the birth of a wave of hatred and discrimination
caused by the illegal context itself. On the other, this study will also take into consid-
eration all those governments, which should operate equal and anti-discriminatory law
on a national level, but decide contrariwise to act according to the alleged “Muslim
supremacy”.
The third chapter deals with the methods and techniques linked to the translation
process of legal documents, presenting also a commented translation of the declaration
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from English into Italian, in the attempt of underlying the logical process behind the
transposition of legal matters from one language to another. The Declaration had
already been translated into Italian before by the Italian COREIS, whose version has
been published on the declaration’s official website, alongside the original Arabic draft,
a Dutch version and an English version. Always in the effort to put a spotlight on
the existence of different translation choices and on the importance of the role of the
translator in using his skills to covey the same message of the source text in the target
text, both Italian versions have also been compared, pointing out the most important
differences and the reasons behind certain choices.
The last chapter of this thesis will deal with the existing relationship between re-
ligious minorities and the global media. The content will take into consideration the
position minorities hold in mainstream media and how they handle their own media
strategy, offering insights into how a marginalized community evolves and try to fit
in, while preserving its own cultural heritage. Further sections of this last chapter will
analyze the treatment of minorities specifically in the landscape of the American and
British news production. Based on the general features that the treatment of minori-
ties in the States and in England present, some articles, published by The New York
Times, The Washington post and The Times, on the declaration of Marrakesh will
be critically analyzed, in order to understand how the document has been perceived
from the general public and if the gathering of 2016 has been sufficiently mentioned




The Marrakesh Declaration of 2016
Despite the fact that history has recorded many examples of Muslim societies be-
ing diverse, tolerant and accepting towards other religions and communities, in more
recent times religious minorities have been murdered, starved, intimidated and forced
to exile by governments and religious authorities from all over the world.
In this cultural atmosphere His Highness, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, together
with the international Minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq of
Rabat, and the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies based in the U.A.E
(United Arab Emirates) hosted, from the 25th to the 27th January 2016 in Marrakesh,
a conference entitled “Religious Minorities in Muslim Lands: Legal Framework and a
Call to Action”, which led to the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Mi-
norities in Predominantly Muslim Communities. Many organizations and intellectuals
cooperated together in order to explore and analyze one of the most critical religious
and social issues of our time, according to the content of the Koran, and in an effort
to work together towards pluralism1.
Over three hundred Islamic scholars, politicians, and activists, as well as a small
group of interfaith observers from both Muslim and non-Muslim countries agreed to
meet in Marrakesh to talk about a pressing human rights issue, which is the protection
of religious minorities in Muslim communities. All discussions, opinions and resolu-
tions, touched and analysed in those three days of Conference, led to the creation
of a document, which aims to protect and secure fundamental rights for all religious
1http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org
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minorities in predominantly Muslim communities. The content of the Declaration in-
volves multiple fundamental aspects, such as important statements on how violence
is used in Muslim countries to impose one determinate point of view over the others,
and how false information are globally distorting Islam’s perception. The Declaration
also underlines how strongly the intellectuals community is determined to reaffirm the
content of the Charter of Medina (VII cent.) on a legal level and to find new and con-
crete ways to apply it and for it to be used as a catalyst for change. The declaration
is also a symbol and instrument of cooperation among all countries, Muslim and non,
in order to provide full protection to religious minorities, erasing arrogance, bias and
violence among communities.
What the Declaration promises to do, in conclusion, is to make religious law in
Muslim countries more inclusive, to review educational programs and to push all deci-
sion makers to work together, in order to make the content of the document a reality
within Muslim societies. The final paper affirms that:
“In the Name of God, the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate
Executive Summary of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minori-
ties in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities
25th-27th January 2016
WHEREAS, conditions in various parts of the Muslim World have deteriorated dan-
gerously due to the use of violence and armed struggle as a tool for settling conflicts
and imposing one’s point of view;
WHEREAS, this situation has also weakened the authority of legitimate governments
and enabled criminal groups to issue edicts attributed to Islam, but which, in fact,
alarmingly distort its fundamental principles and goals in ways that have seriously
harmed the population as a whole;
WHEREAS, this year marks the 1,400th anniversary of the Charter of Medina, a con-
stitutional contract between the Prophet Muhammad, God’s peace and blessings be
upon him, and the people of Medina, which guaranteed the religious liberty of all,
regardless of faith;
WHEREAS, hundreds of Muslim scholars and intellectuals from over 120 countries,
along with representatives of Islamic and international organizations, as well as leaders
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from diverse religious groups and nationalities, gathered in Marrakesh on this date to
reaffirm the principles of the Charter of Medina at a major conference;
WHEREAS, this conference was held under the auspices of His Majesty, King Mo-
hammed VI of Morocco, and organized jointly by the Ministry of Endowment and
Islamic Affairs in the Kingdom of Morocco and the Forum for Promoting Peace in
Muslim Societies based in the United Arab Emirates;
AND NOTING the gravity of this situation afflicting Muslims as well as peoples of
other faiths throughout the world, and after thorough deliberation and discussion, the
convened Muslim scholars and intellectuals:
DECLARE HEREBY our firm commitment to the principles articulated in the Char-
ter of Medina, whose provisions contained a number of the principles of constitutional
contractual citizenship, such as freedom of movement, property ownership, mutual sol-
idarity and defense, as well as principles of justice and equality before the law; and
that, the objectives of the Charter of Medina provide a suitable framework for national
constitutions in countries with Muslim majorities, and the United Nations Charter and
related documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are in harmony
with the Charter of Medina, including consideration for public order.
NOTING FURTHER that deep reflection upon the various crises afflicting human-
ity underscores the inevitable and urgent need for cooperation among all religious
groups, we AFFIRM HEREBY that such cooperation must be based on a ”Common
Word,” requiring that such cooperation must go beyond mutual tolerance and respect,
to providing full protection for the rights and liberties to all religious groups in a civi-
lized manner that eschews coercion, bias, and arrogance. BASED ON ALL OF THE
ABOVE, we hereby:
Call upon Muslim scholars and intellectuals around the world to develop a jurispru-
dence of the concept of ”citizenship” which is inclusive of diverse groups. Such jurispru-
dence shall be rooted in Islamic tradition and principles and mindful of global changes.
Urge Muslim educational institutions and authorities to conduct a courageous review
of educational curricula that addresses honestly and effectively any material that insti-
gates aggression and extremism, leads to war and chaos, and results in the destruction
of our shared societies; Call upon politicians and decision makers to take the political
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and legal steps necessary to establish a constitutional contractual relationship among
its citizens, and to support all formulations and initiatives that aim to fortify relations
and understanding among the various religious groups in the Muslim World;
Call upon the educated, artistic, and creative members of our societies, as well as or-
ganizations of civil society, to establish a broad movement for the just treatment of
religious minorites in Muslim countries and to raise awareness as to their rights, and
to work together to ensure the success of these efforts.
Call upon the various religious groups bound by the same national fabric to address
their mutual state of selective amnesia that blocks memories of centuries of joint and
shared living on the same land; we call upon them to rebuild the past by reviving
this tradition of conviviality, and restoring our shared trust that has been eroded by
extremists using acts of terror and aggression; Call upon representatives of the various
religions, sects and denominations to confront all forms of religious bigotry, vilification,
and denigration of what people hold sacred, as well as all speech that promote hatred
and bigotry;
AND FINALLY AFFIRM that it is unconscionable to employ religion for the purpose
of aggressing upon the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries.
Marrakesh
January 2016 ,27th.” 2
Scholars, intellectuals and religious authorities from almost three hundreds differ-
ent Muslim and non-Muslim countries, including the United Arab Emirates,Turkey,
Pakistan, India and Iran, worked together towards the creation of this document, but
most importantly a big role was played by the King of Morocco, His Highness, King
Mohammed VI.
Since the beginning of his kingdom, the king has been a stunning example of tol-
erance and acceptance. Muhammad VI is famous and known all over the world for
actively participating in promoting interfaith dialogue and mutual respect between
different religious communities, while working on different improvements regarding
2The text is the official English translation of the original document in Arabic, made public on the
official site of the Declaration, together with an Italian and a dutch version as well.
www.marrakeshdeclaration.org
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very important national matters such as education and the creation of a new non-
discriminatory legal system. The gathering kicked off on a Monday morning with the
words of King Mohammed VI, read by the Minister of Endowments and Islamic Af-
fairs, Ahmed Toufiq. Worth mentioning are the most interesting and inspiring bits:
“In normal circumstances, there would have been no need to address a theme such
as the one chosen for this conference, The rights of religious minorities in Islamic
lands, given the unambiguous position and principles of Islam as well as its legacy in
this regard. Nevertheless, there are events which have rendered the discussion of such
a theme necessary in the current circumstances, and Muslims must show that these
events have no basis or justification in Islam’s frame of reference. Muslims have to
show that certain events which are happening under the guise of Islam are driven or
prompted by considerations which have nothing to do with religion.[...] I am therefore
pleased to see that this conference has been convened, bath to spotlight the true val-
ues advocated by religions and to make sure we uphold those values so that peace and
solidarity may prevail for the benefit of humankind[...]
We, in the Kingdom of Morocco, see no reason for denying religious minorities any of
their rights. We do not tolerate a violation of this kind being perpetrated in the name
of Islam, nor do we tolerate any Muslim being involved in such an infringement. This
firm belief is rooted in the proper understanding of religious principles, in our cultural
heritage and in the history of this time-honored Kingdom; this explains the way Mo-
roccan Muslims interact with each other and with followers of other religions.[...]
Morocco has always been an outstanding model of cultural coexistence and interac-
tion between Islam and other religions, particularly Judaism and Christianity. One
of the glorious pages in this history was the emergence of the Moroccan-Andalusian
civilization, which brought together various communities and led to the development of
trade, industry and the arts, as well as to fruitful exchange in the areas of knowledge,
wisdom, philosophy and science. [...]
As Commander of the Faithful and defender of the faith, I am committed to protecting
the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The religious rights of Muslims and non-
Muslims are protected in accordance with the aforementioned immutable principles,
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and their rights as citizens are guaranteed by the Constitution; there is no difference
or distinction as far as the ultimate goals are concerned. In doing so, I am following
in the footsteps of my glorious ancestors.[...]
The world we live in today needs religious values because they embody the virtues we
should uphold before the Creator. We also need them because they consolidate our
propensity for tolerance, love and cooperation in promoting righteousness and piety.
We need common values not just to nurture tolerance, but also to derive from them
the energy and fortitude that will enable Man to take a long hard look at himself; we
need them because they can help us to rally together in order to enjoy a life free from
war, greed, extremism and hatred a life in which crises and human suffering can be
reduced as a prelude to the elimination of the risk of religious conflict.[...]
I wish your conference every success. I believe what people are expecting you to say,
through your final declaration, is that religion must not be manipulated to justify any
infringement or denial of the rights of religious minorities in Islamic countries. I am
therefore pleased to see that this conference has been convened, bath to spotlight the
true values advocated by religions and to make sure we uphold those values so that
peace and solidarity may prevail for the benefit of humankind.”3 Undoubtedly, King
Muhammad VI played a big role in promoting and hosting in Morocco all conferences
that led to the creation of the Declaration, but he was not alone in the process. At least
two other International Organizations cooperated, in order to make the declaration a
reality for Muslim Communities: first, the Forum for promoting Peace in Muslim so-
cieties and second, the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers.
The Forum for promoting Peace in Muslim Societies announced the creation of its
Council at a meeting in Abu Dhabi in December 2015, under the presidency of His
Excellency Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah 4, plus a group of professionals, scholars and
intellectuals. Its main goals are the promotion of peace and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts in all Muslim communities, the recognition of the importance and rights of
women in the creation of global peace, the protection of religious minorities in Muslim
countries and the promotion of a truthful Muslim culture, free from prejudice and ha-




important and active Organization of the Muslim world5. From the day of its creation
the Forum has organised different events, with the goal of promoting peace and safety
between all communities, but with a spotlight on the Islamic ones: on March 9 and
10, 2014, the first Forum to promote peace in Muslim countries and communities was
organised in Abu Dhabi, in order to scientifically discuss terrorism, hatred and social
disintegration in the Muslim world, plus providing concrete solutions to all of these
issues. Three other meetings took place in 2016, 2017 and December 2018.
Another important founder of the Declaration of Marrakesh was the Network for
Religious and Traditional Peacemakers. The Network aims to build bridges between
peacemakers and global players in order to promote sustainable peace. The Organiza-
tion was originally founded in order to promote the idea that religious and traditional
authorities were and are vital, but underutilized actors in all peacemaking processes.
The initiation of the Network was closely supported by the UN Mediation Support
Unit of the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Alliance of Civi-
lizations. Since its founding, the Peacemakers Network has grown into a network made
up of almost 50 partners6. The Network’s strength lies in its ability to find synergies
between partners organizations and to enable collaborative efforts in building sustain-
able peace.
Last but not least, an important role in the making process of the document was
also played by the Minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq of Ra-
bat. During the 90s, he worked as a Professor of history for the faculty of Letter at




7The Eliah Interfaith Institute is a Forum, which aims to promote the sharing of knowledge and
the creation of projects capable of creating true interfaith cooperation.
(www.elijah-interfaith.org/)
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1.1 The inspiration behind the Declaration of Mar-
rakesh
As previously mentioned, the Declaration is the result of a meeting between hun-
dreds of scholars, intellectuals and theologists from all over world. Nonetheless, this
document is also the outcome of both ancient and more modern legal documents, which
previously treated and tried to improve the condition of religious minorities. The most
ancient and most important source of inspiration and model to the declaration of
Marrakesh is the Charter of Medina (VII cent.), while the Arab Charter of human
rights or the Universal Islamic Declaration of human rights, among other treaties and
agreements, were drafted respectively in the 80’s and 90’s.
1.1.1 Ancient documents on Religious Minorities
The very first example of legal document for the rights of religious minorities in
Muslim countries dates back to the time of the prophet Muhammad, founder of the
Islamic doctrine.
Muhammad was born around 570 CE in the Arabian city of Mecca, from a wealthy
family. His family belonged to the Banu Hashim clan of the mercantile Quraysh tribe
of Mecca, the richest and most respected one of the city. By the time Muhammad was
six, he had already lost both his parents, but according to the holy book, the Koran,
his life was destined to be filled with extraordinary events and to be blessed by one
divine task: the professing and spreading of the Islamic doctrine throughout the world.
Muhammad was known to be an honorable and trusted man, with a nobile personality
and successful in his work as a merchant. According to believers, around 610 AD,
during the first night of Ramadan, Muhammad was visited by the angel Jibril, who
revealed to him some words, which were later to become the initial Surah of the Koran.
The majority of the scholars believe al-Fātiḥah (the opener or the opening) to be
the very first message that Muhammad received from the angel:
“In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate Praise belongs to God, the
Lord of all Being, the All-merciful, the All-compassionate, the Master of the Day of
Doom. Thee only we serve; to Thee alone we pray for succour. Guide us in the straight
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path, the path of those whom Thou hast blessed, not of those against whom Thou art
wrathful, nor of those who are astray.”8
Muhammad dreamt and saw the Angel Jibrīl for the first time when he was around
forty years old. In the VII century, around ten years after the first revelation, Muham-
mad suddenly lost his beloved wife, one of his most supportive family member and first
believer of the doctrine he was trying to spread. This year is known as the year of
sorrow, the year that could have marked the end of Muhammad’s preaching and the
victory of polytheism over monotheism. Despite his grief, the prophet kept on spread-
ing his message, emigrating three years later from Mecca to Yatrib, where the entire
population, already largely converted, had been enthusiastically waiting for him to
arrive.
For Muslim people, the day of Muhammad’s migration to Yatrib marks the be-
ginning of a new era in the history of the world, the beginning of the preaching of
the prophet throughout Arabia and eventually the creation of Islam. Because of him,
Yathrib was then renamed Madīnat an-Nabī, city of the prophet, the city that saw
the birth of the Charter of Medina, which is the first legal document in history to
be created to protect religious minorities in Islam and promote a peaceful coexistence
between all believers.
During his time in Medina, Muhammad took over important political, religious and
social roles, although his main goal was to solve conflicts and create peace between all
Jews and Muslim communities in the city. The constitution of Medina was concluded
after 622, as an agreement between the prophet and all the most important clans in
Medina to secure peace, brotherhood, freedom and security throughout what will later
become the first multi religious Islamic state of Medina.9
Considered to be one of the first written legal documents on democracy in human
8All quotes from the Koran are taken from the version translated by Arthur John Arberry. The
first draft of his interpretation of the Holy book was published in 1955, and it is still the most widely
respected by scholars and professors for the loyalty that it shows towards the original language and
for being without prejudice.
A. Arberry,The Koran Interpreted, Touchstone, New York 1996.
9Baudo,Il profeta Muhammad, un messaggero di Dio per l’Umanità, Accademia ISA, Milano 2008,
pp. 11-28.
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history, it finds its principles on the Koran and the Sunnah, including immigrants,
Muslims, non-Muslims, Jews and even non-Muslims allies. Here are some of the most
important and pivotal points of the Charter, regarding the rights of non-Muslims citi-
zens of Medina:
1. “This is a document from Muhammad the prophet (governing the relations) be-
tween the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed
them and joined them and labored with them.
2. God’s protection is one; the least of them may give protection to a stranger on
their behalf. Believers are friends one to the other to the exclusion of outsiders.
3. The peace of the believers is indivisible. No separate peace shall be made when
believers are fighting in the way of God. Conditions must be fair and equitable
to all.
4. The Jews of the B. ‘Auf are one community with the believers (the Jews have
their religion and the Muslims have theirs), their freedmen and their persons,
except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but themselves and
their families.
5. The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must
help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They
must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against
treachery. A man is not liable for his ally’s misdeeds. The wronged must be
helped.
6. The contracting parties are bound to help one another against any attack on
Yathrib.
7. The Jews of al-Aus, their freedmen and themselves have the same standing with
the people of this document in purely loyalty from the people of this document.
Loyalty is a protection against treachery. He who acquires ought acquire it for
himself. God approves of this document.”10
The charter aimed to establish Muhammad as mediating authority for all tribes in
Medina and to end all inter tribal fights in the city through his guidance. In the
document, Muslims are asked to treat Jews and all other non-Muslims in an equal and
10M. Tahir-Ul-Qadri, The Constitution of Medina, Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, London 2012.
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respectful way, as long as they are willing to maintain peaceful relationships and to act
according to the Sacred Law and the pact itself. On their part, non-Muslims have to
financially contribute to the well-being of the whole community, especially in case of
conflict or war, in order to maintain a certain kind of social equilibrium and a suitable
living condition for every citizen, no matter from which religious background.
There is another fundamental concept of the Islamic doctrine that has been taken
from the Koran and renovated in the Charter of Medina, and that concept is all behind
the meaning of the Arabic word “Ummah”. When the term “Ummah” appears in the
Koran, it generally refers to the collectiveness of a community or a group of people,
brought together not only by blood, but also by spirit. Not only does the term designate
a community, but also a community guided by the same faith, worshipping the same
God and unite thanks to the efforts of one Prophet.
According to W. Robertson Smith, the term is considered to come from the Hebrew
ēm, which means “community” but also “mother” and “race”.11 The Holy Book defines
the “Ummahs” as rightful, honorable and faithful communities, although throughout
the Koran, the concept definitely undergoes a certain kind of evolution.
Nowadays the term refers exclusively to Muslim communities, although initially,
“Ummah” presented a more general connotation, involving and including the most
different types of community, especially those belonging to the so called “People of the
book”. To every Ummah on Earth, God has sent a Messenger or prophet, destined
to spread his divine plan of Salvation, which inspired Muhammad and his followers in
the writing of the Charter of Medina. The community that Muhammad was trying to
build was young and divided on many levels, but through the definition of the Islamic
Doctrine and the concept of “Ummah”, the prophet managed to create a sense of unity
and togetherness both geographically and mentally, capable of bringing people from
different ethnics together, under one faith.
This concept is undoubtedly one of the most interesting and fascinating of the
entire Charter and for sure the main reason why past Muslim societies were famous for
being tolerant, open-minded and non-discriminatory in regards to other faiths. During
the centuries, the more the number of Muslim territories grew larger, the bigger the
11Denny, The Meaning of ”Ummah” in the Qurʾān, cit., p.36.
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melting pot became, including Persians, Romans, Turks, Barbers, Kurds and many
others.
Islamism embraced various cultures and sciences giving birth to one of the most
important civilizations in our history. The Charter remains the one true inspiration
under the whole process that led to the Marrakesh Declaration, whose goal is to bring
its principles back to life, in the attempt to establish a more rightful social situation
within all Muslim Countries and between all different religious communities .12
1.1.2 Modern documents on Religious Minorities
The main issue that scholars and intellectuals have in finding more modern and
contemporary sources connected with the Declaration of Marrakesh, is that in almost
all mayor Islamic legal document, references to religious minorities are either nonexis-
tent or not specific enough to ensure concrete results.
1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights establishes, for example, the
will of the Islamic community to create an environment where all human beings are
equal, but at the same time makes no specific reference to the equal treatment in re-
gards of all members’ faith. Many other articles about religious freedom (eg art XIII,
XIVa and XIVb) and the protection of religious minorities in Muslim countries are
totally insufficient in specificity, also hiding in most cases a sense of supremacy of the
Islamic Law and faith, and omitting the use of the proper term “non-Muslim”.
There is no article dedicated to religious minorities in the 1993 Cairo Declaration
of Human Rights in Islam as well. Article I states that: All men are equal in terms
of human dignity and basic obligation and responsibilities, without any discrimination
on grounds of race, color, language, sex, religious beliefs. Although in the article reli-
gious beliefs are mentioned, the content then recites: True faith is the guarantee for
enhancing such dignity, along the path of human perfection13 This last sentence makes
everything stated before largely conditional, and the general content of the article un-
clear.
12F. M. Denny, The Meaning of ”Ummah” in the Qurʾān, in ≪History of Religions≫, 15.1(1975),
pp. 45-70.
13N. Ghanea, Human Rights of Religious Minorities and of Women in the Middle East, in ≪Human
Rights Quarterly≫, 26.3(2004), pp. 717.
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The first Document in recent history that clearly mentions religious minorities even
if still weakly, is the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights. Article 27 is the most com-
plete one on the topic of religious minorities human rights stating that: -Adherents
of every religion have the right to practise their religious observances and to manifest
their views through expression, practice or teaching, without prejudice to the rights of
others. No restrictions shall be imposed on the exercise of freedom of belief, thought
and opinion except as provided by law.-14. As noticed in the previously mentioned
legal documents, the article is made confusing by the use of certain terminology or
sentences: Does their freedom really have no restrictions, or is it somehow legally con-
trolled? And if it is legally controlled, is the document referring to Islamic law or to
some other kinds of law?
Generally, real attempts in guaranteeing human dignity to religious minorities,
especially in the Middle East, are extremely recent and some are definitely worth men-
tioning. The Amman’s Message, for instance, represents a call for tolerance and unity
in the Islamic world and it was approved on November 9, 2004, by King ʿAbd Allāh II
ibn al-Ḥusayn of Jordan. The document, structured in 3 main points, was drafted by
200 Muslim scholars from 50 different countries, and mainly touches three topics: it
tries to define who a real ”Muslim” is; who should deal with the process of excommuni-
cation from the Islamic religion (takfīr), and the principles regarding legal nonbinding
opinions in the Islamic law (fatwa).
Here are some of the most meaningful sentences, taken from the Amman Message:
1. “Islam has made clear that the goal of its message is realizing mercy and good
for all people.
2. Islam calls for treating others as one desires to be treated.
3. Islam confirms the principle of justice in interacting with others, safeguarding
their rights, and confirms that one must not deny people their possessions
4. Islam rejects extremism, radicalism and fanaticism—just as all noble, heavenly
religions reject them—considering them as recalcitrant ways and forms of injus-
tice. Furthermore, it is not a trait that characterizes a particular nation; it is an
aberration that has been experienced by all nations, races, and religions. They
14Ghanea, Human Rights of Religious Minorities and of Women in the Middle East, cit., p. 719.
17
are not particular to one people; truly they are a phenomenon that every people,
every race and every religion has known.
5. Islam honors every human being, regardless of his color, race or religion”15
Another great result in the creation of equality under many circumstances in Mus-
lim Countries was the 2010 Conference in Mardin, southeastern Turkey, where fifteen
Muslim scholars among the most prominent, declared the fatwa by 14th century scholar
Ibn Taymiyya16, as no longer relevant for the contemporary world. The Conference
was convened by the Global Center for Renewal and Guidance (GCRG) together with
Mardin’s Artuklu University with the purpose of studying Ibn Taymiyyah’s “Mardin
fatwa”.
Basically, Taymiyya’s vision divided societies into “House of Islam” and “House
of unbelief” but according to the Muslim scholars gathered in Turkey, such a vision
needed to be put into the right historical context in order to be considered religiously
and generally acceptable. This fatwa comes from the medieval times, and it cannot
therefore been applied to our modern globalized society. This realization seems to be
fundamental in the resolution of minorities issues, since most of them come by the
concept of “Muslim supremacy”, of which Taymiyya was a great supporter.
The entire discussion in Mardin was focused on the importance of starting new
research on all these ancient fatwa and non binding religious rules, in order to promote
their correct understanding and contextualization together with a new perspective on
their legacy for present and future generations. No more fatwa can be used to justify
killings and radical activities in a world that is collectively working hard to promote
the respect of fundamental human rights and peaceful relationships among all ethnic
groups and faiths.
Here are the most important conclusions reached at the end of this gathering:
1. Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin can under no circumstances be appro-
priated and used as evidence for leveling the charge of kufr (unbelief) against
15http://ammanmessage.com
16Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was one of the most famous Muslim theologian, indeed one of the most
controversial as well. For his theories on the Sunni doctrine, he was imprisoned multiple times from
Orthodox religious scholars. www.muslimphilosophy.com/it/.
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fellow Muslims, rebelling against rulers, deeming game their lives and property,
terrorizing those who enjoy safety and security, acting treacherously towards
those who live (in harmony) with fellow Muslims or with whom fellow Muslims
live (in harmony) via the bond of citizenship and peace.
2. The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence was a classification based
on juristic reasoning that was necessitated by the circumstances of the Muslim
world, then and the nature of the international relations prevalent at that time.
However, circumstances have changed now: the existence of recognized inter-
national treaties, which consider as crimes wars that do not involve repelling
aggression or resisting occupation; the emergence of civil states which guarantee,
on the whole, religious, ethnic and national rights, have necessitated declaring,
instead, the entire world as a place of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between
all religions, groups and factions in the context of establishing common good and
justice amongst people, and wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect
to their wealth, habitations and integrity.
3. Amongst the priorities of Muslim scholars and Islamic academic institutions
should be the analysis and assessment of ideas that breed extremism, takfir
(labeling fellow Muslims as unbelievers) and violence in the name of Islam. Se-
curity measures, no matter how fair and just they may happen to be, cannot
take the place of an eloquent (scholarly) elucidation supported by proof and ev-
idence. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Ummah’s religious scholars to
condemn all forms of violent attempts to change or violent protest, within, or
outside, Muslim societies. Such condemnation must be clear, explicit, and be a
true manifestation of real courage in speaking the truth, so as to eliminate any
confusion or ambiguity.17
In conclusion, the real path to the declaration of Marrakesh concretely began only
four years prior its creation, with a series of seminars in Nouakchott, Mauritania, fol-
lowed by a large forum in Tunis in 2013, where the topic was finally addressed in a




March 26 to 30 2013 where International Organizations, social movements and net-
works, supported by many Tunisian movements, were already fighting in defense of
social justice, democracy and dignity. Despite all attempts to find points of consensus
between different faiths, this issue is still lacking of concrete resolutions and many came
to the conclusion that perhaps religion should be completely left out of all political
concerns and fields.
The discussion remains far from over, but has at least paved the way for the “Re-
ligious Minorities in Muslim Lands: It’s Legal Framework and a Call to Action” gath-
ering in Marrakesh in 2016, for being educational and inspirational to all scholars and
professionals that shaped the new declaration.
1.2 The Future of the Declaration
Many scholars, journalists and members of the international community agree on
the fact that it is too soon to determine on which level and how strongly the Decla-
ration is impacting and will impact Muslim communities worldwide. What we know
for sure is that unfortunately, so far the Declaration has received more attention from
Western Countries and Media than it has within the Muslim World. Nonetheless, the
hope for a stronger and more equitable future is very much alive, even though the
process connected to the crafting of the Declaration saw the continuous clash between
tradition and modernity and between past and future. Worth of mention are the state-
ments of Representatives of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Iran, whose
governments are clearly invested in maintaining the status quo and whose minorities
are still suffering discrimination on a daily basis. Although there have been attempts
to find points of consensus, the entire conference has registered a clear tension between
all participants, especially when it came to talk about how to make the words a reality
and how to put theory into practice.
In December 2018, Ahmed Salisu Garba, member of the Faculty of Law of the
Bauchi State University of Gadau and Deputy Dean/Head of the Department of Pri-
vate & Business Law, published on the journal The Review of Faith and International
Affairs an article entitled “The Prospects and Problems of the Marrakesh Declaration
on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Muslim Majority Communities”. Throughout
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his work Garba presents and explains several issues linked to some issues that the dec-
laration may present, in the attempt to understand if the document can be succesfully
implemented on a practial and legal perspective.
In the article, Swiss-Palestinian Islamic law scholar Sami Aldeeb, paints the dec-
laration as totally useless unless Muslim countries do not legally end discrimination
against minorities in the first place. According to the law scholar, the best way to
do so would be to abort the concept of Islam as state religion and to work towards a
legal system capable of approving multi-religious marriage. It has been scientifically
proved that “religious intermarriage contributes for the growing awareness of cultural
relativism and religious tolerance” 18 since it provides the couple the opportunity to
discuss, celebrate and tolerate their religious differences on a daily basis.
The author also underlines how fundamental it is for Muslim countries to work on
intra-Muslim conflicts first. Surely, Garba refers here to the enmity between Sunni
and Shi’a, two different branches of the Islamic faith. Their conflict dates back to
the death of Muhammad in the VI century, since the core issue that split the Muslim
community was the succession to the prophet himself. At the death of the prophet,
some wanted to elect the next head for the community (Sunni), while others believed
Muhammad to have appointed a successor himself, on the basis of his bloodline (Shi’a).
Many elements involved in the structure of this two branches are still unclear nowadays
and this fact contributes to the difficulties linked to the relationship between Muslim
communities and other faiths.
On top of what has been mentioned so far, it is important to remember that
Islamism still presents a strong hierarchical structure, especially considering the state-
religion relationship. This hierarchical structure dictates that firstly, a state needs to
officially declare Islam to be its national religion, specifying also, which Muslim ideol-
ogy the state is going to embrace between Sunni and Shi’a. Consequently the decision
to protect and promote only that precise ideology is currently pushing governments
to discriminate and maltreat other fellow Muslims, although members of different re-
ligious branches. How are Muslim countries supposed to work and improve the rights
18A. M. Sewenet, Interreligious Marriage: Social and Religious Perspectives, in in ≪Imperial Jour-
nal of Interdisciplinary Research≫, 3.6 (2017), p. 358.
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of religious minorities on their territories, if in many cases still they seem not to accept
the existence of even other Muslim ideologies?. Here comes the urgent need to work on
internal issues first, otherwise the declaration of Marrakesh together with many others
legal documents related to the same issues, will not stand a chance at being really
effective.
Moreover, the declaration lacks of a definition for the term “extremism”. According
to Garba, no definition equals having no boundaries between who deserve the hatred
and who does not: “In Muslim societies today, dangerous misinterpretations can arise
from the use of words like “extremist,” “fundamentalist” or “terrorist” to refer to a re-
ligious group. Such labels, as law and religion experts Cole Durham and Brett Scharffs
have observed, may expose such group to discrimination and cruelty by the state or
by the political and religious majority groups in the society (Durham and Scharffs
2010,293–329).” 19 The last issue that the declaration presents, according to the au-
thor, is the lack of explanation on how representatives were chosen and why. To many,
this fact looked like an attempt to somehow hide its true legal power in the eyes of
Muslim countries. Only the total number of representatives was made public together
with the names of the ones who played bigger roles, but this uncertainty surely does
not allow the masses to fully understand who took part to this process and how effec-
tive it can actually be on a legal level.
His eminence Sheikh bin Bayyah concluded the gathering stating how he would
personally ensure the declaration’s implementation and use in the future. Bayyah
promised to share it with Muslim scholars, to teach it in classes and seminars but also
to cooperate with networks and organizations in order to make sure to give it a proper
boost, by convening to the declaration an higher level of legitimacy. Many implemen-
tations have been suggested, especially regarding the so called “priority countries” such
as Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan and many others. Efforts will be put especially
on four different areas: Civil society, education, legislative and policy change and last
but not least religious engagement.
It is fundamental for the future and the success of the Declaration for it to be
19Garba, The Prospects and Problems of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious
Minorities in Muslim Majority Communities, cit., p. 55-59.
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known and cite by media, especially in the Muslim world, where it unfortunately still
is perceived as “for the elite” and not concerning the majority of the citizens. Nowadays
the Document remains idealistic and with low directions on how to achieve its goals.
According to the Special Report, written by Susan Hayward20 for the United States
Institute of Peace a good solution would be to promote countries cooperation and put
together multiple plans for action around the globe, creating a proper “roadmap for
implementation”. The Declaration has legal value and can therefore be used as an
instrument to hold states accountable for their actions. The more the content of the
declaration will be used in defence of minorities rights, the more recognition it will get
in the international framework.
20Senior advisor for religion and inclusive societies at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Hayward leads the
Institute’s efforts to understand religious dimensions of conflict and advance efforts engaging religious




The Declaration as a necessity
In order to understand why this conference was organised in the year 2016 and
why so many countries felt the urge to finally address this social issue right in this his-
torical moment, it would be useful to generally explain what is happening to religious
minorities on a global level but, most importantly, in predominantly Muslim countries.
According to Pew Research center1 religious threats reached their highest level globally
in 2012, especially in North Africa and in The Middle East. In most Muslim countries
around the world, religious minorities are incapable of seeing their fundamental rights
recognized and persecutions, tortures or death sentences based only on religious hatred
touch the life of thousands of people on a daily basis.
First and foremost it is important to define what a minority is and what kind of
features it needs to have in order to be legally considered a minority within a specific
country. Giving a definition to the term is already a struggle, since very important
documents such as the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, display no proper definition for
this kind of community.2 The most recognized definition, even if still not legally bind-
ing, was drafted by Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti in his Study on the rights
of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. His definition is
the following:A group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
1www.pewresearch.org
2G. Gilbert, Religious Minorities and Their Rights: A Problem of Approach, in ≪International
Journal on Minority and Group Rights≫, 5.2(1997), pp. 100-105.
25
State and in a non-dominant position, whose members posses ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and who, if
only implicitly,maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture,
traditions, religion or language.3
Being this the definition for a minority, it is possible to recognize them from the
different treatment that they get from a social and legal perspective but also from the
different features that they present, such as a different skin colour, a different language
or different cultural habits, if compared to the so called “dominant” ethnicity or, in
this case, religion.
Minority rights is a key component of international human rights law but nonethe-
less many minor populations around the globe have been facing existential threats and
legal solutions to protect them are still nowhere to be found. It is fundamental to take
into consideration also the fact that minorities’ issues can be found both in “legal”
context and in “illegal” ones. On one hand, in certain geographical areas, the strong
presence of extremists groups has created a wave of hatred and discrimination that un-
fortunately involves not only minor communities, but also Muslim people themselves;
On the other hand, there are countries whose governments should operate according
to the rule of law, respecting national treaties and applying a non discriminatory legal
system, but instead, they do not make any effort to change the status quo, which
means ruling according to Muslim supremacy, previously established only on the base
of religious hatred or in the attempt to gain political advantages.
2.1 Morocco and its Approach to Religious Free-
dom
As has already been stated, the accepting attitude that the state of Morocco and
its authorities showed in hosting in Marrakesh the entire making process that led to
the creation of the Declaration, has been fundamental. Nonetheless, the declaration
focuses on religious minorities and their treatment in Muslim countries, so it is equally
important to mention, that religious freedom in Morocco as well, remains on some
3J. Pejic,Minority Rights in International Law, in ≪Human Rights Quarterly≫, 19.3(1997), p.16.
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levels an unsolved issue.
According to the Morocco 2018 International Religious Freedom Report4 99% of
the Moroccan population is Sunni Muslim, while the remaining one percent includes
Christians, Baha’i, Jews and Shia Muslims (0.1%). Nowadays there is no data regard-
ing the number of atheist in the Country, while the Baha’i community should count
around 350-400 members. Several other minorities are legally tolerated with different
limitations and degree of restrictions.5 The country of Morocco hosts, participates
and organizes annual events to promote and encourage respect and tolerance among
all religions. Great examples are the two weeks “Morocco: Jews and Art in the Muslim
world” exposition, hold in New York in September 2000, where a royal Jewish Coun-
selor represented King Muhammad VI for the opening ceremony, and the colloquiums
that the king hosts every year during Ramadan, to discuss about tolerance and pro-
mote interfaith dialogue with Muslim scholars.
The approach that Morocco seems to have taken against discrimination and reli-
gious oppression, especially in recent years, is living proof of how open to dialogue its
Government is and how this Country can potentially become a global advocate for
change in the Islamic environment but if religious freedom in Morocco seems to be
reachable, where are the issues? On what do Morocco place restrictions to religious
practice? How important is the traditional sacred law nowadays?.
The preamble of the Moroccan constitution of 2011 explains that “The preeminence
accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attach-
ment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance
and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations
of the world.”, while article 3 specifies that: “Islam is the religion of the State, which
guarantees to all the free exercise of beliefs and cultures.”6
Nonetheless, Modern Morocco still needs to face numerous issues in regards to the
4Annual Report, drafted by the Bureau of democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US De-
partment of States. It provides an annual analysis of status of religious freedom globally and per
Country.
5Human Rights Bureau of Democracy and Labor and the United States Department of State,
Morocco International Religious Freedom Report, in religious-freedom-report.org, 2018.
6J.J Ruchti, Morocco’s Constitution of 2011, in constituteproject.org, 2016.
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acknowledgment of some of the main Human Rights policies, but the presence of a King
as Muhammad VI definitely represents a good starting point. Unfortunately, this lack
of Human Rights attention does not involve only religious minorities, but also bigger
parts of the population, such as the female side. On a social level Moroccan women
are still suffering different forms of legal and cultural discrimination, partly because
of the existence of the Code of Personal status, also known as Mudawana. The Mu-
dawana became legal in 1958, two years after Morocco’s indipendence, and was then
reformed in 1993, although women still report a strong level of unequal behaviour in
their regards, particularly since the above mentioned document has been regulating
topics such as marriage, divorce, family planning and inheritance. Thanks to the tran-
scendent feminist wave, which from the beginning of the 90’s pressed the government
for reforms on the Moroccan Mudawana, some modest changes have been made and
the document seems to better adjust to International human right law. Despite this
changes, lot of work is still needed and every request considered as fully equal was
either immediately rejected or quickly considered not worth mentioning. In 2004, un-
der the guidance of King Muhammad VI, the Mudawana was againg slightly modified,
ensuring more rights and security for women. For the first time in history, thanks to
the king’s contribution, sexual violence was recognized as a crime and the minimum
legal age for women to get married was raised from 15 to 18 years old.
Muhammad VI graduated in law from Mohammed V University in Rabat in 1985.
Starting from the 70’s, he had already begun to replace his father in official trips
abroad as a Prince, participating in several meetings and national and international
conferences. His Majesty the King is considered to be the Head of State, ”Amir Al
Mouminine” Commander of the Believers and supreme arbiter among all institutions
of the country. Legislative power in the Kingdom of Morocco is attributed to a Par-
liament composed of two Chambers: the House of Representatives and the House of
Councillors. Their members receive their mandate from the nation by election. The
House of Councilors is composed of 270 members elected by indirect ballot to represent
the economic and social institutions, as well as all local communities.7
Muhammad VI became king on the 23rd of July 1999, shortly after the death of
7www.ambasciatamarocco.it/sistema-politico/
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his father Hasan. Generally King Mohammad VI promotes a more moderate political
line. As soon as he inherited his father’s role, he promised to work on all economical,
educational and social issues that were affecting the country, declaring the end of the
political line brought on from the previous King. Politically, he opened up to dialogue
with the opposition by releasing numerous political prisoners and by giving permis-
sion to a number of political opponents to come back from exile.8 The Constitution
places limitations on all Islamic organizations that seem to have turned into political
in nature, crossing the boundaries of pure religious practice. The only extra restric-
tions that the Government places regard the use of certain religious materials and the
process of conversion from Islam to other faiths. Between the 1998 and the first half of
1999 the entry to Morocco was denied to some foreigners because they were carrying
christian materials, and the same is reported to be happened in April 2018, when the
police detained a men for 24 hours with the accuse of having christian literature in
his backpack. Christians can actually freely build new churches, schools and hospitals,
since the time of the French Protectorate, although rights still need to be established
on the topic of Christian marriage, the right for children to decline Islamic classes at
school and the possibility of using biblical names.
The Islamic traditional law calls for punishment every Muslim who is willingly de-
ciding to convert to another faith and as a matter of fact these citizens, in Morocco
as well, still do face some social ostracism and might also have gone through some
detention or questioning processes, the last ones reported being in 2018. Such events
happened on the basis of references to the Koranic law, since neither the civil nor the
criminal law in Morocco consider conversion as a crime. The Bahai’i community is still
living under complicated circumstances, with their faith still considered to be hereti-
cal. Since 1983 they have been obliged not to take part to public communal activities
and consequently not to practise their faith openly and freely. Nowadays, the Baha’i
still fear to be harmed by “extremists” in the country and the need to practice their
religion behind curtains, away from public spaces.
In conclusion, in Morocco as well total religious freedom seems to be a work in
progress and a fully equitable situation between all religious communities is nowhere
8www.ambasciatamarocco.it/biografia-di-sua-maesta-il-re-mohammed-vi/
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in sight. The biggest hope for all kinds of minorities globally, lies on the creation of a
proper legal system capable of defending their rights and on the growth of an interna-
tional recognition of their condition from both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.
2.2 Religious Freedom in Iraq
Considering the strong presence of extremist groups in the territory as fertile ground
for minorities issues to grow, the situation suffered by Kurdish Yezidis in Iraq is one
worth of mention. Kurdistan, like many other regions in that area of the world, was
politically and geographically divided in multiple occasions, also against the people’s
will. The latest time that Kurdistan (“Land of the Kurds”) was divided, happened to
be in 1923 with the Lausanne Treaty, which shaped the region the way we know it
today. With the Lausanne Treaty, Modern Iraq was placed under the British mandate
and the city of Mosul, birth place of the feud between Muslim and Kurds, was divided
into four governorates: Mosul with an Arab majority, Erbil and Sulaimaniya with a
Kurdish majority, and Kirkuk with a Turkmen majority, except in some of its northern
parts.
After the Iraqi Parliament signed the Iraqi-British Treaty in 1924, with a majority
of 37 members in favour and 24 against, Sulaimaniya became part of Iraq. From the
very beginning of the British mandate, the English government was not capable of
ensuring to the Kurds members of the population their political and cultural rights,
particularly the right to use their own language. Great Britain instead, decided to
exploit this feud in order to fulfil their own goals, meaning that they used Kurdish
discontent as a bargaining counter, through which exert pressure on successive Iraqi
governments, in an attempt to force them to sign long-term agreements and treaties
that served British interests alone.
Only when the Monarchy was established in Iraq, the regime felt the need to adopt
concrete political measures in regards to the Kurds by accepting them in senior po-
sitions into the power structure, although not in a fully equal way. The Monarchy,
in fact, still distinguished two “types” of Kurds: the “loyal Kurds”, which could be
granted with power and freedom, and the “opposition Kurds”, which could not be
accepted or allowed to participate in the political life of the country. The Kurdish
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situation did not change also during the first republican regime.
Iraq-Iran war of 1980 did not bring any improvement to the Kurdish sufferings. By
the end of the war Iraq registered a 60 billions worth of debt and the Iraqi govern-
ment soon found out that former Kurds leaders had taken the decision to collaborate
with Iran during the war, giving them new excuses to perpetuate injustice, oppression,
killings and deportations. It was only in 1991 that Iraqi authorities, army, civil service
and police finally withdrew from the region, leaving KOP (Kurdish Democratic Party)
and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) politically in power. Nonetheless, the two
parties were not in good terms and a civil war broke out in the years between 1994
and 1998, a fight that was solved by the US, who brokered a ceasefire in September
1998. In October 2002 the reunified Parliament of the Kurdish state declared Iraqi
Kurdistan a federal state, the first and for now only independent Kurdish territory.9
The Encyclopedia Britannica reports a complete and inclusive definition of who
the Yazidis are and where they are generally located: Yazīdī, also spelled Yezīdī, Azīdī,
Zedī, Izadī, Êzidî, or Yazdani, member of a Kurdish religious minority found primarily
in northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, the Caucasus region, and parts
of Iran. The Yazīdī religion includes elements of ancient Iranian religions as well as
elements of Judaism, Nestorian Christianity, and Islam. Although scattered and prob-
ably numbering only between 200,000 and 1,000,000, the Yazīdīs have a well-organized
society, with a chief sheikh as the supreme religious head and an emir, or prince, as
the secularhead. 10
August 3 2019 marked 5 years since the 74th genocide in the history of the Yazidis
of Iraq, led by the most brutal Jihadist organization in History: the Daesh, local name
for ISIS. Yazidism is recognized internationally as one of the oldest Kurdish religions
in the East11. Yazidism is an ancient monotheistic religion and one of its key aspect
lays on how Yazidis distinguish and to whom they attribute the presence of good and
evil on Earth. Yazidis believe in just one source of good and evil and in the power
of people’s choice, which eventually determines where good and evil are found. The
9S. N. Jawad, The Kurdish question in Iraq: historical background and future settlement, in




religious figure of the Arch-Angel Melek Taus, often depicted as a peacock, guides
humanity when it comes to make a decision. According to Islam “... the arch-angel
refuses to bow down to Adam out of sinful pride and subsequently falls from the grace
of God. After this, he continues to try and corrupt mankind through temptation and
other means. In Yazidism however, the angel does refuse to bow down to Adam, is
expelled from Heaven, but cries for 7,000 years until his tears of repentance quench
the fires of Hell. In the Yazidi faith therefore, Melek Taus is redeemed in the eyes of
God and continues to serve as a medium between mankind and God”12. From these
different religious interpretations comes the idea that Yazidis worship the devil, which
consequently causes a huge amount of religious discrimination against the Kurdish mi-
nority.
The Yazidis community has been the target of extremely violent attacks through-
out history, two of the worst ones being in the villages of Kataniya and Jazira and
in Mosul, respectively in 2007 and 2014. On August 14th 2007, terrorists inflicted
a devastating coordinated attack detonating simultaneously four truck-bombs, killing
more that 500 people and wounding over a thousand between Kataniya and Jazira. No
one has been held responsible or arrested for the attack but presumably al-Quaeda was
behind it.13 By 2014, the conflict in Syria had been going on for a number of years and
it was during that period that what was known as ISI became ISIS, increasing its ter-
ritory into Syria and Iraq. In a matter of a weekend they conquered the city of Mosul
by force, and in Kocho, district of the Singer, Northern Iraq, the organization arrived
in a morning of the beginning of August. The Yazidi’s issue is led only by religious
hatred and for religious matters, since, according to the people of al-Baghdadi, they
are a minority that do not deserve to live, unless they deny their faith and embrace
Islam. They gave only to men the possibility to choose between death and conversion,
while women were deported, raped, enslaved or sold as goods. In the various episodes
of the attack of those days, 3100 Yazidi died and another 6800 were kidnapped14.
The tragedy has left this minority alone, divided and lost, even from a political
12Van Zoonen, Wirya,The Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict, cit., p. 9.
13D. van Zoonen, K. Wirya,The Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict, in ≪Middle
East Research Institute≫, 2017, pp. 3-12.
14www.affarinternazionali.it/segnalazioni/genocidio-degli-yazidi-simone-zoppellaro/
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point of view and to the present day the issue still has no solution; many affirm that
there can be no future for them in Iraq and that is why law is now more needed than
ever. Declarations such as that created in Morocco in 2016 need to be recognized and
legalized, to make a difference both in critical and conflicted circumstances and in more
conservative nations where the alleged supremacy of the Muslim doctrine damages the
well being of smaller religious communities. This is the case of the Baha’i in Iran and
the Christian community in Pakistan.
2.3 Religious freedom in Pakistan and Iran
Pakistan, as well as Iran, is overwhelmingly Muslim, although the Christians make
up the 1.6 percent of the population. Since the creation of the State of Pakistan,
the circumstances for minorities in the country are so unbearable, that the percent-
age of minor religious communities dropped from 15 to 4 percent. Minorities issues
in Pakistan mainly come from the strong blasphemy law that the country adopts,
which means that legally, every act or faith that goes against Muhammad’s will is
considered to be punishable with death or life imprisonment. Through the objective
resolution number 11 of 194915, the same fundamental rights guaranteed to Muslims,
were guaranteed to non-Muslim citizens as well, but the regime of Zia al-Haqq ini-
tiated, between 1977 and 1988 in Pakistan, a process of gradual Islamicization that
has still not mitigated. In 1973, year of the last revision of Pakistan’s constitution,
Islam became Pakistan’s state religion and constitutionally, Prime Ministers can be
only Muslims. Since then, Christians in Pakistan have been living in an atmosphere
of hostility, categorized as “persona non grata”, discriminated and persecuted on all
fronts. Nonetheless, Christians who are currently living in that area, cannot be con-
sidered as ahl-al-Dhimma16, since they were already present in Pakistan in 1945, after
15In March 1949, the first Constituent Assembly led by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan,
passed the objectives resolution, one of the most important constitutional documents in Pakistan’s
history. The document was drafted as a guideline, in terms of principles and values, for all the
future Constitutions of the country. M. A. Shahzad (International Islamic University), The Objectives
Resolutions, in ≪Islamic studies≫, 48.1(2009), p. 89.
16Subjects to the Muslim state by virtue of having been conquered.
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the II World War, when the sub-continent was partitioned.
Discrimination against religion minorities in Pakistan can be particularly identified
among two social aspects: law and education. In 1991, the council of Islamic ideology
and the enforcement of the Shari’a act led to a profound Islamicisation of the legal
system in the country, which deeply compromised the position of religious minorities in
front of the law. The act’s enforcement officially declared mandatory for all judges to
be Muslims and for non-Muslim testimonies to be considered as secondary in legal cir-
cumstances. Moreover, Pakistan’s penal code is famous for being a bastion of Islamism
and quite often its judicial system has proved to be easy to distort. Judges tend to be
threatened by the police, secret services or extremist movements, hence the Christian
have been demanding for legal cases involving Christian marriage or divorce to be
managed only by Christian judges. A key factor in the promotion of religious equality
and inter-religious harmony is education. The whole educational system in Pakistan
is compromised by bias and religious intolerance, creating a general feeling of hostility
also among young citizens. As pointed out by the Justice and Peace Commission of
the Roman Catholic Church of Pakistan, school texts are not based on democratic
values, and educational material is generally insensitive towards religious differences
and minorities, not only in a matter of religious subjects, but also in history, civic
and social studies. Interesting phenomenon in Pakistan is also the presence of proper
Christian villages, which point to some kind of ghettoisation of Christians all over the
country. There are at least two dozen of these villages in Pakistan, nonetheless in 1997
a group of Christians were evicted with the apparent blessing of the police, who had
been harassing them while openly asking them to leave the country.
Despite the presence of proper Christian villages, most of the violence throughout
the decades has been against Christian institutions, and since the 90’s the attacks have
largely intensified. On 8 December 1992 a mob of 5000 men attacked the Sacred Heart
Church in Kemani, allegedly mistaken for a Hindu Temple, while on January 2004 the
Pakistan Bible Society building suffered a grenade attack. On 28 October 2001, five
militant Muslims attacked the congregation of the St Dominic Church in Bhawalpuri,
killing 16 worshippers including 8 children, while at the end of 2005 a mob of 3000
had destroyed three Churches in Sangla, near Lahore, attacked two Christian schools, a
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hostel and a convent after false allegations that a copy of the Qu’ran had been burnt.17
Surely, the attacks on institutions have created an atmosphere of fear among the
Christian community in Pakistan, but the events happened in Gojra, Punjab, were
supposed to become the most famous ones internationally. In 2009, in Gojra, churches
and houses were burnt and nearly 10 people burnt alive, during a religious mob, fol-
lowing the alleged desecration of the Koran by the Christian community. In this case
though, the reasons under all this hatred are not exclusively religious, but also polit-
ical. Some journalists and scholars see the growing violence as a message to Muslim
countries that seem to have become too friendly with the West, but also as an issue
linked to the war in Afghanistan, led by the Americans.18
In 1979 the revolution in Iran overthrew the regime of the Shah. Contrary to
popular belief, the revolution was the result of a mass rebellion against a corrupt rule,
which involved a large part of the Iranian citizenship. It was only towards the end of
the revolutionary process that Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile, seized
political control over the country, promising to be a true, moral and independent ruler.
Although Khomeini did promise to restore justice, equality and to stop external in-
volvements into Iranian affairs, he proved himself to be a brutal ruler, imposing his
theology and his decisions on the regime even while heavily criticized by many clerics
and scholars.
Definite statistics on religious minorities in Iran are difficult to obtain, but mul-
tiple sources claim that in the country there are: 13,000 Chaldean, Latin and Arme-
nian Catholics; 122,000 Armenian, Assyrian and Greek orthodox Christians; and 8,500
Protestants. In addition, there are 300,000 Baha’is, number that makes it the biggest
non-Muslim community in the country.19 In Iran specifically, the roots of religious
hatred and discrimination can be classified under two different lights; their legal status
on one hand, and the way the state actually treat them on the other.
Legally, Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution recognises Christianity, Judaism and
17G. Theodore, Christian Citizens in an Islamic State: The Pakistan Experience, Ashgate Publish-
ing, London 2007, pp. 41-57.
18www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35910331
19D. Kirkham, State Responses to Minority Religions, Routledge, New York 2013, p. 34.
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Zoroastrianism as minority religions, which means that these communities are allowed
to use their own language in religious practice, establish charitable associations and to
have their own educational system. Ipso facto, the constitution points to the persecu-
tion of all the minority groups that are not included in article 13, such as the Baha’i
community. Unfortunately, article 13 is not the only one that can lead to discrimi-
nation and hatred; articles 12, 167 and 168 allow more forms of legal discrimination
on some religious minorities due to Shari’a laws.20 Concretely, these articles of the
constitution deal with issues such as the credibility of testimonies of non-Muslim in
court and the illegality of Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.
As weak as Iranian legal measures to ensure fundamental rights for religious minori-
ties can be, their actual treatment has been proved to be even more brutal. Two groups
in particular remain extremely vulnerable: Christians with Muslim backgrounds and
the Baha’i. Founded a century and a half ago, the Bahá’í faith is one of the fastest
growing religions in the world. With more than five million believers in at least 233
countries, it has already become the second most widespread faith after Christianity.21
The most important feature of the Bahá’í lies in the composition of its community,
which includes over 2100 different ethnic and tribal groups, all with the most different
professional, social and economical background. The hatred and persecutions against
this community in Iran have ancient roots: in the 19th century, the Iranian clerical
class felt threatened by a new religion, which was the Babi religion, precursor of the
Baha’i faith. The Bab (gate) was the founder of the spiritual movement and he claimed
to be not only the twelfth imam awaited by the Shi’is, but also a messenger and bearer
of a new revelation. Unfortunately, the Bab’s claim and Muslim’s core belief that
20“Sharia as ideal alludes to the religious and metaphysical principle of a divine plan for human
beings and their society. In this sense, the term has a strong motivating and mobilizing meaning,
for example, as a plea for greater justice or against corruption. [...] Sharia is religious law and
therefore concerns precepts of belief. Even where this finds expression in formal, national law, the
individual believer or an Islamic movement can find his/her/its own interpretations for rules to live
by and be able to employ them in fulfillment of – or in deviation from – the formal law in place.”
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, Dynamism in Islamic Activism: Reference
Points for Democratization and Human Rights, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2007, pp.
111-113.
21Kirkham, State Responses to Minority Religions, cit., pp. 33-39.
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Muhammad was “the seal of the prophet” and Islam the ultimate religion, could not
coexist together. The Bab was firstly imprisoned and then publicly executed in June
1850 in Tabriz. Years later Bahá’u’lláh, a Persian nobleman from Tehran, who in the
mid-nineteenth century left a princely, comfortable and secure existence for a life of
persecution and deprivation in order to proclaim himself as the new and independent
Messenger of God, gathered the Baha’i remnant and founded the Baha’i faith.
With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, persecution became system-
atic: more than 200 Bahá’í have been executed or killed, hundreds more imprisoned
and tens of thousands left without jobs, pensions and study opportunities. All Bahá’í
national administrative structures have been banned by the government and all sa-
cred sites, mausoleums and cemeteries have been confiscated, vandalized or destroyed.
Thousand of members of the Bahá’í community have been persecuted only on a reli-
gious hatred basis. Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and elsewhere have always consid-
ered the Bahá’í as a threat to Islam, and its followers as heretics, based on moral and
theological reasons. The idea that both the revelation and the line of prophets were
progressive, made of Muhammad not the ultimate prophet but a figure in a chain of
revealers of divine will. This chain included not only Jesus, but also the founders of
many religions that Islam does not recognise, such as Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and
Buddhism.22
When ten Baha’i young women were arrested in Iran for teaching their doctrine
to children, and then condemned to death for not converting to Islamism, their fight
against persecutions finally reached every corner of the globe. Thousands of newspa-
per articles about the situation of the Bahá’í in Iran appeared on a global level and
important international organizations, including the European Parliament, approved
resolutions condemning or at least expressing concern about the situation of the Bahá’í
in the country. Most importantly, the Commission on Human Rights, the General As-
sembly on Human Rights and the General Assembly of the United Nations urged the
Iranian government to respect international human rights conventions.
As a result of international criticism, the most violent aspects of the persecutions
22F. Kazemzadeh, The Baha’is in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression, in ≪Social Research≫, 67.2
(2000), pp. 537-539.
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ceased in the early 1990s. Iran’s Bahá’í are still fighting for their rights to freely prac-
tise their religion, and international efforts to achieve their full emancipation are still
on the go.23 The same can be said about the Christian community in Pakistan.
2.4 Religious freedom in Turkey
The historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire and especially the post-Ottoman
period, with its lack of democracy and external impositions of autocrats, has pushed
the condition of minorities in the Middle East towards their exclusion. For Turkey,
the threat of Western powers dismembering the country after World War I surely
had an impact on the way they treat and have been treating minorities in the past.
Since Turkey’s foundation its treatment towards minorities has changes multiple times,
alternating periods of repression and discrimination with times of accommodation and
near inclusion. In regards to the question of religious minorities, the Kurdish case
surely represents the most brutal example of their treatment in the country, although
they are not the only ethnic minority that was excluded from the building of the
Turkish Republic.
The Alevis, considered as “heterodox” Muslim for being part of the Shi’a tradition,
were religiously discriminated since the only form of Islam recognized by the Turkish
Republic was Sunni Islam. Although spiritually excluded from the building process
of the new Republic, Turkey put some efforts into their cultural inclusion, in order to
prove and publicly display Turkey’s “cultural diversity”. In Turkish Republican history
there is always been a contradiction regarding the Alevis, since on one side they are
displayed as a fundamental element of Turkish folkloric heritage, while on the other
political and religious hostility towards them still persists.
The history behind the relationship between Kurds and Turks in Turkey has deep
roots and can be divided into three chronological phases:
• The original phase of repression of the 20th century (mainly cause by the PKK
insurgency since 1984).
• The Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU of 1999 caused new proposi-
23www.bahai.com/ibahai/
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tions to include Kurds in the Turkish society.
• The current phase of hostility, allegedly began in 2011, but especially since sum-
mer 2015.24
At the birth of the new Turkish Republic only Armenian, Catholics, Greek Ortho-
dox and Jews were legally recognized by the regime, leaving the large ethnic Kurdish
minority out, purely on the belief that it could have been a threat to the newborn
nation. Founders of the Turkish Republic considered the presence of an ethnically
heterogeneous society as a feature capable of making a nation weak, preferring to fol-
low the nationalist European model of one language, one nation, one state. Since the
beginning of the Turkish state the main goal was to assimilate Kurds to Turks, causing
the loss of their language and cultural identity. When and where uprisings happened,
the government neutralized them through arrests, deportations, executions of leaders
or simply supporting the Kurdish feudal landowning class in order for them to block
any desire of rebellion among their communities.
In 1974, as a reaction to years of repression and assimilation, a group of Kurdish
activists known as the Revolutionaries of Kurdistan started a campaign for Kurdish
rights, which led o the foundation of PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in 1978. In
1983, a new law, which prohibited the use of Kurdish language in the expression and
dissemination of thoughts, was incorporated into the constitution, pushing the PKK
towards a full scale insurgency that officially started in 1984. The war has been causing
the death of almost 40,000 people, passing through several periods of escalation, which
involved civilians especially in the southern areas of the country.
The second phase of the Turkish-Kurds relationship’s history started in 2002 when
the AKP (Justice and Development party), first moderate Islamist party to attain
power in Turkey, without unleashing an immediate response from the military. Since
1999, year of the Turkish EU candidacy, the nation had already been going through a
phase of democratization, in which even the Prime Minister of the time, Mesut Yilmaz,
started expressing the need to create a new more supportive approach to the Kurdish
question. The new AKP was mainly made up of Black Turks, a more religious part of
24M. Geri, Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries: Turkey and Indonesia, Palgrave
Macmillan, Norfolk 2018, p. 81.
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the population, generally coming from East Anatolia, and more similar to the people
of the Kurdistan area. Therefore, Erdogan in particular, pushed for the recognition of
the Kurdish identity. Books in Kurdish became legal, under previous control from the
government and Kurdish broadcasting was allowed on TRT for 30 minutes a week.
Despite these improvements regarding the treatment of the Kurdish minority,
democracy in Turkey was always gradually, in small but powerful steps and through
the presence of civil society organizations and a well balanced economical system.
Thanks to the wealth, generated by smart and strategic economic performances, the
new broader middle class started to push for an active civil society, without which
democracy could not exist. Since the day AKP came to power, particularly between
2002 and 2014, Turkish economy tripled in size while the party kept winning and grow-
ing in size and number of supporters.
In 2007, once acknowledged the support that the party was gaining, its elites began
to infiltrate civilians and military institutions, probably helped by internal oppositions
and enemies of Erdogan. The whole scandal, together with many conspiracy theories
on the AKP, such as the alleged existence of a “deep state”, culminated in a plot,
known as Ergenekon, to overthrow the AKP, caused the arrest of hundreds of people,
especially retired military personnel. In 2014, Erdogan became President in a direct
election from the population and as a result of a change in the Constitution, but he
was forced to work on his strategy by two international events that happened around
that time: the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, from which ISIS arose in 2013.
The Arab spring caused the AKP to worry about possible internal repercussions, con-
sidering the general youth frustration towards the Turkish regime, but the civil war
in Syria and the uprising of ISIS were a threat not only to a party but, ontologically,
to the entire system. Suddenly it seemed possible, for an independent organization
as ISIS, to create its own space inside another nation, deeply corrupting its strength
and unity. This fact, pushed the AKP to go back to inequality and discrimination, in
order to maintain a unified regime and protect the country from the possible birth of
a Kurdish area on national ground.
Scholars today do not consider Turkey as an effective democracy, but more as an
“hybrid regime” of democracy and autocracy, idea that seems to be confirmed by all
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the difficulties that the nation is facing regarding its acceptance as member of the
European Union.25 The Turkish constitution as well, has been going through changes
over time, sometimes improving the condition of religious minorities, and some others
showing clear signs of inequality and discrimination. The constitution of 1924 states
that: “The religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam”, even if the Lausanne Peace treaty
of 1923, which formally established the Republic of Turkey, recognizes the existence of
religious minorities and makes references regarding their protection and fundamental
rights. Article 39 of the treaty states that: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim
minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims. All the inhabitants
of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the Law”. In fact, Mus-
lim in Turkey make up the 98 percent of the population, while the remaining 2 percent
is made up of Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Jews and Syrian Christian, which
are the only minorities that the government recognize.
Nonetheless, since 1936, minorities have been facing issues with property owner-
ship, education and renovation or expansion of their worship places. Although in 2008
the Parliament did pass an amendment, expanding religious freedoms and ensuring
free water and electricity for Mosques and Synagogues equally, multiple obstacles are
still preventing to a party to openly and freely defend religious minorities, both for the
presence of strong public opinions on the issue, and since they are still perceived as a
threat.26.
2.5 Religious Freedom in Indonesia
Indonesia’s population is famous for being one of the most multicultural in the
world. Nowadays, Indonesia counts 1,128 ethnic groups, all linked to their own cul-
ture, dialects, belief system and language. Despite this kind of cultural background,
Indonesia recognises only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism,
Buddhism and Confucianism. In order to ensure fundamental human rights to as many
25M. Geri, Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries: Turkey and Indonesia, Palgrave
Macmillan, Norfolk 2018. pp. 79-95.
26A. Hetzke, The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, Oxford University Press, Oxford
2013, pp. 270-285.
41
religious or ethnic minorities as possible, the UN accepts minority status according to
both subjective and objective criteria, meaning that a minority can be identified as
such, when its members:“(1) share common religion, (2) share a common desire to
preserve their religion, (3) they are numerically inferior, (4) they are citizens of the
state, (5) they are in a non-dominant position.”27
The latter is in Indonesia the most subject to debate, since the concept of non-
dominant can be interpreted in different ways. Seeing it as lack of state recognition
would imply that every belief group that Indonesia does not officially recognise is in
fact a minority. The term may also simply encompass any religious or ethnic group
whose belief is considered to be outside of mainstream from the most important civil-
religion doctrine of the country, which is the principle of Belief in One and Only God.
The principle was present and considered in many pivotal points of the Indone-
sian history, such as the drafting of its first Constitution in 1945. It was Soekarno,
first president of Indonesia, who envisioned the country as an independent state whose
population was to be united in front of the Almighty God. Soekarno believed the fact
of praising God to be part of the human race since the beginning of civilization, firstly
as Gods of nature, and then as invisible force in control of all material universe. In an
effort to incorporate Soekarno’s idea, that the belief in God was part of Indonesia’s
identity, into the Constitution, its drafters included this principle in article 29, creat-
ing tough critics. Article 29 is supposed to foster intolerance towards smaller belief
systems and to fight for religious harmony at the expense of religious freedom.
At the end of November 1967, the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs Muham-
mad Dahlan spoke about religious harmony during The first Inter-religion Conference,
giving the following definition: “Religious harmony is a situation in which the relation
of religious followers is based on toleration, understanding, respect, equality in prac-
tising religious teachings and cooperation in social and national life under the unitary
state of Indonesia and the Constitution”28 This approach towards religious harmony
has changed over time in multiple occasions, but there are three widespread assump-
tions that survives, no matter which implementation the Ministry of Religious Affairs
or the Parliament have done over the years: (1) Religion is seen and perceived as a
27Kirkham, State Responses to Minority Religions, cit., p. 66.
28Kirkham, State Responses to Minority Religions, cit., p. 69.
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potential source of conflict; (2) There must be no clashes of interests between Religious
clerics and followers; and (3) Religious harmony must be protected, maintained and
controlled by the state. In conclusion, the whole concept is focused on the protection
of national stability, rather then creating actual religious freedom, and every social
elements that concerns the survival of religious harmony, must be handled by the gov-
ernment.
The government of Indonesia has been stating for decades that most religious intol-
erance cases in the country deal with innocuous conflicts, however the Wahid Institute
of Religious Freedom and Tolerance is on a different page. On their report of 2011 on
religious freedom they found out that many cases of discrimination deal with far more
severe restrictions, such as worship, hate speech, violent threats, forced conversion,
heresy and blasphemy. In fact, although even according to Indonesian law, all beliefs
should deserve respect, this is no the case for the aliran kepercayaan community. This
community involves multiple mystical beliefs systems, which include animist, Hindu-
Buddhist, and Islamic, linked together by a meditational path that seems to be more
spiritual than properly religious.
In 1953, the Ministry of Religious Affairs reported that the aliran community did
not deserve legal protection, since their belief could not be considered legitimate. in
1955, after Indonesia’s first elections, the whole community mobilized against the gov-
ernment, forming a coalition called BKKI. The BKKI was left alone for years, until the
Indonesian Communist Party decided to publicly defend them in order to gain support.
When the communists were deflated, the end of this alliance left the community even
more vulnerable and exposed than in the past and all previous efforts to gain some
legal recognition came to and end. The Indonesian Government recognizes the right
to follow Aliran Kepercayaan, as long as its practitioners do not upset the public order
or offend the sensitivities of the followers of the major religions, even if their actual
social status remains unclear.
very interesting in Indonesia is also the presence of Bakor Pakem, which is a branch
of the Attorney’s General Office that is meant to monitor all religious beliefs that could
harm or endanger society and the regime itself. Bakor Pakem can work closely with
the police, the military, local governments and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
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exist to prevent religious minorities from gaining “too much” independence.
In conclusion, both Indonesia’s government and its mayor religious communities
consider religious minorities as threat to public order and social life. Religious and
cultural differences keep leading to tension, hatred, discrimination and killings in the
absence of governmental preventive action. Progress is to be made, and the regime
must take it upon itself, without considering sizes, numbers or influence among reli-
gious groups, and progress will happen only when the focus will shift from religious
harmony to religious freedom.29
Genocides, killings, rapes and tortures are still happening in many countries only
for religious reasons and many nations seem not to be able to recognize the gravity of
the situation from the Human Rights perspective. The need of legal remedies and rules
for Minorities’ issues is stronger than ever and maybe what has been said and done in
Morocco in January 2016 can finally put a proper spotlight on this humanitarian crisis
and start a real effort in finding concrete solutions.
29Kirkham, State Responses to Minority Religions, cit., pp. 65-80.
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Chapter 3
The Declaration and its Translation
Process
3.1 The Translation of a Legal Document
In the last few decades the increasing levels of contacts between countries and the
phenomenon of globalization has been requiring an higher demand in the translation of
legal documents, which has gained a fundamental role especially within the European
Union. The EU has, nowadays, 23 official languages and also is under obligation to
guarantee to its citizens the maximum level of multilingualism possible. Difficulties in
legal translation can already be found in the translation of the term “law” itself: Are
the English term “Rule of Law”, the French term “Etat de Droit” and the German
term “Rechtstaat” fully equivalents?.1
Translation can be divided into 3 categories: general translation, literary trans-
lation and specialist or technical translation. Legal translation belongs to the last
category and it is normally referred to as a translation activity that involves language
for special purposes (LSP) in the context of language for legal purposes (LLP). Legal
translation can be then classified according to many criteria, the most important being
according to the subject, the function and the purpose of the legal document.
Different methods must be adopted according to the subject of the legal text that
we need to translate, since there is a difference in content and style between statutes,
1D. Cao, Translating Law, Multilingual Matters, Toronto (2007), p. 3-4.
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treaties, private legal documents, legal scholarly work and case law. Documents such
as regulations, codes or contract are identified as primary prescriptive texts, while
pleadings, briefs, appeals or petitions present more descriptive features. Generally, in
Europe, all bilingual or multilingual translations for normative purposes have equal
legal power among all members and once translated they go through precise authenti-
cation processes prescribed by law.2
Generally speaking, Law is not universal but tied to a specific national legal sys-
tem, which means that every single piece of legal documentation makes reference to
a specific legal system, that may present contrasts or differences with other countries.
Comparative lawyers have classified mayor legal systems into different categories. Ac-
cording to lawyers David and Brierley (1985), these previously mentioned categories
are seven: Romano-germanic law, Common Law, Socialist law, Hindu law, Islamic
law, African law and Far East law3. Eighty percent of nations belong to the two most
influential legal families, which are the Romano-germanic (also known as Civil law)
and the Common law. Legally speaking, the Common law focuses on facts, it is based
on extracting rules from events, of which analysis generally determines the purpose of
the rule itself. On the other hand, Civil law traces legal history, it identifies patterns
and determine for each new rule a domain of application and validity. Despite their
systematic differences, translation is not impossible and these two legal families are
not totally incompatible, even if the role that each legal family has in each nation
represents one of the mayor sources of difficulty in legal translation.
Legal language is linguistically classified as a sub-language, which means a lan-
guage that follows its own pragmatic, syntactic and semantic rules. Nevertheless the
main issue in not essentially linguistic, but actually lies in the “invisible” layers of legal
communication: unstated conventions. Legal matters have developed their structure
to meet the demands of the country in which they are built, meaning that each legal
language is the product of a specific culture and history. Linguistically speaking, a
translator can find difficulties in finding good equivalents, in maintaining the same
style of the original and in correctly transposing legal content from one culture to an-
other.
2Cao, Translating Law, cit., pp. 13-15.
3Cao, Translating Law, cit., pp. 23-28.
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Gotti (2016) in his literal production talks about legal translation more as a trans-
position than only a translation, since legal translator must overcome not only linguistic
barriers but cultural ones as well, when reproducing a TL version of a text written for
an SL audience. 4
For all the reasons mentioned above, the most important feature of a good legal
translation is the presence of a good level of adequacy, which means that, in some
cases, the final result must be adapted to a new legal system, but most importantly
must result comprehensible to a culturally new audience. This kind of formulations
generally present a very precise a specific goal, that must be maintained throughout
the translation process; the message that the original text aims to transmit to its read-
ers must be equally effective and clear in the translated version, no matter how many
linguistic contrasts there might be between TL and SL.
Recent translation studies developed by experts such as Hurtado Albir (2002), and
Gerardo Vazquez Ayora (2002) proved the difference between translation methods,
strategies and techniques. The term translation method refers to the general way in
which a translation can be carried out, meaning an attitude that the translator adopts,
depending on the topic, the aim and the target audience of the text he is working on.
Whatever method the translator chooses, different problems and difficulties can be
encountered during the translation process, and it is in those circumstances that he
needs to possess some translation strategies. The translator needs to activate the best
existing translation strategies, depending on the challenge he is about to face. In the
light of the above, translation techniques are: [...]procedures to analyse and classify
how translation equivalence works. They have five basic characteristics:
1) They affect the result of the translation
2) They are classified by comparison with the original
3) They affect micro-units of text
4) They are by nature discursive and contextual
5) They are functional”5
4M. Gotti,The translation of legal texts: Interlinguistic and Intralinguistic perspectives, in ≪Journal
of English for specific Purposes at Tertiary Level≫, 4.1(2016), p.7.
5L. Molina and A. H. Albir,Translation Techniques Revisited: A Dynamic and Functionalist Ap-
proach, in ≪Meta Journal des traducteurs≫, 47.4(2002), pp. 507-509.
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The main Translation techniques that have been used throughout the entire trans-
lation process, are now listed and individually explained.
First of all, a general attitude of “good faith”, which refers to the translator’s
ability and effort in trying to convey the same meaning, especially when an exact cor-
respondence is nowhere to be found. It is fundamental for a translator to remember,
particularly in legal contexts, that the main goal is to stick as much as possible to the
sense of the source text, since the final effect needs to be equal in both languages. This
phenomenon is known as the act of “domestication“ of text “...where the former seeks
to evoke a sense of the foreign” while the latter involves assimilation to the TL culture
and is intended to ensure immediate comprehension”.
Generally speaking, the act of domestication or adaptation of the text is applied
in three circumstances: firstly, when elements of the text that we are translating are
unknown to the target culture, this issue can be solved by adding a classifier or chang-
ing terms into something more familiar to the target audience. Secondly, when we
are talking about historical events, since history cannot be modified or influenced by
cultural features. In this second case, the META journal des traducteurs suggests to
stick to a more “letter by letter” translation, in order to avoid any cultural influence.6
Finally, adaptation must be applied in case of translation of cultural processes, where
the audience might also need the aid of explicating footnotes or appendixes to add
some context to what he or she is reading.
One of the most famous and used translation techniques, especially in a legal con-
text is the use of “frozen” terminology, particularly when the translation work needs
to present the highest level of equivalence to the source text possible. The “frozen“
patterns or ”routines“ are fixed and well-known terms’ equivalents, globally accepted
by the legal community, that translators often use when in front of specific terms or
expressions. An example of routine, from Italian to English, is the translation of the
expression ‘Salvo che la legge disponga altrimenti’, which is commonly translated as
‘Unless otherwise provided by law’.
The act of coining a calque can be useful as well, although it is mandatory to be
6L. Biel, Legal terminology in translation practise: Dictionaries, googling or discussion forums?,
in ≪SKASE Journal of Translation and Interpretation≫, 3.1(2008), pp. 24-25.
48
sure that the newly coined term is going to be entirely understood by the target au-
dience. When finding an equivalent becomes complicated or the term that is going to
be translated is probably unknown in the eyes of the general public, some explication
strategies might be useful, for instance through the creation of footnotes or appendixes.
In conclusion, according to Venuti, American translator, professor and theoretical:
“A translated text (…) is judged acceptable by most publishers, reviewers and read-
ers when it reads fluently, when the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities
makes it seem transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer’s
personality or intention or the essential meaning of the foreign text – the appearance,
in other words, that the translation is not in fact a translation, but the ‘original’.”7
3.2 Translation with Commentary
3.2.1 Introduction
The text that is going to be examined and translated from English into Italian in
this project is the Marrakesh Declaration on the rights of religious minorities in pre-
dominantly Muslim Countries, put together in 2016 in Morocco by a series of religious
intellectuals and scholars. The original document was drafted in Arabic, but both
the Arabic version, together with the English, the Italian, and the Dutch one were
officially published on the online website dedicated to the Declaration, shortly after it
was drafted in 2016.
The aim of this project is to create a new Italian version, clearer in terms of
adaptation and syntax and with a more in depth attention towards a proper and full
comprehension of the content by the target audience. The entire translation process,
complete with both the reasoning behind all adaptations and chosen translation tech-
niques is then explained in a series of comments, linked to both the English and Italian
version.
In his article on the prospects and problems of the Declaration of Marrakesh,
7L. Biel, Legal terminology in translation practise: Dictionaries, googling or discussion forums?,
in ≪SKASE Journal of Translation and Interpretation≫, 3.1(2008), p. 24.
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Ahmed Salisu Garba (2018) identified in the document 6 main goals: the development
of a new law, the equal treatment of every believer in multicultural Muslim societies,
the promotion of religious minorities rights, the revival of the charter of Medina in all
its features and the fight against bigotry and the vilification of people.8
Even if the declaration is an international legal document, the tone and terminol-
ogy chosen for its drafting do not reflect all the features of a typical international legal
production, such as a charter, a pact or a treaty. Differently from other international
documents, this production reflects the need for its goal to be fully understood and
for its audience to actively fight for change. This stylistic diversity may come from
different factors. Firstly, the text is actually the result of days of discussions and
speeches, which are generally more difficult to transport into formal written language,
and secondly, the target audience, in order for the declaration to actually be effective
needs to be understood by as many people as possible. Therefore the general structure,
from both a linguistic and stylistic point’s of view, needs to be suitable for all kind
of readers. The text has been translated from English into Italian with the goal of
maintaining, but at the same time adjust, all the previously mentioned features of the
original text, to the new version as well.
Despite the fact that Italy is not a Muslim country, it still is important to consider
the relevance of certain topics on a global scale. The condition of minorities in Muslim
countries is a humanitarian emergency that puts in risk the lives of many people on a
daily basis. Therefore, the declaration needs to be known and understood by as many
people as possible, no matter which Country or religious background they come from.
8A. S. Garba,The Prospects and Problems of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious
Minorities in Muslim Majority Communities, Taylor’s and Francis online, London (2018), p. 53.
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3.2.2 The Translation process
“In the Name of God 1, the All-Merciful,
the All-Compassionate
Nel nome di Allah1, il Clemente e Mis-
ericordioso.
Executive Summary 2 of the Marrakesh
Declaration on the Rights of Religious
Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Ma-
jority Communities
Riassunto esecutivo2 della Dichiarazione
di Marrakesh sui Diritti delle Mino-
ranze Religiose negli Stati a Maggioranza
musulmana.
25th-27th January 2016 25-27 Gennaio 2016
WHEREAS 3, CONSIDERATO CHE3,
1 “In the name of God, the All-Merciful, the All-compasionate” is an Arab Divine
Invocation, known as Basmahla or Bismillah. It is the most sacred sentence of the
Islamic doctrine and not only does it give religious legitimacy to what is about to
be written, but also proves that the speaker or writer is an active member of the
Islamic community. The Basmahla can be found at the beginning of every Koranic
Surah, with the exception of number IX, and its origin is considered to be at least
as ancient as the first written version of the Holy Book. The invocation begins
with the particle “bi-” (meaning “in” or “with”). The Koran begins with the same
particle ,(ب) written according to the Arabic alphabet with a dot. That dot is
considered to be the origin of everything.1.a
2 The use of the term executive underlines the will of the participants to turn the
document into something concrete, usable on a daily basis by all communities and
capable of providing a real change and impact on all minorities groups. According
to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, the term means: designed for or relating to
execution or carrying into effect.
3 The term whereas is a synonym for while, which could be translated in Italian as
“mentre” or “al contrario di“. Nonetheless, this text has a legal background and ac-
cording to the Oxford Lexico Dictionary the best term to convey the right meaning




conditions 4 in various parts of the Mus-
lim World have deteriorated dangerously
5 due to the use of violence and armed
struggle as a tool for settling conflicts
and imposing one’s point of view;
lo stile di vita4 in varie parti del mondo
musulmano si è nettamente deteriorato5
a causa dell’uso della violenza e della
lotta armata, che vengono utilizzate
come strumento per risolvere conflitti e
imporre un’unica opinione sulle altre;
WHEREAS, this situation has also weak-
ened the authority of legitimate govern-
ments and enabled criminal groups to
issue edicts 6 attributed to Islam, but
which, in fact, alarmingly distort its fun-
damental principles and goals in ways
that have seriously harmed 7 the popu-
lation as a whole;
CONSIDERATO CHE, tale situazione
ha inoltre indebolito l’autorità dei gov-
erni legittimi e permesso a gruppi crim-
inali di rilasciare editti6 falsamente at-
tribuibili alla comunità islamica, in
quanto distorcono i suoi principi e obiet-
tivi danneggiando7 l’intera popolazione;
4 The choice of the expression “stile di vita” in Italian is linked to its inclusive and
wide meaning. Generally, it allows to convey in the target text, the fact that this
kind of issue has an influence not only on the most common spheres of daily life,
but on all of them, drastically changing and lowering the general well-being of many
Muslim populations.
5 “Dangerously deteriorated” syntactically works in English, but literally translating
this expression into Italian might end up sounding redundant. That is the reason
why the expression “nettamente” is preferred, since it makes the sentence lighter
and easier to read and hear.
6 In a legal context: formal or authoritative decree, demand, or proclamation issued
by king, queen, or other sovereign of a country. It is a legally binding command
or decision inserted in the court record. An edict has legal force equal to that of a
statute.1b
7 The use of gerund is common in Italian since it makes the sentence more fluid and
easier to read, especially while translating longer clauses.
1b www.definitions.uslegal.com/e/edict/
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WHEREAS, this year marks the 1,400th
anniversary of the Charter of Medina
8, a constitutional contract between the
Prophet Muhammad, God’s peace and
blessings be upon him, and the people of
Medina, which guaranteed the religious
liberty of all, regardless of faith; 9
CONSIDERATO CHE, l’anno in corso
segna il 1400esimo anniversario della
Carta di Medina8, un contratto cos-
tituzionale, garante di totale libertà
religiosa a prescindere dalla Fede
professata9, stipulato tra il profeta
Maometto, possano la pace e la benedi-
zione di Dio scendere su di lui, e il
popolo di Medina;
WHEREAS, hundreds of Muslim schol-
ars and intellectuals from over 120 coun-
tries, along with representatives of Is-
lamic and international organizations,
as well as leaders 10 from diverse reli-
gious groups and nationalities, gathered
in Marrakesh on this date to reaffirm the
principles of the Charter of Medina at a
major conference;
CONSIDERATO CHE, centinaia di in-
tellettuali e di studiosi Musulmani da più
di 120 nazioni, insieme a rappresentanti
di organizzazioni Musulmane ed inter-
nazionali e ai leaders10 di diversi gruppi
religiosi, si sono riuniti a Marrakesh in
questo giorno per riaffermare i principi
della Carta di Medina in una storica con-
ferenza;
8 The Charter was drafted by Muhammad and his followers, during his time in the
city of Medina, also known as city of the prophet. The Document dates back to
the VII century and it’s a symbol of collective responsibility, freedom and of a
peaceful multi-religious environment. The document is well-known in Italian under
the name of “Carta di Medina”.
9 In the source text the relative clause “...which guaranteed the religious liberty of
all, regardless of faith” is inserted at the end of the entire statement. Nonetheless,
the relative pronoun which refers to the previously mentioned Charter of Medina,
hence the translation choice to keep the subject close to its relative clause, in order
to make the sentence generally more cohesive.
10 “Leader” is a well-known term in the context of the target language, hence the
decision to maintain the English word also in the target text.
Leader; capo riconosciuto di un partito, di un’organizzazione, di un gruppo, di un
movimento ecc.: un leader politico, sindacale1c
1c www.garzantilinguistica.it/ricerca/?q=leader
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WHEREAS, this conference was held un-
der the auspices of His Majesty, King
Mohammed VI of Morocco, and orga-
nized jointly by the Ministry of Endow-
ment and Islamic Affairs 11 in the King-
dom of Morocco and the Forum for Pro-
moting Peace in Muslim Societies based
in the United Arab Emirates;
AND NOTING 12 the gravity of this sit-
uation afflicting Muslims as well as peo-
ples of other faiths throughout the world,
and after thorough deliberation and dis-
cussion, the convened Muslim scholars
and intellectuals:
CONSIDERATO CHE, tale conferenza
si tiene sotto gli auspici di Sua Maestà,
Re Muhammad VI del Marocco, con
la collaborazione del Ministero dei beni
religiosi11 e degli Affari Islamici e del fo-
rum per la promozione della Pace nei
Paesi musulmani, stanziato negli Emirati
Arabi Uniti;
CONSTATANDO12 la gravità di questa
situazione, che affligge la popolazione
musulmana tanto quanto altri popoli di
diversa fede e dopo una scrupolosa dis-
cussione, i suddetti intellettuali e scolari
Musulmani:
11 The Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs is a governmental authority, re-
sponsible for the promotion of Islam and its principles on a global level. The term
Endowment indicates, according to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of
current English, an amount of money that is given to a school or another institution
to provide it with an income. Nonetheless, in this case, the concept needs to be
adapted to a religious context. The source text does not refer to general kinds of
endowments, but to funds or money, raised in support of projects, created specif-
ically to spread the Islamic doctrine around the world, hence the addition of the
adjective “religiosi”. No Italian readers would be able to comprehend the term’s
meaning in its English version, therefore finding a suitable translation is mandatory
to the understanding of the whole text.
12 The verb to note in English is a synonym for “notice”, “be aware of something”,
also in a sense of perceiving or feeling a certain situation or change in someone
or something. On the other hand the Italian equivalent notare did not seem to
convene the right impact for this sentence, hence the choice of “constatare”, which
underlines the fact that the issue is global, really affecting the everyday lives of
many people.
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DECLARE HEREBY 13 our firm com-
mitment to the principles articulated in
the Charter of Medina, whose provisions
contained a number of the principles
of constitutional contractual 15 citizen-
ship, such as freedom of movement, prop-
erty ownership, mutual solidarity and de-
fense, as well as 14 principles of justice
and equality before the law;
CON LA PRESENTE13 DICHIARANO
la loro completa dedizione nei confronti
dei principi stipulati sulla Carta di Med-
ina, le cui disposizioni includevano sia14
parte dei fondamenti della cittadinanza
contrattuale15 e costituzionale, quali la
libertà di movimento, il possesso di pro-
prietà, la solidarietà e la difesa reciproca;
sia16 alcuni dei principi di giustizia ed
eguaglianza di fronte alla legge;
AND THAT, The objectives of the Char-
ter of Medina provide a suitable frame-
work for national constitutions in coun-
tries with Muslim majorities, and the
United Nations Charter and related doc-
uments, such as the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, are in harmony
with the Charter of Medina, including
considerations for public order.
E CHE, Gli obiettivi della Carta di
Medina forniscono validi elementi alle
Costituzioni dei Paesi a maggioranza
musulmana. Inoltre, la Carta delle
Nazioni Unite con relativi documenti,
quali la Dichiarazione Universale dei
Diritti Umani, concordano con la Carta
di Medina, includendo considerazioni
sulla tematica dell’ordine pubblico.
13 Hereby belongs to a specialised legal terminology. In this case it is used to introduce
the purpose of the entire Document. According to Translegal.com, a multi-lingual
dictionary specialised in legal terminology the term is often “used to emphasize
something written in a document, or to say that something is now official”. Gen-
erally translated into Italian with the formulation “Con la presente...“.
14 As well as is here been translated through the use of the form “Sia...sia”. This
form is commonly used in the Italian language, in order to apply a good level of
fluidity to the whole sentence, especially when dealing with longer phrases.
15 In this case the use of the term contractual defines everything mentioned above as
legally binding, which means that there is an actual document that regulates every
element involved in the owning of a citizenship. ”Contrattuale“ conveys the same
sense of obligation.
16 See footnote 14.
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NOTING FURTHER that deep reflec-
tion upon the various crises afflicting 17
humanity underscores the inevitable and
urgent need for cooperation among all
religious groups, we AFFIRM HEREBY
that such cooperation must be based on a
”Common Word”, 18 requiring that such
cooperation must go beyond mutual tol-
erance 19 and respect, to providing 20 full
protection for the rights and liberties to
all religious groups in a civilized manner
that eschews coercion, bias 21, and arro-
gance.
CONSIDERANDO INOLTRE che la
profonda riflessione sulle diverse crisi
che affligono17 l’umanità accompagna
l’urgente ed inevitabile bisogno di co-
operazione fra tutte le comunità re-
ligiose; CON LA PRESENTE NOI
AFFERMIAMO che la suddetta co-
operazione debba essere basata su un
“Pensiero comune”18, che possa andare
oltre il reciproco rispetto e la reciproca
tolleranza19, assicurando 20 totale e civile
protezione dei diritti e delle libertà a tutti
i gruppi religiosi, evitando coercizione,
stereotipi21 ed arroganza.
17 Taking into consideration that the target language of this translation is Italian,
it might be difficult to find a good translation technique for the -ing forms (see
afflicting). One of the most used translation techniques in this case is to transform
the sentence into a relative clause with “che”.
18 Although in the source text the term used is “Word”, the entire sentence to convey
a sense of common action towards one common goal, hence the adaptation obtained
through the use of the term “Pensiero”. This form can better express the strong
search for unity of actions and thoughts.
19 The terms “rispetto” and “tolleranza” are respectively masculine and feminine,
therefore the adjective is repeated twice, in its feminine and masculine forms, both
for a matter of fluidity of the sentence and respect towards genres.
20 (See footnote 17) In this case the -ing form of the verb “provide” was translated
into the Gerund form of the verb “assicurare”.
21 Some difficulties have been encountered in the translation of the term bias into
Italian. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term can indicate a strong feeling
in favour or against one group of people or a deep and deep interest in one thing,
which ends up in not considering all the others. The best equivalent is this case is
considered to be “stereotipo”.
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BASED ON ALL OF THE ABOVE 22,
we hereby:
Call upon 23 Muslim scholars and intel-
lectuals around the world to develop a
jurisprudence of the concept of ”citizen-
ship” which is inclusive of diverse groups.
Such jurisprudence shall be rooted in Is-
lamic tradition and principles and mind-
ful 24 of global changes. Urge Muslim
educational institutions and authorities
to conduct a courageous review of edu-
cational curricula that adresses honestly
and effectively any material that insti-
gates aggression and extremism, leads to
war and chaos, and results in the destruc-
tion of our shared societies;
PREMESSO TUTTO IL
SOPRAMMENZIONATO22, noi:
Chiediamo formalmente23 agli intellet-
uali e studiosi musulmani di tutto il
mondo di sviluppare un sistema legale
sul concetto di “cittadinanza”, che possa
includere diversi gruppi. Tali leggi
dovranno comunque essere fondate sulla
base della tradizione islamica, dei suoi
principi e con consapevolezza24 verso
i mutamenti su scala globale. Esorti-
amo inoltre le Istituzioni ed autorità
educative musulmane, ad intraprendere
una coraggiosa revisione dei curricula
educativi e del loro contenuto, con lo
scopo di eliminare efficacemente qualsi-
asi elemento che istighi all’aggressione e
all’estremismo, che porti a guerra e chaos
e che possa essere fonte di distruzione
per le nostre società condivise;
22 Soprammenzionato is, in Italian, a very specific term, not very used in a daily
context. Nonetheless, according to the Treccani Italian Dictionary, it fits in the
translation of a legal/bureaucratic text. The definition states: Soprammenzionato:
Menzionato precedentemente, nel discorso o, più spesso, in uno scritto. Com.
soprattutto nell’uso notarile e burocr.
23 Finding a good match for the term mindful was not easy. The term is a formal
version of conscious or aware and it is generally recognised from an Italian audience
for its connection with the mindfulness meditation practice. Nonetheless, the choice
of “consapevolezza” fits the context better.
24 The verb ”eliminare” has been added in the translated text, and the linguistic
form ”Essere fonte di“ has been preferred over the literal match “risultare in”.
Both choices aim to correctly adapt the content of the original sentence to a new
linguistic system.
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Call upon politicians and decision mak-
ers 25 to take the political and legal steps
necessary to establish a constitutional
contractual relationship among its cit-
izens, and to support all formulations
26 and initiatives that aim to fortify
relations and understanding among the
various religious groups in the Muslim
World;
Chiediamo formalmente ai politici, e agli
altri detentori del potere 25, di compiere
quei passi politici e legali, necessari a sta-
bilire una relazione contrattuale e costi-
tuzionale fra tutti i rispettivi cittadini,
e di supportare i progetti26 e le inizia-
tive che puntino a fortificare le relazioni
e la comprensione fra i vari gruppi reli-
giosi del mondo musulmano;
Call upon the educated, artistic, and cre-
ative members of our societies, as well
as organizations of civil society 27, to es-
tablish a broad movement for the just
treatment of religious minorities in Mus-
lim countries and to raise awareness as
to their rights, and to work together to
ensure the success of these efforts. 28
Chiediamo inoltre, ai membri più cre-
ativi, artistici e intellettuali delle nos-
tre società, come anche agli Enti sociali
no-profit 27, di stabilire un’ampio movi-
mento in difesa dei diritti delle mino-
ranze religiose in paesi a maggioranza
musulmana e di creare consapevolezza in
merito, lavorando simultaneamente per
garantire il successo di tali sforzi. 28
25 Some difficulties were found in the translation of the English form “Decision mak-
ers”. The expression refers to a specific group of people, which are those globally
in charge of taking relevant decisions, in social, political and economical contexts.
Hence the choice of the Italian formulation “detentori del potere”.
26 The choice of the term “progetti” instead of a general equivalent like formula-
tions,helps underlining the importance of supporting all kinds of attempts aiming
to religious respect and equality in Muslim countries, no matter in which form they
present themselves.
27 According to the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, the Organizations
of civil societies are “Non-State, not-for-profit, voluntary entities formed by people
in the social sphere that are separate from the State and the market”. In Italian,
these kind of Organizations are generally referred as “No-profit”.
28 The words order has been changed, in order to maintain both a formal style and
the same meaning conveyed in the source text.
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Call upon the various religious groups
bound by the same national fabric 29 to
address 30 their mutual state of selec-
tive amnesia that blocks memories of cen-
turies of joint and shared living on the
same land; 31 we call upon them to re-
build the past by reviving this tradition
of conviviality, and restoring our shared
trust that has been eroded by extremists
using acts of terror and aggression;
Chiediamo formalmente ai vari gruppi re-
ligiosi, uniti sotto la stessa bandiera29, di
discutere apertamente30 del loro stato di
amnesia nei confronti di secoli di condivi-
sione e vita comune sullo stesso suolo;31
Chiediamo inoltre, la ricostituzione dei
rapporti passati tramite la ripresa del
senso di convivialità e la ricostruzione
della fiducia condivisa che è stata dan-
neggiata dagli estremisti e dai loro atti
di terrore e aggressione;
Call upon representatives of the vari-
ous religions, sects and denominations
to confront all forms of religious bigotry
32, villification, and denegration of what
people hold sacred, as well as all speech
that promote hatred and bigotry 33;
Chiediamo ai rappresentanti dei vari
gruppi, sette e denominazioni religiose
di affrontare qualsiasi tipo di fanatismo
settario32, villificazione o denigrazione
di ciò che è sacro al popolo, così
come i discorsi che promuovano odio e
bigottismo33.
29 The expression “bound by the same national fabric” has been translated as “uniti
sotto la stessa bandiera”, since this equivalent conveys in Italian the same meaning
found in the source text, through the use of the ”flag“ as a symbol of ”nation“.
30 “Address” has multiple meanings and multiple functions in English. In this case,
as a verb, the term means to “talk about something or begin to deal with an
issue”. The best translation option, to maintain the same meaning, was to pair
the main verb with an adverb. Hence the choice of “discutere” plus the adverb
“apertamente”, in the sense of “clearly, completely or openly”.
31 The syntactical structure of the sentence has been here completely changed, in
order to make the general content “sound” more Italian.
32 The term “settario” underlines that certain behaviours are actually linked only to
a restrict group of people.
33 “Bigotry” is repeated twice, hence the choice of two different synonyms (“bigot-
tismo” and “fanatismo”).
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AND FINALLY, AFFIRM that it is un-
conscionable to employ 34 religion for the
purpose of aggressing upon the rights of




che, l’utilizzo della religione come
strumento34 di aggressione verso i diritti




34 The English verb “employ” incorporates a strong sense of practical and concrete
use of something. Therefore, the use of the Italian expression “utilizzare (come
strumento)“ helps in conveying the same message suggested in the source text.
35 The main concept that the source text aims to underline in this last section is that
an act, or a certain behaviour, is considered to be unconscionable. Changing the
order of the different elements of the sentence is helpful in the process of translation,
in order to make very clear to the readers that everything previously mentioned is,
in the intellectuals’ opinion, unreasonably excessive.
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3.2.3 Italian Versions Compared
ORIGINAL VERSION1 NEW VERSION
In nome di Dio, il Clemente, il Misericor-
dioso
Nel nome di Allah, il Clemente e Miseri-
cordioso.
Sintesi della Dichiarazione di Marrakesh
sui diritti delle minoranze religiose nelle
comunità a predominante maggioranza
musulmana
Riassunto esecutivo della Dichiarazione
di Marrakesh sui Diritti delle Mino-
ranze Religiose negli Stati a Maggioranza
musulmana.
25-27 gennaio 2016 25-27 Gennaio 2016
CONSIDERATO che le condizioni in
varie parti del mondo musulmano si
sono deteriorati pericolosamente a causa
dell’uso della violenza e della lotta ar-
mata come strumento per la soluzione dei
conflitti e per l’imposizione del proprio
punto di vista;
CONSIDERATO CHE lo stile di vita in
varie parti del mondo musulmano si è
nettamente deteriorato a causa del’uso
della violenza e della lotta armata, che
vengono utilizzate come strumento per
risolvere conflitti ed imporre un’unica
opinione sulle altre;
CONSIDERATO che, questa situazione
ha anche indebolito l’autorità dei gov-
erni legittimi e attivato gruppi criminali
ad emettere editti che vengono attribuiti2
all’Islam3, ma che, in realtà, distorcono
in modo allarmante i suoi principi fon-
damentali e i suoi obiettivi, in modi che
hanno seriamente danneggiato4 la popo-
lazione nel suo complesso
CONSIDERATO CHE, tale situazione
ha inoltre indebolito l’autorità dei gov-
erni legittimi e permesso a gruppi crim-
inali di rilasciare editti falsamente2 at-
tribuibili alla comunità Islamica3, in
quanto distorcono i suoi principi e obiet-
tivi danneggiando4 l’intera popolazione;
1 The declaration was translated into Italian by the Italian COREIS, which is a na-
tional association of Italian Muslims, created in the 90s with the goal of protecting
and preserving the Arabic culture in Western countries.
2 In this case the adverb “falsamente” helps in underlying that those actions do not
belong to Islam.
3 Adding “comunità”, instead of simply mention “Islam”, gives to the reader a
stronger reference to the people, members of the Islamic community.
4 The use of the gerund in Italian gives more fluidity to the sentence.
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CONSIDERATO che, quest’anno ricorre
il 1400 ° anniversario della Carta di Med-
ina, un contratto costituzionale tra il
Profeta Muhammad, la pace e la benedi-
zione di Dio su di lui, e la gente di Med-
ina, che garantiva la libertà religiosa di
tutti, a prescindere dalla fede;
CONSIDERATO CHE, l’anno in corso
segna il 1400esimo anniversario della
Carta di Medina, un contratto costi-
tuzionale, garante di totale libertà reli-
giosa a prescindere dalla Fede professata,
stipulato tra il profeta Maometto, pos-
sano la pace e la benedizione di Dio scen-
dere su di lui, e il popolo di Medina;
CONSIDERATO che, centinaia di stu-
diosi musulmani e intellettuali proveni-
enti da oltre 120 paesi, insieme con i rap-
presentanti delle organizzazioni islamiche
e internazionali, così come i leader di di-
versi gruppi religiosi e nazionalità, riuniti
a Marrakech in questa data5 per riaffer-
mare i principi della Carta di Medina in
una grande conferenza;
CONSIDERATO CHE, centinaia di in-
tellettuali e di studiosi Musulmani da
più di 120 nazioni, insieme a rappresen-
tanti di organizzazioni musulmane ed in-
ternazionali e ai leaders di diversi gruppi
religiosi, si sono riuniti a Marrakesh in
questo giorno per riaffermare i principi
della Carta di Medina in una storica5
conferenza;
CONSIDERATO che, questa conferenza
si è tenuta sotto gli auspici di Sua
Maestà, il re Mohammed VI del Marocco
e organizzato congiuntamente dal Minis-
tero della Endowment e degli Affari Is-
lamici nel Regno del Marocco e dal Fo-
rum per la Promozione della Pace nelle
Società Musulmane con sede negli Emi-
rati Arabi Uniti;
CONSIDERATO CHE, tale conferenza
si tiene sotto gli auspici di Sua Maestà,
Re Muhammad VI del Marocco, con la
collaborazione del Ministero dei beni re-
ligiosi e degli Affari Islamici e del fo-
rum per la promozione della Pace nei
Paesi musulmani, stanziato negli Emirati
Arabi Uniti;
5 The adjective “storica” act as a reminder for the reader, of the importance and
unicity of this gathering.
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E RILEVANDO che, la gravità di questa
situazione coinvolge i musulmani così
come i popoli di altre fedi in tutto il
mondo, dopo deliberazione approfondita
e discussione, gli studiosi musulmani e gli
intellettuali convocati:
CONSTATANDO la gravità di questa
situazione, che affligge la popolazione
musulmana tanto quanto altri popoli di
diversa fede e dopo una scrupolosa dis-
cussione, i suddetti intellettuali e scolari
Musulmani:
DICHIARANO CON LA PRESENTE
il proprio fermo impegno verso i prin-
cipi articolati nella Carta di Medina, le
cui disposizioni contenevano una serie
di principi di cittadinanza contrattuale
costituzionale, come la libertà di movi-
mento, di proprietà, la mutua solidarietà
e la difesa, nonché i principi di giustizia
e di uguaglianza di fronte alla legge;
CON LA PRESENTE DICHIARANO la
loro completa dedizione nei confronti dei
principi stipulati nella Carta di Medina,
le cui disposizioni includevano sia parte
dei fondamenti della cittadinanza con-
trattuale e costituzionale, quali la libertà
di movimento, il possesso di proprietà, la
solidarietà e la difesa reciproca; sia alcuni
dei principi di giustizia ed eguaglianza di
fronte alla legge6;
E CHE gli obiettivi della Carta di Med-
ina forniscono un quadro adeguato per
le costituzioni nazionali nei paesi a mag-
gioranza musulmana, e la Carta e i rela-
tivi documenti delle Nazioni Unite, come
la Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti
dell’Uomo, sono in armonia con la Carta
di Medina, incluse le considerazioni rela-
tive all’ordine pubblico.
E CHE, Gli obiettivi della Carta di
Medina forniscono validi elementi alle
Costituzioni dei Paesi a maggioranza
musulmana. Inoltre, la Carta delle
Nazioni Unite con relativi documenti,
quali la Dichiarazione Universale dei
Diritti Umani, concordano con la Carta
di Medina, includendo considerazioni
sulla tematica dell’ordine pubblico.
PRENDENDO ATTO INOLTRE che
una profonda riflessione sulla varie crisi
che coinvolgono l’umanità sottolinea
l’inevitabile e urgente necessità della co-
operazione fra tutti i gruppi religiosi7,
CONSIDERANDO INOLTRE che la
profonda riflessione sulle diverse crisi che
affligono l’umanità accompagna l’urgente
ed inevitabile bisogno di cooperazione fra
tutte le comunità religiose7;
6 The sentence has been built using “sia...sia” (“both..and) for fluidity reasons.
7 The term “comunità” (“comunity”) strengthens the sense of unity among a religious
group, which is why it has been preferred over “gruppo”.
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AFFERMIAMO CON LA PRESENTE
che tale cooperazione deve basarsi su una
”Parola Comune”8 che possa andare oltre
il reciproco rispetto e la reciproca toller-
anza assicurando9 totale e civile pro-
tezione dei diritti e delle libertà a tutti i
gruppi religiosi ed evitando9 coercizione,
stereotipi ed arroganza.
CON LA PRESENTE NOI AFFER-
MIAMO che la suddetta cooperazione
debba essere basata su un “Pensiero
comune”8 richiedendo che tale coop-
erazione vada oltre la tolleranza e il
rispetto reciproci, al fine di fornire pro-
tezione completa per i diritti e le libertà
di tutti i gruppi religiosi in un modo civile
che rifugga la coercizione, il pregiudizio e
l’arroganza.
PREMESSO TUTTO QUANTO SO-
PRA, noi con la presente:
PREMESSO TUTTO IL SOPRAM-
MENZIONATO, noi:
Chiediamo formalmente agli intelletuali
e studiosi musulmani di tutto il mondo
di sviluppare un sistema legale sul con-
cetto di “cittadinanza”, che possa includ-
ere diversi gruppi. Tali leggi dovranno
comunque essere fondate sulla base della
tradizione islamica, dei suoi principi e
con consapevolezza verso i mutamenti su
scala globale.
facciamo appello agli studiosi musul-
mani e agli intellettuali di tutto il
mondo per sviluppare una giurispru-
denza del concetto di “cittadinanza”, che
sia comprensiva dei diversi gruppi. Tale
giurisprudenza deve essere radicata nella
tradizione e nei principi islamici e con-
sapevole dei cambiamenti globali.
Urge10 che le istituzioni educative musul-
mane e le autorità operino una revisione
coraggiosa dei percorsi formativo
Esortiamo10 inoltre le Istituzioni ed
autorità educative musulmane, ad in-
traprendere una coraggiosa revisione
8 “Pensiero” (“thought”) involves the mind and and stress out the importance of
finding a common solution for a common goal.
9 As previously mentioned, gerund is generally used in Italian to avoid a relative
clause and give more fluidity to the sentence.
10 According to the Treccani Italian dictionary “Urgere” is a synonym for “insist” or
“put pressure on someone to do do something”, while “esortare” indicates urging
someone to do something, but giving them good reasons to do so and explaining
them why they should act in a certain way. Therefore “esortare” has been preferred.
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che affronti onestamente e in modo
efficace qualsiasi materiale che istighi
l’aggressività e l’estremismo, conduca
alla guerra e al caos, e conduca alla dis-
truzione delle nostre società comuni;
dei curricula educativi e del loro con-
tenuto, con lo scopo di eliminare effi-
cacemente qualsiasi elemento che istighi
all’aggressione e all’estremismo, che porti
a guerra e chaos e che possa essere fonte
di distruzione per le nostre società con-
divise;
Facciamo appello ai politici e a coloro che
hanno potere decisionale affinché pren-
dano le misure politiche e giuridiche nec-
essarie per stabilire un rapporto contrat-
tuale costituzionale tra i propri cittadini,
e per sostenere tutte le formulazioni11 e
le iniziative che mirano a rafforzare i rap-
porti e la comprensione tra i vari gruppi
religiosi nel mondo musulmano;
Chiediamo formalmente ai politici, e agli
altri detentori del potere, di compiere
quei passi politici e legali, necessari a sta-
bilire una relazione contrattuale e costi-
tuzionale fra tutti i rispettivi cittadini,
e di supportare i progetti11 e le inizia-
tive che puntino a fortificare le relazioni
e la comprensione fra i vari gruppi reli-
giosi del mondo musulmano;
Facciamo appello alle personalità del
mondo della cultura, dell’arte e ai mem-
bri creativi della nostra società, così
come alle organizzazioni della società
civile12, per stabilire un ampio movi-
mento per il giusto trattamento delle
minoranze religiose nei paesi musulmani
e per aumentare la consapevolezza sui
loro diritti, e per lavorare13 insieme per
garantire il successo di questi sforzi.
Chiediamo inoltre, ai membri più cre-
ativi, artistici e intellettuali delle nos-
tre società, come anche agli Enti sociali
no-profit12, di stabilire un’ampio movi-
mento in difesa dei diritti delle mino-
ranze religiose in paesi a maggioranza
musulmana e di creare consapevolezza in
merito, lavorando13 simultaneamente per
garantire il successo di tali sforzi.
11 The term “progetto” identifies in a clearer way something very practical. Moreover,
it underlines the will of the project maker to achieve concrete results.
12 The term is more comprehensible to an Italian audience.
13 See note 4.
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Facciamo appello ai vari gruppi religiosi
legati dallo stesso tessuto nazionale per
affrontare il loro stato reciproco di am-
nesia selettiva che blocca le memorie di
secoli di vita comune e condivisa nella
stessa terra14;
Chiediamo formalmente ai vari gruppi re-
ligiosi, uniti sotto la stessa bandiera14, di
discutere apertamente del loro stato di
amnesia nei confronti di secoli di condi-
visione e vita comune sullo stesso suolo;
Ci rivolgiamo a loro per ricostruire il pas-
sato facendo rivivere questa tradizione di
convivialità e ripristinare la nostra fidu-
cia condivisa che è stata erosa dagli es-
tremisti con atti di terrore e di aggres-
sione;
Chiediamo inoltre, la ricostituzione dei
rapporti passati tramite la ripresa del
senso di convivialità e la ricostruzione
della fiducia condivisa che è stata dan-
neggiata dagli estremisti e dai loro atti
di terrore e aggressione;
Facciamo appello a i rappresentanti
delle diverse religioni, sette e confessioni
affinché affrontino tutte le forme di fa-
natismo religioso15, diffamazione e deni-
grazione di ciò che le persone hanno di
sacro, così come tutti i discorsi che pro-
muovano l’odio e il fanatismo;
Chiediamo ai rappresentanti dei vari
gruppi, sette e denominazioni religiose
di affrontare qualsiasi tipo di fanatismo
settario15, villificazione o denigrazione di
ciò che è sacro al popolo, così come i dis-
corsi che promuovano odio e bigottismo.
E INFINE, Affermiamo che è inconcepi-
bile impiegare la religione con scopo di
aggressione ai diritti delle minoranze re-
ligiose nei paesi musulmani.16
ED INFINE, AFFERMIAMO che,
l’utilizzo della religione come strumento
di aggressione verso i diritti delle mino-
ranze religiose nei paesi musulmani, è
irragionevole.16
Marrakesh Marrakesh
26 gennaio 2016 27 Gennaio 2016
14 “Essere uniti sotto la stessa bandiera” is an Italian expression which indicates the
membership of a certain social group to a particular nation.
15 Religious fanaticism is uncritical zeal related to one’s own, or one’s group’s devo-
tion to a religion. On the other hand “fanatismo settario” indicates an obsessive
enthusiasm towards subgroup of a religious, political, or philosophical belief system.
16 Putting the adjective “irragionevole” at the end, allows to convey a stronger mes-
sage to the reader and to catch his attention.
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Chapter 4
The International Press and
Minority Issues
4.1 Religious Minority and the Media
Media has become an increasingly popular field of study as communication technol-
ogy develops and our world becomes more and more interconnected. The analysis of
the portrayal of religious minorities in international media can offer insights into how a
minority community behaves and evolves, as it experiences the process of minorization.
The relationship between minorities and media revolves around two specific aspects:
first, the position minorities hold in national mainstream media, and second how they
eventually handle and establish their own particularistic media. Surely, minorities do
experience many pros in being involved into mainstream national media, although this
process can eventually lead to assimilation and loss of cultural heritage. On the other
hand, establishing their own dedicated media, be it a newspaper or a tv channel, can
produce an isolating effect and the reduction of knowledge, on the minority commu-
nity, available to the public spheres. This suggests that a marginalized group must
strive for balance in its media strategy, in order to preserve its heritage, while playing
a national role as active citizens.
Focusing on media and minorities in the Middle East, Arabic-speaking Christians
had a pivotal role in the emerging of the press from the early 19th century. Cairo
and Beirut where initially the two main centers for publishing, since many writers
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from Syria and Lebanon migrated to Egypt to enjoy its greater freedom of expression.
It is important to remember that these are years of development and modernization,
therefore many Arab intellectuals, writers and leaders were aiming to redefine society
through their written production. As part of the Tanzimat reforms, instigated by the
Ottoman Empire, equal status was granted to minorities, as national subjects. Minori-
ties did actually have a stronger voice and a deeper impact in public life, also thanks to
their wider exposure to foreign cultures and languages, that allowed them to translate
and transmit the writings of European philosophers and scientists. The first printing
press reached Egypt in 1821, while the second one was brought by Pope Kyrilos IV
around 1859 and became famous as the Coptic Community Press. The publications
produced by this press were Church-focused (particularistic) and acted as a vehicle
for Coptic participation in public life. Through this productions they were able to
support their identity and the Christian faith and all challenges faced by the Copts
were addressed as a challenges for Egypt itself.
Apart from Egyptian Christians, Jews around the Middle East as well saw the
emerging press as an opportunity to be more involved in social and public life. Partic-
ularly in Baghdad, Iraq, Jews set up newspapers and worked as journalists for Muslim
newspapers as well, in response to the Ottoman Empire’s effort to promote tolerance
and equality among all religious groups. In conclusion, both in Egypt and in Iraq,
minorities were able to recognize the importance of media on a national level and they
tried to use it in an effort to increase their visibility and affirm their belonging. Af-
ter World War II, the post-colonial Middle East saw the birth of new regimes, which
tented to squeeze heterogeneity in all forms, in order to promote more authoritarian
approaches and radical Arab nationalism.
In Egypt, for instance, Nasser went so far as to nationalize the press in 1960, lead-
ing to the decline of one of the most important Coptic parties of the country, the Wafd,
which was the main tool through which Copts could actively participate to public life.
Therefore, to balance these circumstances, particularistic medias started to flourish in
parallel to mainstream national media. There was one newspaper in particular, edited
by Yusef Sidhom, called Watani, which persisted in trying to involve Copts issues in its
production, since, according to Sidhom, the community was facing an high risk of social
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isolation. The aim of the editor, was to avoid the reduction of mutual understanding
between religious groups and to promote a good amount of knowledge on “the others”
among the predominantly Muslim community. These last examples all point to the
main dilemma regarding particularistic media, which is how to support and empower
a marginalized group without bringing them to isolation or starting an assimilation
process that could cause the disappearance of the minority’s heritage.
Very interesting is also the use and development of particularistic media carried on
by the Yezidis community in Iraq. Especially from 2014, when the Islamic state (IS)
began to target them, Yezidis have been subject to violent attacks and forced to flee
their traditional territories. In response to this desperate situation, the community’s
media have been evolving in two different ways: first, to act as a tool through which
they could connect with international media and make their condition visible to the
global public, and second as a resource to preserve the Yezidis community in its num-
bers and cultural practices while going through a proper diaspora.
Prior to the threat posed by IS, media strategies did not matter to the community,
since they were a small group, mainly based in one territorial region. Thed did have
newspaper, online media, books, TV channels, and their faith was thought in school,
but with the government of Saddam Hussein, they were subject to a great assimilation
campaign to impose Arab ethnicity over the others. During Hussein’s regime, inde-
pendent sources of Yezidis media production were born, but not without a political
agenda or a political purpose. The most famous was Merkez Lalish, which produced
and printed newspapers through its twenty-eight offices in Yezidi towns. Its head,
Sheikh Shamo, was a KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) deputy in the Kurdish par-
liament, fact that in many cases led the Yezidis identity to be politically and culturally
linked to the Kurdish one, and that made of the Merkez Lalish not a fully independent
and bias-free production.
This lack of independent media production has led to a rise pf diaspora-based me-
dia, in the attempt of connecting members of a community that had been dispersed
and isolated both within Iraq and on a global level. In the last decades Yezidi have
managed to create their own media networks, specifically through the use of electronic
tools and thanks to the arrival of the Internet. The Ezidipress was founded in 2013
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in Germany, as self-financing, non-partisan blog, which led to the foundation of many
other multilingual new sites, managed by Yezidis in Turkey, Syria, Russia, Georgia
and Armenia. They now produce articles in six different languages and their goal is to
build network among all diaspora groups.
What we understand from these example cases is that minorities need to develop
a well-balanced and efficient media strategy, which can handle both specialist me-
dia and mainstream national media, in order to support the community, while cor-
recting stereotypes and keeping minority knowledge circulating and accessible to the
general public. The correction of bias and stereotypes is clearly vital for communi-
ties that perceive itself as excluded or misrepresented, since to a religious or ethnic
group, misrepresentation can be more dangerous than direct exclusion and can, in
some cases, also exacerbate or prolong conflicts. Studying the media and its develop-
ment among marginalized ethnic or religious groups has the potential to provide an
enormous amount of information on how they perceive themselves within their own
communities, but also towards the national majority. Moreover, the increased use of
online media acts as a solution for the dilemma of particularistic media being possible
sources of isolation, since online production are often accessible to most of the global
population. The power and impact of the Internet on these communities daily life has
the potential to make them more impactful on a political and social level while having
a real effect on inter-groups and intra-group relations of the Middle East.
4.2 The American Press and the Issue of Religious
Ignorance
In the last few decades, a growing number of experts have expressed concern about
the role of certain mainstream media in building narratives which eventually picture
marginal groups or faiths as something sinister, pathological or harmful to both their
own members and society. To what can we attribute this growing phenomenon? Is
it a question of general religious illiteracy? or is it for inadequate resources or time
constraints?. ABC’s editor of the World News Tonight, Peter Jennings, in an essay
that appeared in a Harvard Divinity school publication stated that: Peter Steinfels of
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the New York Times, and others who cover religion much more thoroughly than I do,
know and have said in various forums that ignorance, incompetence and insufficient
resources are serious inhibitions to understanding the role that religion plays in the
world. I would venture that in the overwhelmingly majority of newsrooms in America
there is an appealing ignorance of religion and faith.1
The issue seems to come from the fact that the majority of journalists do not search
for direct contact with marginalized religious groups, especially with the newest one.
Moreover, journalists face deadlines and time constraints on stories, which lead to not
having enough time and resources to investigate a religious group through field re-
search. In the absence of these resources or any kind of empirical study, journalists
tend to write stories based on their impression drawn from a “common stock of knowl-
edge”, which is really likely to reflect cultural stereotypes and bias, picturing events in
a condensed and reduced way. Lack of knowledge about religion is not the only source
of issues in the American media coverage. Stuart A. Wright, American Professor of
Sociology and Director of Research in the Office of Research at Lamar University in
Beaumont, Texas, identified five other different factors. They are as follows: 1. jour-
nalists familiarity with religion matters, 2. the degree of cultural accommodation of
a specific religious group, 3. economic resources available to reporters, 4. time con-
straints, 5. journalists’ sources of information.
First of all it must be mentioned that religion is never been a priority in the re-
porting of American Mass Media, in fact only ABC, among other major television
networks, hired a full-time religion reporter. Moreover, religion experts come to their
occupation from many different avenues and backgrounds, for instance following semi-
nars, but theological training does not necessarily translate into increased tolerance of
nontraditional religion, on the contrary it can actually point to the presence of a priori
assumptions in their writings. The tenor of media coverage is then bound to the degree
of cultural accommodation of a specific religious or ethnic group, meaning that media
do reflect in what measure a country honestly accept and understand the presence of a
certain group on national ground. Religious dissent is a long-standing tradition and a
1S. A. Wright, Media Coverage of Unconventional Religion: Any ”Good News” for Minority Faiths?,
in ≪Review of Religious Research≫, 39.2 (1997), pp. 101-107.
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cherished right in American culture, articulated both in the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, although today, as in the past, marginalized groups receive less favorable
treatment from society that mainstream religious organizations.
The structure of news production necessitates of resources and time in order to
fuilfill the output of news. Despite this, news production needs to be fast, stories face
deadlines and reporters rarely have enough time an resources to deeply investigate a
story. This phenomenon causes facts to be described in a superficial way, skimming
only the surface of events and creating the illusion of being informed, when in fact we
are missing all the important details. A case in point could be the widely reported
by printed media spread of satanic cults in the U.S. during the 80’s, which was then
brutally questioned by careful science research that proved them to be unsupported.
In some cases, cults “experts” possesses no forms education, training or credential to
qualify them as reliable sources in religious matters, so these sources, if abused, can
lead to the birth of bias, discrimination and inequality among religious groups.2
The media have been a prominent source of information about Muslims, with more
Americans learning about Muslims from the media than from any other source. In
addition, experimental and survey evidence has demonstrated that media exposure to
Muslims is linked not only to negative perceptions, but also to greater support for
civil restrictions of Muslim Americans as well as military action in Muslim countries.
In 2018, Professor Erich Bleich built a comparative sentiment analysis of American
newspapers in the years bvetween 1996 and 2015. The project was entirely computer-
assisted through lexicon-based, coding to over 850,000 articles that mention Muslims,
Hindus, Jews, or Catholics in 17 national and regional US newspapers and compare
them to a representative baseline of articles. Final data demonstrate that the tone
of articles mentioning Muslims is substantially more negative than the tone of aver-
age newspaper articles. The same cannot be said about coverage of Hindus, Jews, or
Catholics, where the overall tone is similar to or modestly above that of the general
representative corpus of articles. Based on these data, it has been estimated that the
average article about Muslims has a more negative tone than over four-fifths of all
2S. A. Wright, Media Coverage of Unconventional Religion: Any ”Good News” for Minority Faiths?,
in ≪Review of Religious Research≫, 39.2 (1997), pp. 107-115.
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articles published in leading US newspapers during the two decades from 1996 to 2015.
Most importantly, it has been discovered that controlling for all of the factors
known to be associated with negativity still does not eliminate the negative tone of
articles mentioning Muslims. The average story identifying Muslims is more negative
than 81% of articles in the representative corpus. Even articles mentioning Muslims
that contain no reference to extremism and are not set exclusively in a foreign loca-
tion, that are in conservative papers and not in a tabloid newspaper, and that were
published after 9/11 still have a tone more negative than 63% of all articles and are
even more negative relative to the tone of comparable articles mentioning Hindus,
Jews, and Catholics. Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that media exposure
reinforces racial stereotypes and that it is associated with higher racism scores. Fur-
ther studies have shown that consuming media about Muslims in the United States is
connected to stereotypical beliefs, negative emotions, and support for policies that are
harmful to Muslims.
These observations provide reasons to believe that systematic, long-term associa-
tions between Muslims and negative words have a substantial impact on newspaper
readers’ beliefs, emotions, and policy preferences. While future scholarship may reveal
factors that attenuate the “Muslim gap”, its robustness across a wide swath of US
newspapers indicates that it is an enduring and consequential part of the American
landscape3.
4.3 The Portrayal of Religious Minorities in the
British Press
It is the daily national press based in London that dominates the UK newspaper
market, and British people are among the most avid British newspaper’s reader in the
world. It was estimated that 84 percent of all British adults (40 million people) read
a regional newspaper, while 68 percent read a national one. Britain presents a unique
overtly partisan press, meaning that newspapers are expected to adopt an explicit po-
3E. Bleich, Media portrayals of Muslims: a comparative sentiment analysis of American newspapers,
1996–2015, in ≪Politics, Groups, and Identities ≫, (2018).
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litical line, which tends to be expressed in a more subtle way at the time of general
elections. Moreover, partisanship is not rigid, but changeable, since it is influenced by
several factors like the newspaper’s history, ownership and readership.
Although the representation of minorities in media has in many cases gained a lot
of space internationally, in the UK they have been rare, especially in the last three
decades. One of the most important studies on press representation of difference, which
was led by Hartmann and Husband (1974), did reach some very important conclusions:
minorities in British press are often stigmatized and and associated with negative im-
ages, they over-appear in crime stories (phenomenon probably linked to the most recent
episodes of terrorism), and their general representation in British media is limited.
In 2015, Erik Bleich, Hannah Stonebraker, Hasher Nisar and Rana Abdelhamid to-
gether with a group of experts and research assistants based at the University of Leeds
and the University of Bradford, conducted a study on Muslims in British Newspaper
Headlines in the years between 2001 and 2012. For the aim of this study, wthe team
analysed a sample of four newspapers, two tabloids and two broadsheets, representing
the left and right leaning press. The Telegraph and The Sun represent the broadsheet
and tabloid rightwing press respectively, and The Guardian and The Mirror repre-
sent the leftwing broadsheet and tabloid respectively. The majority of articles they
analysed fell into four newspaper sections: 31% supplements, 15% mixed news, 13%
opinion and 11% national affairs. Of the 538 relevant articles analysed through the
four phases of the study (8% of all articles), 513 have a headline.
The focus is on headlines because, while most news consumers do not read most arti-
cles, media studies have demonstrated that even casual readers are drawn to headlines,
which serve as cognitive shortcuts that impact a large number of readers. Headlines
do also have a stronger influence on readers who do not already have a definite opin-
ion on a specific topic. Whoever the editor who composes headlines is, he typically
cannot convey all nuances found in the whole article into the title, so he simply tries
to come up with a statement that can capture the attention of the reader by tapping
into prevailing feelings about a topic. Tracking the tone of headlines is a tool through
which we can understand how certain communities are portrayed, as well as whether
the portrayals have changed across time. In addition, the experts also examined head-
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lines about Jews and Christians from the same time period and from the same array
of newspapers. These groups provide reference points that allow to create a clearer
picture on how Muslims are portrayed if compared to analogous groups. If portrayals
of Muslims in newspaper headlines are similar to those of comparable groups, there is
little reason to believe Muslims are unduly stigmatised. On the other hand, if depic-
tions of Muslims are systematically more negative than those of analogous groups, it
may constitute evidence that Muslims have a lower status.
Each headline was coded in one of five frame categories: victim, beneficial, problem,
other and ambiguous. Although some scholars have suggested that victim frames may
cast groups as lacking agency, experts have argued convincingly that they are more
often identified as having a positive tone because they tend to generate sympathy for
the victim group. Beneficial frames have a positive tone in portraying groups as con-
tributing to society, while also generating support for the group. Problem frames have
a negative tone because they evoke fear or animosity. The other category captures
headlines that have a frame that is neither positive nor negative, such as those that
identify a group as distinctive without showing any specific valence to it (‘Let’s shed
more light on Islam’). The ambiguous category includes headlines that are too unclear
to code (‘Cam’s claim is slammed; Islam’), those where readers could interpret it as
having either a positive or a negative tone (‘Islam group drops troop town march’) and
those where positive and negative elements make the headline internally contradictory
(‘Both Muslim boys, born in the same year. One died serving his country ... the other
died trying to destroy it’).
The study led the experts to three main conclusions: First, British pres headlines
do not portray the Muslim minority in a consistently negative light, although head-
lines coming from the most widely read right-leaning tabloids clearly presented a more
negative attitude. This fact causes the largest portion of readers to be exposed to
headlines that were more negative. Moreover, the comparison between the portrayal
of Christians/Jews and Muslims revealed that Muslims are systematically portrayed
in a more negative way. There are substantial differences in the percentage of victim
and problem frames across the three groups. Jews are very infrequently identified as
posing societal problems, and when they are, it tends to be based on events that take
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place outside of British borders. Headlines about Christians as victims tend to be
about repression of Christians around the world (such as in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan or
China) or about unfair treatment of Christians in Britain.
So, even if the British press in the years between 2001 and 2012 did not identify
the Muslim minority in a negative way, the most widely read newspapers still depict
them in a more negative way, causing the British media portrayal of Muslims to be
perceived as negative from the majority of the population.4
Based on what has been mentioned so far, the following sections will provide an
analysis of certain selected articles published by mainstream English and American
newspapers, on the creation of the declaration of Marrakesh. The analysis has been
conducted in the attempt to understand how the declaration has been received by the
international non-Muslim community and how these news organizations portray such
an important religious event.
4.3.1 The Washington Post and The New York Times
The Washington Post (WaPo) is one of the most widely known daily newspapers in
the USA, mainly famous in the Washington metropolitan area. The news organization
was founded in 1887 by Stilson Hutchins and was then bought in 1933, after a difficult
financial period, by Eugen Meyer. Mr Meyer decided to publicly established 7 princi-
ples, on which the newspaper is still currently based, and write them on the entrance
wall of its headquarter in Washington DC. According to the Washington Post website,
these seven principles are:
1. The first mission of a newspaper is to tell the truth as nearly as the truth may
be ascertained.
2. The newspaper shall tell ALL the truth so far as it can learn it, concerning the
important affairs of America and the world.
3. As a disseminator of the news, the paper shall observe the decencies that are
obligatory upon a private gentleman.
4. What it prints shall be fit reading for the young as well as for the old.
4E. Bleich, H. Stonebraker, H. Nisar & R. Abdelhamid, Media Portrayals of Minorities: Muslims
in British Newspaper Headlines, 2001–2012, in ≪Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies≫, 41.6
(2016), pp. 942–962.
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5. The newspaper’s duty is to its readers and to the public at large, and not to the
private interests of its owners.
6. In the pursuit of truth, the newspaper shall be prepared to make sacrifices of its
material fortunes, if such course be necessary for the public good.
7. The newspaper shall not be the ally of any special interest, but shall be fair and
free and wholesome in its outlook on public affairs and public men. 5
On January 27 2016, the Post published an article written by Aida Alami, entitled
Morocco summit pushes Muslim clerics to improve the lot of religious minorities.
Aida Alami is a Marrakesh-based freelance journalist, often displaced all around the
world, specialised in foreign policies, human rights, anti-terrorism practices and case
of police violence.
The article begins with the author giving some details on the creation process of the
declaration, explaining who took part to it, when, where and which ones are the hopes
for its future implementations. An important element that stands out is the concept
of Islamophobia: “Mohamed Magid, executive imam of the All Dulles Area Muslim
Society, a mosque in northern Virginia, said that it is necessary for religious minorities
to be treated well in Muslim countries but also that the world needs to be aware of the
rise of Islamophobia, too. “We have a lot of kids that are bullied at school,” he said.
“The threat is serious all over the world,” added Magid. “We have to stop it and we
also have to take preemptive measures. I look forward to the implementation of the
declaration at a grass-roots level.”6
Islamophobia is a fairly new concept in social studies, that includes in its meaning
both a political issue and strong anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim feelings. Despite the
fact that the term is still hard to properly define, it clearly shows how strongly, in the
perception of the general public, the term Muslim and Islam can be, in some cases
incorrectly, intertwined. In the US, especially after 2001, Islamophobia has grown
stronger and stronger, but the reason why Magid links the presence of Islamophobia
with the protection of minorities in Muslim countries might result unclear in the eyes of
5www.washingtonpost.com/news/ask-the-post/wp/2016/01/01/policies-and-standards/
6All quotes of this section are directly taken from the following article: A. Alami,Morocco sum-
mit pushes Muslim clerics to improve the lot of religious minorities in ≪The Washington Post≫,
Washington (2016).
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a general reader, not deeply informed on the topic. Moreover, Islamophobia starts from
negative attitudes or emotions, which can be both connected to prejudice or actions
linked to the Muslim culture that are considered to be unfair or wrong from a western
perspective. Under this light, the protection of minority rights in Muslim countries
and the change of attitude towards Human rights issues might be the perfect weapon
also against the spreading of Islamophobia. According to Erick Bleich, professor of
political science at Middlebury College in Vermont, there’s still no social evaluated
element that can prove Islamophobia to prevail in dimension and intensity if compared
with other forms of intolerance. 7
The article than further develops through the presentation of different opinions on
the actual feasibility of the document in the social context of Muslim countries, under-
ling that Morocco in the first place can be considered as a good example of tolerance.
In Alami’s words: “Some participants pointed to Morocco as a successful example of
tolerance and hoped it could serve as a model for other Muslim countries: Moroccan
law specifically protects its Jewish population of around 6,000 people, according to
2010 estimates. “We in the kingdom of Morocco will not tolerate the violation of the
rights of religious minorities in the name of Islam,” said King Mohammed VI in an
opening statement read by the minister of religious affairs, Ahmed Toufiq. “I am en-
abling Christians and Jews to practice their faith and not just as minorities. They
even serve in the government.”. Surely Morocco, especially thanks to its latest King,
has become a great example of tolerant country, but as the author herself affirms later
on, the country still needs to legally improve many aspects of the so called religious
tolerance: “...while Morocco may be held up as a model for the region, Moroccan con-
verts to Christianity live in secrecy out of fear of punishment from the authorities. It
is illegal to attempt to convert Muslims to other faiths, and those who do convert of-
ten face prejudice. Christians worship in private homes and secret congregations exist
where Christian converts gather to practice their faith, said conference attendee Anne
Marie Teeuwissen, 63...”.
What stands out in the content of the article is the presence of different perspec-
7E. Bleich,What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging
Comparative Concept, in ≪American Behavioral Scientist≫, (2011).
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tives and opinions, which underline Alami’s attempt to maintain an inclusive attitude.
Every idea finds its own space to the point that the end seems almost to be left open
for the readers to honestly form their own idea on the true purpose of the declaration
and all the vital discussions that came with it. Generally, the article gives all necessary
information for the reader to understand all main events that led to the creation of the
document and seems to be neutral in the language and inclusive in the content.
Very interesting is Annelle Sheline’s take on the topic in her article Middle East
regimes are using ‘moderate’ Islam to stay in power. The article was published on
the Post on March 1, 2017. The author is a American Phd student, who moved for
a period of time to Yemen and Egypt to work as a journalist. After a long time
abroad, she decided to write her dissertation on “moderate Islam” and on the tech-
niques that the Arab monarchies use to promote it in their countries. About moderate
Islam Sheline affirms in the article, that “There is no real agreement on the meaning
of moderate Islam, of course. Muslim-majority governments that wish to be labeled
moderate generally need to comply with the agenda of the United States [...] Accord-
ing to the “inclusion- moderation hypothesis,” Islamist groups that participate in the
democratic process typically merit the label of moderate. However, since the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks, and particularly since the rise of the Islamic State, moderation has more
specifically corresponded to the rejection of violence.”8
Throughout Sheline’s article, the concept of moderate Islam and how Muslim coun-
tries themselves use it to preserve their position in the eyes of powerful Western coun-
tries, presents itself as an enlightening concept. The fact that there is no firm definition
of what moderate Islam is, comes from the issue of the constant adaptation that Mus-
lim countries need to show to the agenda of the United States in particular. Surely,
the 2001 attack at the World Trade Center played an important role as well, in finally
defining what being moderate, within an Islamic context, really means. After the
destruction of the large complex of seven buildings in the financial district of Lower
Manhattan in New York City, the States policy determined that ‘being moderated’
8All quotes of this section are taken from the following article: A. Sheline, Middle East regimes
are using ‘moderate’ Islam to stay in power, in ≪The Washington Post≫, Washington (2017).
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eventually means to reject the violent extremism linked to certain organizations.
This is the main reason why Egypt earned the title of moderate in 1973 signing a
peace agreement with Israel in the White House and writing the word end on three
decades of hostility between the two countries9, while Jordan gained the same title
in 1994 for the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. ”When a regime like the UAE claims to
represent moderate Islam and paints any alternative expression of Islam as extremist,
the United States is more likely to ignore human rights violations against “terrorists”
and continue offering military and financial partnership“, which explains why, accord-
ing to Sheline, every move is made for Muslim countries own gains and why Muslim
countries themselves do not hold back from exploiting confused mass information and
power games in order to maintain their status and their position in the eyes of the
most influential Western countries.
Nonetheless, as the author herself points out in the article, the joining of extrem-
ist groups “is actually rooted in youthful desires for excitement and significance rather
than religious belief”, plus “violent extremism remains a path chosen by a tiny fraction
of the population. Individual acts of violence pose a less significant threat to the regime
than did the Arab Spring protests of 2011 in Morocco10. The author also underlines
that there is no need for Islamism to be somehow moderated and that not enough
efforts are put into showing and explaining to the masses that behind the joining of
extremists groups there might also be political frustration and exploitation of poor
conditions: “Yet efforts to counter violent extremism have failed to address underlying
sources of religious manipulation or economic and political frustration.”
According to Sheline, speaking about the promotion of moderation among Mus-
lim countries, Morocco probably has “the most developed strategy”, since “King Mo-
hammed VI of Morocco opened an international Imam Training Center to educate
religious leaders from around the globe in Moroccan Islam”. Aim of the training center
is to involve as many Moroccan religious leaders as possible in this new moderate form
of Islam by training them on specific rites and religious practices. Since late 2013, Mo-
9www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-egyptian-peace-agreement-signed
10Series of protests occurred between 2011 and 2012, organized by the 20 February Movement. The
demands that Moroccans had involved political reforms, solutions to unemployment rates and less
police brutality.
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rocco has signed accords to train imams from a number of countries across Africa and
Europe, including Mali, Libya, Tunisia, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, the Maldives,
and most recently Belgium. In addition to the Moroccan students enrolled, including
150 imams and morchidines and 100 morchidates, the Institute currently hosts 447
foreign students. 212 are from Mali, 37 from Tunisia, 100 from Guinea Conakry, 75
from Côte d’Ivoire, and 23 from France.11
Yet, according to the author, this attempted internationalization of Moroccan Is-
lam abroad acts only as distraction to the soft political measures adopted inside the
borders. Generally, the article presents itself as well structured and objective in the
content, although the reader can definitely sense some irony in certain sections, such
as the one speaking about the Moroccan training center or the one dedicated to the
research of a definition to the concept of moderate Islam.
Some elements could also bring the reader to think that the author actually does not
believe in the capability of the declaration to be implemented and put into practice
since she states that “And as long as moderate Islam remains a state-led project, it is
unlikely to be seen as credible by citizens.”
The NYT was founded in 1851 as a penny paper, interestingly already with the idea
of aiming to a very specific target, which was not the mass audience but a cultured and
intellectual readership. Adolph Simon Ochs, American publisher and former owner,
was the one who made of the news organization internationally respected and famous,
through the introduction of an international news section and and the reduction of the
paper’s price back to a penny. Throughout its activity the paper was often involved
in controvert issues as well in spectacular recognition. When the Titanic sank in April
1912, the NYT’s deep research and exploitation of all possible resources confirmed it
to be the first news organisation that gave to the public a detailed and in depth de-
scription of the events and issues that led to the death of thousand of passengers. A
few decades later, in 1971, the NYT published a number of reports allegedly based on




Vietnam war, but the US Supreme Court discovered that the content was protected
by the first Amendment of the American constitution and a year later those reports
earned to the Times a Pulitzer Price. The NYT ended up on the Internet in 1995,
launching in 2006 also an electronic version, which allows the readers to download and
print the journal daily.12
On February the 2nd, 2016 the NYT published an article entitled Muslim Confer-
ence Calls for Protection of Religious Minorities, written by Aida Alami. After a brief
introduction on the Declaration and the content of the Charter of Medina, the author
included in her work different authoritative opinions on the future of the document,
giving some interesting cuts on the topic. Worthy of mention is the issue of the left out
extremist movements: “Some experts said they doubted that the meeting would have
lasting impact because it did not include representatives of more extremist movements,
like the Muslim Brotherhood. They also said the groups that did attend do not have
great sway over young people.
“These efforts are compromised from the get‐go because of their association with
states that don’t have legitimacy among young, angry, frustrated Muslim youths in
the Arab world,” said Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in
Washington and the author of “Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam
is Reshaping the World,” who did not attend the conference. “It’s something that
appeals to Western governments, but what’s the follow‐up?” “The targeted audience
should be people who are predisposed to radicalism,” he continued. “A young Muslim
who is intrigued by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria would be more likely to listen
to a Salafi13 scholar than a traditionalist scholar.”
The extremist group mentioned by Alami in the article, known with the name of
Muslim Brotherhood, is a religio-political organisation founded by Ḥasan al-Bannā14.
The Brotherhood spread rapidly throughout Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon,
12www.britannica.com/topic/The-New-York-Times
13The Salafi movement or Salafism, which dates back to the late XIX century, is a revivalist branch
within Sunni Islam. The movement aims to return to an authentic interpretation of the Koran and
the Sunna, recreating the same conditions where Muhammad lived and acted.
14Egyptian religious leader (1906-1949), who founded this new movement called the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Egypt in 1928.
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and North Africa. Although numbers are extremely unstable and difficult to determine
for sure, it is estimated that at its height in the late 1940s the brotherhood may have
counted around 500,000 members. Goal of the entire organization is to promote a
return to the Hadith15 and the traditional content of the Koran as guides for modern
Islam, which basically would bring to the defeat of democracy and the absolute disre-
gard of basic human rights, corruption and injustice.16
Furthermore this extremist group represents everything that the Declaration and
its founders are trying to fight through its creation and spreading, which means that
their absence certainly did not come as a surprise to neither the other participants nor
the King of Morocco himself. Is their lack of participation a good enough reason to
state that “these efforts are compromised from the get‐go”?. In dealing with issues
that involve multiple countries, cultures and social groups, there are always going to be
multiple perspectives and opinions. The absence of representatives of an extreme vi-
sion, such as the one pursued by the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot prevent hundreds of
other scholars from getting together and work towards a solution, otherwise no global
issue would even stand a chance at being solved.
Later on in the article the author reports Shadi Hamid’s take on the topic.17.
Hamid declared 99to be a firm non-believer on the work done in Marrakesh and on
its implementation. The main issue, according to Hamid, is linked to the inability
of the declaration to involve young people, especially those fascinated by extremist
movements. The reasons behind this claim are comprehensible, but as previously men-
tioned, hundreds of different nations gave their contribution to the creation of the final
document. These states all present different backgrounds in terms of human rights is-
sues and the protection of religious minorities rights: Some, like Morocco for instance,
are on a good path but still need to improve their legal systems in order to reach
equality between religious groups on their grounds, while others, like Pakistan or Iraq,
15The Hadith summons a series of anecdotes on the life of the prophet Muhammad. The document
also presents a much more important meaning as a constitutive part of the so-called Sunna, the second
source of Islamic law after the Koran itself.
16E. Mohamed and B. Momani,The Muslim Brotherhood: Between Democracy,Ideology and Dis-
trust, in ≪Sociology of Islam≫, 2.3(2014), pp. 197-200.
17Shadi Hamid is a senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the
Center for Middle East Policy.
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seem to be incapable to even recognise the issue on a human rights perspective.
Despite their differences, they all agreed to meet in Marrakesh in order to give a
chance at inter-faith dialogue and confrontation between different nations and religious
communities. The fact that there is still much work to do to ensure to the Declaration
its proper implementation in the next decades remains true, but not to even recognise
the effort that has been made thanks to the contribution of many, would be extremely
.
Despite what has been mentioned so far, the article ends on a positive note, re-
porting the words of Susan Hayward, director of religion and inclusive societies at the
United States Institute of Peace and a minister in the United Church of Christ, who
believes the declaration to be “a call for action and to set standard for accountability”.
The author also underlines how President Obama himself also quoted the Declaration
in one of his latest public speech, during the Washington Among the Nations Awards,
“which honor non‐Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust.” All in all, the author’s
real thoughts on the declaration remain unclear and the strength of her theories do
not seem supported enough and are incomplete from a contextual perspective.
4.3.2 The Times
The Times is the oldest national English newspaper, since it was founded in 1975
by John Walter. The News Organization took up its name only in 1788, while before it
was called Daily Universal Register. In Walter’s words, the newspaper should “contain
something suited to every palate” including politics, foreign affairs, matters of trade,
legal trials, advertisements and amusements”, together with the chance “to censure
or applaud either political party”, although remaining faithful and respectful towards
every subject. These values still survives today, in fact in recent years The Times has
openly supported both New Labour and the Conservatives.
The most important feature to the current owner of the organization, which is News
UK, is to maintain The Times editorial independence and this is the main reason why
the daily journal is currently governed by both a board of independent directors and a
set of legal undertakings, which aim to protect its content’s independence. For being
the best printed newspaper in Great Britain, in 2018 The Times was named Britain’s
most trusted national newspaper by the Reuters Institute for Journalism at Oxford
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University, while in 2019 the newspaper was rewarded with the Daily and Sunday
newspaper of the year categories at the British Press Awards.18
In February 2016, The Times published an article, written by Michael Binyon,
with the title Muslim scholars confront Isis in battle over ideas. The author, Michael
Binyon, is a leader writer for The Times, who is been displaced internationally for
most of his career. He spent fifteen years in Russia, for which reports won the British
journalism prizes both in 1979 and 1980. Among all the articles analysed up until this
point, Binyon is the first one to clearly underline the importance and the substance
of the event: “It is almost the first time that Muslim leaders have tackled the threat
of extremist ideology head-on. [...] Few have tackled the ideological challenge posed
by Isis, and until now almost no Muslim leaders have spoken out publicly against the
narrow, puritanical interpretation of the faith that dominates religious teaching in the
Middle East.”Despite the fact that it is honorable for a group of intellectuals to gather
together and promote a less aggressive kind of theology, the writer puts a spotlight
also on two main critiques made to the content of the declaration and to the concept
of extremism itself: the first one was made from President Sisi of Egypt, while the
second one by Jamal al-Suwaidi.
During a speech at the Al-Azhar University of Cairo, President Sisi of Egypt openly
rejected the ideology of Sunni Islam19. The core of the speech was focused on the im-
portance of religious reforms, in order to adapt them to the current social atmosphere
and on the duty, that religious leaders have, to pursue these reforms and start a new
Ijtihād.20. Both members of the Salafi and puritanical sects saw President Sisi’s speech
as threat to their ideology, although there has been no public answer from their parts.
Jamal al-Suwaidi, director of the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Re-
search has firmly stated in his book “Mirage” that “Islamism is an illusion sold by
18www.thetimes.co.uk/static/about-us/?region=global
19Sunni is one of the three branches of Islam (Sunni, Shi’a and Kharijites). It involves almost 90
percent of the religion’s adherents. (www.britannica.com/topic/Sunni)
20The Arabic term literally means effort. According to the Islamic law, it indicates the right to
apply original thinking on the interpretation of some problems not precisely covered by the Koran.
(www.britannica.com/topic/ijtihad)
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political and religious groups who exploit it for partisan and personal interests”.21
What Al-Suwaidi tries to demonstrate is the fact that religion and religious belief are
struggling, simply because they seem not to be able to cope with modernity. In fact,
historically, high level of hatred, bloodshed, terrorism and fanaticism, have always
been accompanied by scientific stagnation and a general decline in the social progress.
Apart from both critiques that the author decides to make public through his work,
the piece seems to end on a positive note stating that “the scholars arguing in Mar-
rakesh for greater freedom and pluralism in Islam, are determined not to yield to the
blandishments of Isis or to allow the Islamists narrow views to win the day by default
in the Muslim world”.
21All quotes in this section are taken from: M. Binyon, Muslim scholars confront Isis in battle over




This research aimed to put a spotlight on one of the most critical social issues of
our time, which is the discrimination of religious minorities in Muslim countries. What
has been promoted in Marrakesh by the King of Morocco and many other previously
mentioned institutions and organizations represents an encouraging step forward, to-
wards the creation of a more equal and accepting social environment among Muslim
communities. The declaration deals with false information globally distorting world’s
perception of Islam and how the intellectuals community is determined to reaffirm the
content of the Charter of Medina (VII cent.) on a legal level and how Muslim coun-
tries can eventually find new and concrete ways to apply it and use it as a catalyst
for change. As proved throughout this work, this gathering symbolises the first real
attempt to create inter-faith dialogue in decades, although the result surely presents
some deficiencies and can be considered in a way as not completely satisfying.
Unfortunately, how the declaration is going to improve its legal effect, especially
in the most socially convoluted Muslim countries, still remains unclear and difficult to
foresee. All the obstacles linked to the spreading of the declaration and how religious
leaders are going to obtain some concrete social improvements out of it, strengthen the
importance of the effort made by a legal translator in making sure to always transpose
a text, especially if legal, in the most precise and effective way possible. Especially con-
sidering legal documentation, such as the declaration of Marrakesh, intertwined with
human rights and dealing with matters of life and death, the translator represents the
vehicle through which the message possibly finds the opportunity to reach a brand new
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audience and become part of a new culture as well. This represents exactly what has
been attempted through this thesis: to make the content declaration as much visible
and comprehensible as possible in the eyes of an Italian audience.
Chapter four is a reminder of how important it is for each and everyone of us to
wisely choose the channels through which we keep up with everything that happens
globally. It is important to consider that every news organization follows some politics,
every reporter has his own opinion and every article can go down a path that does
not fully represent the reality of the circumstances. Studying how media interact with
minorities and how minorities handle media has allowed the creation of a picture of
how marginalized groups are actually perceived by mainstream media but also by the
general society. Data have shown how impactful and in some cases even damaging
media production can be to a marginalized group, which nowadays need to come up
with a well structured media strategy for both preventing its heritage to die and avoid
the spread of bias and prejudice.
With regard to the last section of this thesis, some considerations can be made
on both the American and British reaction to the topics touched by the declaration.
Undoubtedly, all four articles were published by respectable and noteworthy news orga-
nization and written by influential authors, well prepared and interested in conveying
quality mass media information.
Both The Ney York Times and The Washington Post heavily criticised the decla-
ration and the process that has led to it, both for who took part to its drafting and for
Morocco’s policy, which was all in all not considered to be the best example to follow
in terms of respect and tolerance towards religious minorities. In The Washington
Post Alami underlined how Christians living in Morocco still are forced to worship
in private, while in her piece for The New York Times she also underlined how at
the conference nobody addressed all tensions within Islam itself or the persecution of
Muslims towards other Muslims. The biggest critique was moved by Sheline, expert
on the concept of Moderate Islam, who treated the document just as another example
of how Muslim countries desperately try to accommodate the United States agenda,
in order to maintain their position of power and safeguard their benefits. Generally
speaking, this pieces published by the American press did not welcome the declaration
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with a positive and hopeful attitude, but mainly focused on its many shortcomings,
leaving aside possible suggestions on future implementations or any general discussion
on what is to come for the declaration.
It must be mentioned, that the British press, especially if compared with the Amer-
ican one, for sure let less space to the topic. Some of the most important English news
organizations, such as the Mirror, the Telegraph and the Guardian let the Declaration
of Marrakesh and all the events linked to it, go unnoticed.
Nicely written is also the work of Micheal Binyon for The Times. Through his
work, Binyon points out how hard some political and religious members of mayor
Muslim communities are fighting against extremism, in order to promote a less aggres-
sive theology that can live comfortably with the modern world. In addition to that
the author also conveys to the public a very important message: terrorism, bloodshed,
fanaticism, violence and confusion, have always been linked in history with a deep and
rooted cultural decline and sense of ignorance. The real issue maybe hides beyond the
pure treatment that minorities receive from Muslim governments and communities,
and some representatives of Islamism need to be more accepting towards what is dif-
ferent from their own narrow interpretations.
In conclusion absolute religious dictatorship, based on excluding, rejecting or even
killing the “others”, is not the right path to follow in the building of a more equitable
and free future for all communities, and this ideology does not involve Muslim countries







The history of Morocco from 1912
to the present day
In order to fully understand the reasons behind the creation of the Declaration and
why Morocco was the country that decided to host and guide its creation process, it is
fundamental to have an insight on what has been happening historically in Morocco
in the last few decades. Generally, the country presents a population of almost 36
million members, making it the 11th most populous African state. From the cultural
point of view, also thanks to its geographical position, Morocco is a blend of Arabo-
Islamic, Amazigh (Berber), Saharan-Hassanic cultures, together with Andalusians and
Mediterranean influences.1
In 1912, Morocco’s government signed the Treaty of Fez, officially becoming a
French protectorate. After the end of the Second World War, the people of Morocco
began to call for independence and the sultan of that time, Mohammed Ben Youssef,
supported by Franklin Roosevelt as well, started to plan how to achieve Morocco’s
indipendence, together with the Arab league and the Independence Party. The French
protectorate in Morocco allowed no freedom of speech and a limited political expres-
sion, in an everlasting attempt to defeat opposition. This regime surely caused an
unprecedented amount of social and educational issues, censorship in press, journalism
and information included, but in 1930, with the “Berber Dahir”, the opportunity came
to officially and openly fight this oppressive administration.
1www.populstat.info/Africa/moroccog.htm
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The Berber Dahir was a decree, inspired by France and signed on May 1930 by the
Sultan of Morocco (then under French Protectorate), which aimed to apply the con-
cept of ”Berber separatism” into the social system of the time. The Berbers (in their
own language, “Imazi￿en” or “Imazighen”), meaning “free men”, represent the native
populations of those North African territories known by the name of “Tamaz￿a”, which
includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The concept of “Berber separatism” is
based on the idea that Arabs and Berbers are not only different, but two distinguished
“races” with completely different features. The division created by the Decree was
not only meant for a linguistic perspective, but also for a social, mental and physical
one. Protectorate officials in Morocco tried their best to re-categorize the entire social
framework of the country according to this principles, without caring about any ethnic
and cultural varieties. Such practises of separation became common features in all
countries under the protectorate policy, creating divisions and a lot of misjudgment.
Protest and revolts exploded almost immediately, starting from the city of Salè
and reaching Rabat, Fez and Tangier. Crowds were literally spilling into the street
to join demonstrations and fight against the separation with their Berber brothers.
Thanks to the contribution of intellectuals as The Emir Shakib Arslan, a pan-Islamic
activist resident in Geneva, and many Arab newspaper publicly sending messages of
protest throughout all the Arab world, the concept of Berber separatism was discreetly
reduced by 1934, when all National movements gained quite a boost.
Already in 1930 a group of activists from different Moroccan cities had formed an
Organization of nationalist leaders called “Zawiya”, a clandestine association built to
fight the protectorate Administration and promote Nationalism. It is fundamental to
remember that, at that time, a future without France was still unthinkable. Zawiya’s
goal, as well as that of many other organizations across the country, involved mainly
two tasks; First of all, to push masses together and mobilize them against the Dahir
and second, to develop new ideas and plans of actions, capable of communicating and
compromising with the French Protectorate.
Another important step in the fight for Morocco’s independence was the publica-
tion of a widely elaborated Plan of Reforms, known as Plan de Réformes marocaines.
The document was written in Fez in 1934 by a small group of activists, first in Ara-
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bic and then translated into French. Made up of one hundred thirty-four pages, the
Plan’s goal was to find compromises with the French Protectorate regime, by submit-
ting complaints and suggesting more even alternatives to its Administration. Among
all, the plan proposes a new judicial system, based on both Shariah and Western law,
compulsory primary education for all citizens, with no kind of distinction, new social
policies for both aged an unemployed people and a land reform, to better handle feudal
ties. According to the plan, Arabic had to be reinserted in every single public space,
balancing the usage of both French and Arabic. Indeed, the document did not aim at
Morocco’s independence, but instead at “restoring confidence in the work of France
in Morocco” 2 plus demanding more cooperation and more participation within the
Government. In December 1934, the plan was presented to the Foreign minister Pierre
Laval in Paris, but was rejected and failed.
In the eyes of the Protectorate’s lobby, the Plan represented a clear attempt at
pro-national reform, therefore the only legal paper capable of showing some concerns
without directly attacking the whole regime, was promptly rejected and forgotten by
history. After this tremendous failure, all nationalist parties knew the they had to find
new ways to extend their view and beliefs in order to gain consensus throughout the
entire Country. Starting from the 30’s and then until the day Morocco became indepen-
dent, the movement experienced a vigorous expansion, spreading to rural population,
forming new alliances and organizations and boosting the number of its members to
six thousand, although the nationalist cause was completely radicalized only after the
II World War.
Almost at the end of the War, on January 11,1994, The independence Party pro-
moted a “Manifesto of independence”, which officially and directly called for the inde-
pendence of Morocco. The manifesto urged the Sultan to start negotiating with any
Nation, that could have been possibly interested in pursuing Morocco’s independence
and it openly called Moroccan citizens to be the change the protectorate could not be.
Confused by wartime, the Administration did not handle the issue in the best possible
way, arresting people involved in the creation of the manifesto and creating therefore
2S. G. Miller,A History of Modern Morocco, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp.
88-119.
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a wave of protests and riots. The Nationalist movement became a well-known fact.
In this atmosphere of open conflict between the protectorate Administration and the
Nationalists, the relationship between the sultan and all nationalist movements grew
tighter and tighter. In 1952 a UN mission was sent to Morocco in order to objectively
investigate the situation and report it to the UN. The result surely gave a lot of atten-
tion to Morocco’s independence issue worldwide, and the movement took advantage of
it by sending messages, advertising enormous demonstrations and spreading their new
political vision, always hoping for a favourable resolution. The panic level the French
Protectorate had was so high, that they decided to send the Sultan into exile.
On August, 20 1953, the entire royal family was sent to Madagascar, shocking to
the core the entire Moroccan population, together with the national Movement. Not
even the French opinion was united on this front; Many saw the exile as pure stupidity,
a decision taken without properly thinking about the consequences, driven by the fear
of losing both power and legal control on the territory. The departure of the Sultan
unleashed an enormous series of protest and riots throughout the entire country. The
radio, new instrument of insurgency, started to broadcast a call for arms and fight in
honour of their beloved Sultan, factories and farms were set on fire and secret cells
planned violent attacks all over the country. In the north side of Morocco, a Moroccan
army of liberation was formed, with the aim of destroying french military basis and
forcing the Administration to negotiate with the nationalists. The French response
arrived immediately and brutally, killing around five hundreds Moroccans through the
use of tanks, airplanes and heavy weapons. The French regime, unable to find any
alternative solution to restore some peace in the country, decided to allow the Sultan
to come back in Morocco.
A few days later, His majesty left a Madagascar to reach Paris, and from there he
spoke to the nation, promising the beginning of a new Era and to turn Morocco into “a
democratic state based on a constitutional monarchy”. The Sultan landed in Morocco
on November 16, 1955 and that day marked the beginning of a long and complex pro-
cess to rebuild the nation after years of war, fights and destruction and finally make
the transition to independence complete. Further negotiations for full independence
led to the Franco-Moroccan Agreement signed in Paris on March 2, 1956 and on April
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7, 1956 France officially renounced the protectorate on Morocco.3
The country the Sultan went back to, was definitely not the same as the Country
he left for exile almost three years prior. Morocco’s economy and society had been
transformed by the harsh presence of the French Protectorate. In the cities the pop-
ulation was either extremely poor or lucky enough to belong to the small group of
wealthy landowners; illiteracy had touched the never seen before level of 90 percent
and all fake attempts to introduce modernity into the economical system had only
brought poverty and lack of advancement. A real monarchy was established in the
Country only by 1957 when Mohammad V took the title of King instead of Sultan.
Mohammed V immediately put a lot of effort into giving to Morocco a democratic
institution, by drawing up the first Constitutional draft with particular attention to
the modernization of the country and to the diffusion of education and culture. Mo-
rocco joined then the UN and the Arab League, openly declaring its solidarity and
giving political support to Algerians fighting for independence. This certainly did not
mean a break in ties with France, even if it signed the beginning of a solid and cordial
relationship between the United States and Morocco.
On February 26, 1961, King Mohammed V suddenly passed away, allowing his son
Ḥassan II to succeed him to the throne. The first challenges that the new King had
to face immediately were not easy to tackle, not even for a boy who had been closed
to his father since a young age, learning and participating in Morocco’s political life.
Firstly, Hassan II needed to find a quick and efficient way to establish the monar-
chy as new form of government. After years of conflicts and wars, finally in December
1962 the first Moroccan Constitution was drafted behind closed doors only by Hassan’s
appointees and approved from the 85 percent of the population thanks to a popular
referendum.
The Kingdom of Hassan II is also remembered in history for his hard work on foreign
politics and diplomatic relationships, especially in creating a fresh new tie with France,
which was fundamental for the country at the time. The King’s main goal was to show
himself as firm supporter of the West by improving Franco-Moroccan relations and
most importantly creating new ones with rich and powerful western countries, such as
3Miller,A History of Modern Morocco, cit., pp. 120-161.
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the USA. Data shows that actually, relations between France and Morocco improved
in the years between 1962-1965, at the expense of those with Morocco’s neighbour,
Algeria. The conflict with Algeria, that culminated eventually in the so called “Sands
war”, started for territorial reasons. The conflict broke out because of a territorial
dispute that arose between the two states, specifically regarding the border areas of
Béchar and Tindouf.
After weeks of threatening messages, on September 25, the Moroccan forces launched
a great offensive beyond the border with Algeria, putting in serious difficulty the poorly
equipped and trained Algerian troops. The cease-fire was negotiated in November 1963
but the issue regarding this southeast portion of land remained unsolved. The period
of severe dictatorial system, led by Hassan II, from the 60s to the early 90s, is defined
in history as “years of lead”. During his time as King, strong political repression was
exercised, and hundreds of dissidents were killed, arrested, or exiled. On 29 October
1965, the kidnapping of the Moroccan democratic leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, was car-
ried out in Paris in the light of day, and no trace of him was ever found.
In November 1975, the Green March organized towards the territories of the an-
cient Spanish colony of Western Sahara gave the King the opportunity to rebuild some
sense of unity around him, in an attempt to establish a sort of personality cult. His
portrait was affixed in every public place of every city and village, with the police ready
to intervene for whatever reasons the King decided to. Hassan’s regime was entirely
built on the support he received from the army and the police, although at a certain
point even some ranks of the military started to feel disgusted by the political and
economical climate in the Country. The life of the entire royal family was threatened
multiple times and an attack to kill them all was planned by some of his officers dur-
ing the King’s forty-second birthday party, attack that they luckily survived sneaking
away from the building. The political crisis was the automatically followed by the
economical one. Indicators show a steady decline from 1956 onward, caused by low
productivity and employment plus weak investments, strong signs of the fact that a
fake democracy was been used to cover a proper dictatorial regime.
Hassan II spent the last years of his kingdom trying to solve the problems he caused
at the beginning of it, by starting a new dialogue with the opposition and especially
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creating new ties with the conservative Islamic establishment. As a matter of fact the
years of lead definitively ended only with the ascent to the throne of his son Mohammed
VI, in 1999.4




The Press: Full-length articles
B.1 The Washington Post: Morocco summit pushes
Muslim clerics to improve the lot of religious
minorities
By Aida Alami
Religion News Service January 27, 2016
Marrakesh, Morocco
After the Prophet Muhammad established the first Muslim state, he wrote the
Charter of Medina to make sure his subjects lived in harmony, whether they were
Muslims, Jews or people of other faiths. Nearly 1,400 years later, hundreds of religious
scholars met in Marrakesh in a bid to revive the charter to protect religious minorities
in Muslim communities today.
The scholars recognize a worldwide crisis: The so-called Islamic State is killing
Christians, Yazidis and others and imposing its harsh orthodoxy on millions in Iraq,
Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Tensions between Sunni and
Shiite leaders throughout the region are escalating, too.
Sponsored by Moroccan King Mohammed VI and the United Arab Emirates-based
Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, the Jan. 25-27 conference included
300 prominent Islamic clerics and experts from Morocco to Indonesia.
Participants called for more tolerance for minorities and unveiled the Marrakesh
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Declaration, an updated bill of rights for religious minorities, inspired by the Charter
of Medina. The goal was to prepare clerics, judges and others to return home and
sensitize their communities about the Prophet Muhammad’s message of peace, said
attendee Mohamed Elsanousi, the Washington, D.C., director of the Network for Re-
ligious and Traditional Peacemakers.
“Freedom of religion is inscribed in the Koran,” Elsanousi said. “’We need to get
the message out and refute the ideas that Daesh (or the Islamic State) and al-Qaida
are spreading.” Conference participants included Iranian muftis, Pakistani judges and
other Muslim authorities. “Enough bloodshed,” said Abdallah bin Bayyah, a Mauri-
tanian religious scholar and professor of Islamic studies based in Saudi Arabia. “There
is a sickness right now in the world but we have treatments for it within Islam.”
Some participants pointed to Morocco as a successful example of tolerance and
hoped it could serve as a model for other Muslim countries: Moroccan law specifically
protects its Jewish population of around 6,000 people, according to 2010 estimates.
“We in the kingdom of Morocco will not tolerate the violation of the rights of religious
minorities in the name of Islam,” said King Mohammed VI in an opening statement
read by the minister of religious affairs, Ahmed Toufiq. “I am enabling Christians and
Jews to practice their faith and not just as minorities. They even serve in the govern-
ment.” Andre Azoulay, a Jewish adviser to King Mohammed, said the conference was
a small but important step in changing attitudes as well as government policies.
“The exercise is not just academic,” he said in a phone interview. “Many are siding
with diversity and are resisting going backward. A lot is at stake: There are many
risks and challenges but also much promise.” Azoulay said he has never felt like a
minority in Morocco, a country where the monarch’s grandfather — King Mohammed
V — didn’t surrender its Jews during World War II when it was controlled by France’s
pro-Nazi Vichy government.
Mohamed Magid, executive imam of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society, a mosque
in northern Virginia, said that it is necessary for religious minorities to be treated well
in Muslim countries but also that the world needs to be aware of the rise of Islamo-
phobia, too. “We have a lot of kids that are bullied at school,” he said. “The threat
is serious all over the world,” added Magid. “We have to stop it and we also have to
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take pre-emptive measures. I look forward to the implementation of the declaration
at a grass-roots level.”
But others cautioned that a three-day conference wouldn’t solve the profound prob-
lems facing the Muslim world. Farid Esack, president of the International Koranic
Studies Association in South Africa and a professor of Islamic studies at the Univer-
sity of Johannesburg, said profound political and theological reforms need to take place
to change how Muslims treat minorities. He didn’t believe the conference would ac-
complish much. “This issue has become an issue of huge embarrassment for Muslim
governments,” said Esack, who did not attend the conference and spoke via a phone
interview. “But the embarrassment factor isn’t sufficient enough to address the prob-
lem. Religious minorities lead horrendous lives of marginalization and persecution.”
The positions taken by clerics wouldn’t impact most Muslims, he added, because
most religious authorities in Muslim countries are more concerned with supporting
their governments than engaging in dialogue.
And while Morocco may be held up as a model for the region, Moroccan converts to
Christianity live in secrecy out of fear of punishment from the authorities. It is illegal
to attempt to convert Muslims to other faiths, and those who do convert often face
prejudice. Christians worship in private homes and secret congregations exist where
Christian converts gather to practice their faith, said conference attendee Anne Marie
Teeuwissen, 63, a Protestant French citizen who has lived in Morocco for more than 30
years and is married to a Moroccan man. Refusing to convert to Islam disadvantages
her, she said. Under Moroccan law, she cannot inherit her husband’s assets, and her
children cannot inherit anything from her. “When spouses of Muslim Moroccans are
naturalized, there is a pressure for them to convert to Islam,” she said. “I chose to not
convert, and I am accepting the consequences.”




Muslim clerics from around the world gathered in Morocco in January 2016 to
103
draft the Marrakesh Declaration on religious tolerance. A reaction to the Islamic
State’s highly public brutalization of religious minorities, the document harked back
to the prophet Muhammad’s constitution of Medina, which enshrined the rights of
non-Muslims in the first Muslim community in 622 CE.
While sponsors presented the declaration as an official form of moderate Islam to
counter extremism, other domestic and international political goals also drove it. My
interviews with government officials and religious leaders in the Middle East shed light
on the murky politics surrounding regimes’ strategic use of “moderate” Islam.
There is no real agreement on the meaning of moderate Islam, of course. Muslim-
majority governments that wish to be labeled moderate generally need to comply with
the agenda of the United States. Therefore, the definition changes with U.S. policy
goals. Willingness to negotiate peace treaties with Israel earned Egypt the unoffi-
cial designation of moderate in 1979, followed by Jordan in 1994. According to the
“inclusion- moderation hypothesis,” Islamist groups that participate in the democratic
process typically merit the label of moderate. However, since the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks, and particularly since the rise of the Islamic State, moderation has more
specifically corresponded to the rejection of violence.
This definition has drawn criticism from non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Some
argue that religion offers no solution to violent extremism, which is actually rooted in
youthful desires for excitement and significance rather than religious belief. On the
other end of the spectrum, Islamophobes assert that moderate Islam is futile because
the religion cannot be moderated. Many Muslims criticize the concept for implying
that the faith is in need of moderation at all and for implicitly linking Islam with
violence.
Its ambiguity has made “moderate Islam” a useful banner for conservative Arab
regimes to pursue their agendas at home and abroad. By buying into assumptions
that moderate Islam offers solutions to violence, governments can avoid responsibility
for the repercussions of their own policies. By buying into the notion that religion is
to blame for extremism, political elites can justify increased crackdowns on Islamist
groups, which often represent one of the few outlets for political opposition.
The United Arab Emirates illustrates this moderation rhetoric. In addition to co-
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sponsoring the Marrakesh Declaration, the UAE established the Forum for Promoting
Peace in Muslim Societies in 2014 and appointed a minister of tolerance in 2016. Si-
multaneously, the UAE has vigorously decried the Muslim Brotherhood, labeling it a
terrorist organization in 2014, a move the United States may soon emulate. When a
regime like the UAE claims to represent moderate Islam and paints any alternative ex-
pression of Islam as extremist, the United States is more likely to ignore human rights
violations against “terrorists” and continue offering military and financial partnership.
While many countries in the Middle East have appropriated moderate Islam, Mo-
rocco has perhaps the most developed strategy. In 2015, King Mohammed VI of
Morocco opened an international Imam Training Center to educate religious leaders
from around the globe in Moroccan Islam. The king has also launched an initiative
to train female religious leaders, or mourchidates, and established the League of Mo-
roccan Religious Scholars. Moroccan religious and educational institutions emphasize
religious moderation as part of the Moroccan way of life, engendered by its heritage
of religious toleration and its role as a geographic conduit between Europe and Africa.
Other countries appear to agree: Mali, the Ivory Coast, France and others have sent
students to study Moroccan Islam.
This discourse on moderation expanded in the wake of terrorist attacks that shook
Morocco in 2003 and in 2011. Yet efforts to counter violent extremism have failed to
address underlying sources of religious manipulation or economic and political frustra-
tion. More than 1,000 Moroccans have been identified as fighting for the Islamic State.
While it attracts substantial attention, violent extremism remains a path chosen
by a tiny fraction of the population. Individual acts of violence pose a less significant
threat to the regime than did the Arab Spring protests of 2011, to which the king
responded with largely meaningless constitutional reforms. Morocco has sought to
publicize its promotion of moderate Islam abroad in part to distract from the lack of
political reform at home. For an international audience more concerned with security
than democracy, a PR campaign dedicated to promoting moderate Islam is an effective
way to enhance the Moroccan government’s soft power.
Jordan has similarly sought to portray itself as a champion of moderate Islam and
religious toleration. It sponsored the Common Word initiative to emphasize similari-
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ties between Christianity and Islam and lobbied for World Interfaith Harmony Week.
Jordanian textbooks, sermons and statements by the Ministry of Religious Affairs as-
sert that Islam is a moderate religion, citing verse 2:143 of the Koran, “Thus We have
made you a middle [centrist] nation,” a passage often noted by proponents of moderate
Islam. The religious narrative in Jordan emphasizes that Islam is itself moderate, so
any use of religious discourse for violence is inherently un-Islamic.
Jordan has also experienced violent extremism, with a major bombing in 2005.
An estimated 2,500 Jordanians have joined the Islamic State, and the December 2016
attack on tourists highlighted the kingdom’s vulnerability to the group. When I asked
him to explain acts of violence allegedly committed in the name of Islam, Jordan’s
former minister of religious affairs, Hayel Dawud, replied, “Those who kill, or burn, or
bring war to the world, this is not Islam.” Yet when I interviewed less senior mem-
bers of Jordan’s religious and educational establishments, many expressed frustration
with the government’s promotion of moderate Islam. From their perspective, Islam is
already a religion of centrism, making efforts to encourage moderation unnecessary.
Many see the focus on moderate Islam as simply an attempt to appease powerful allies
like the United States.
From the Jordanian regime’s perspective, appeasing powerful allies has long been
the most effective strategy to ensure the kingdom’s survival. Facing war just over its
border in both Syria and Iraq, and burdened with millions of refugees, the Jordanian
regime relies on continued goodwill from Western governments who see it as moderate.
Promoting a vague moderate Islam — through international declarations, religious
training centers or interfaith initiatives — has not proven an effective antidote to vio-
lent extremism. And as long as moderate Islam remains a state-led project, it is unlikely
to be seen as credible by citizens. Yet for many governments, focusing on moderation
offers real benefits for regime survival: the opportunity to target political opposition,
enhance international standing and ensure foreign support. Statements made during
Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearings indicate U.S. sponsorship of “moderate Muslim
partners” is likely to continue.
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B.2 The New York Times: Muslim Conference Calls




At a recent conference held by Muslim scholars to confront violence in the Islamic
world, a representative of the Yazidi religious minority in Iraq and Syria said his people
desperately needed protection from the Islamic State.
“Please help us,” said Hadi Baba Sheikh, the Yazidi representative. “They are
killing us and kidnapping our women and children.” The gathering here of about 300
muftis, theologians and scholars last month responded far more broadly by issuing the
Marrakesh Declaration, which calls for Muslim countries to tolerate and protect reli-
gious minorities living within their borders — among them Christians, Jews, Hindus
and Bahais as well as Yazidis and Sabians.
They cited the Charter of Medina, established by the Prophet Muhammad after
he fled to Medina, in what is now Saudi Arabia, from Mecca in the seventh century to
escape an assassination plot.
“The Medina Charter established the idea of common citizenship regardless of re-
ligious belief,” said Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah, a Mauritanian religious scholar and
a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia who helped convene the meeting, in a
speech. “Enough bloodshed. We are heading to annihilation. It is time for coopera-
tion.”
Since it was issued last Wednesday, the declaration has been welcomed by many,
though with some skepticism, and it is only now beginning to gain wider circulation.
Some experts said they doubted that the meeting would have lasting impact because it
did not include representatives of more extremist movements, like the Muslim Broth-
erhood. They also said the groups that did attend do not have great sway over young
people.
“These efforts are compromised from the get‐go because of their association with
states that don’t have legitimacy among young, angry, frustrated Muslim youths in
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the Arab world,” said Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in
Washington and the author of “Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam
is Reshaping the World,” who did not attend the conference. “It’s something that
appeals to Western governments, but what’s the follow‐up?”. “The targeted audience
should be people who are predisposed to radicalism,” he continued. “A young Muslim
who is intrigued by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria would be more likely to listen
to a Salafi scholar than a traditionalist scholar.”
Yet for the representatives of persecuted religious minorities who attended the
meeting or followed the proceedings from afar, the gathering and the document it pro-
duced were a hopeful sign that influential Muslim leaders and scholars were grappling
with a serious problem. “I think the declaration is important because it sets a standard
for accountability,” said the Rev. Susan Hayward, director of religion and inclusive
societies at the United States Institute of Peace and a minister in the United Church
of Christ, who attended the conference. “This is a call for action.”
She said those who took part in the conference had the clout to cultivate sustain-
able peace efforts in their homelands. Muslim participants came from 120 countries,
and the conference also drew representatives of many other faiths. It was sponsored
by King Mohammed VI of Morocco and the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim
Societies, which is based in the United Arab Emirates.
“Conditions in various parts of the Muslim world have deteriorated dangerously
due to the use of violence and armed struggle as a tool for settling conflicts and im-
posing one’s point of view,” the declaration said. “This situation has also weakened
the authority of legitimate governments and enabled criminal groups to issue edicts
attributed to Islam, but which, in fact, alarmingly distort its fundamental principles
and goals in ways that have seriously harmed the population as a whole.”
President Obama hailed the conference last Wednesday at a ceremony held in Wash-
ington to honor recipients of the Righteous Among the Nations Awards, which honor
non‐Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. “We know that there were Muslims
— from Albanians to Arabs — who protected Jews from Nazis,” Mr. Obama said. “In
Morocco, leaders from Muslim‐majority countries around the world just held a summit
on protecting religious minorities, including Jews and Christians.”
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The conference did not address tensions within Islam itself, or the discrimination
and persecution Muslims sometimes face at the hands of other Muslims. It also did
not address the concern that many of the participants represented countries with poor
human rights records.
Hatem Bazian, a lecturer in Near Eastern studies at the University of California,
Berkeley, and editor of The Islamophobia Studies Journal, was doubtful that the dec-
laration would amount to much. He did not attend the conference, but followed it
closely via the Internet.
“Overwhelmingly, Muslim populations will be in agreement with this declaration,”
he said. But “the overall picture is that civil society discourses have been captured by
extremists across the board.”
B.3 The Times: Muslim scholars confront Isis in
battle over ideas
The Marrakesh declaration calls for a less aggressive theology that can live com-
fortably with the modern world, writes Michael Binyon.
Muslim scholars from around the world have recently published a strongly worded
demand that Christians and other minorities should be free to worship in Muslim coun-
tries, denouncing intolerance and extremism. It is almost the first time that Muslim
leaders have tackled the threat of extremist ideology head-on.
Most Arab governments understand the threat to their rule by the so-called Is-
lamic State (Isis). Most have committed themselves to the fight against terrorism and
have outlawed Islamist militant movements. Few have tackled the ideological challenge
posed by Isis, and until now almost no Muslim leaders have spoken out publicly against
the narrow, puritanical interpretation of the faith that dominates religious teaching in
the Middle East.
Yet, as scholars and reformers admit in private, unless social and religious leaders
denounce the basis of extremist ideology and refute the seductive media messages of
extremism, Isis will continue winning support from young Muslims across the Arab
109
world.
There have been signs recently, however, that more and more Muslim leaders un-
derstand the threat to Islam itself from association with the violence, intolerance and
extremism of Isis and are determined to reassert a less aggressive theology. Last month,
a conference of scholars meeting in Morocco issued the Marrakesh declaration, calling
for the rights of religious minorities in Muslim communities and basing their demand
on the Medina charter of 1,400 years ago, which guaranteed the religious liberty of all.
The scholars, from 120 countries, were joined by Christian leaders from Iraq and other
countries where Christians face persecution.
They declared that “conditions in various parts of the Muslim world have deterio-
rated dangerously due to the use of violence and armed struggle as a tool for settling
conflicts and imposing one’s point of view”. This had enabled criminal groups to issue
edicts that alarmingly distort Islam’s fundamental principles and goals. The declara-
tion added: “It is unconscionable to employ religion for the purpose of aggressing upon
the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries.”
Some political leaders are also becoming impatient. Last year, President Sisi of
Egypt delivered a sharp rebuke to Sunni Islam when he told al-Azhar university in
Cairo that there had to be a revolution in Islam. Religious scholars, he said, had a
duty to reform a “discourse that has not changed for 800 years”. He was referring to a
decree of 1258, which ended the practice of ijtihad — the right of scholars to interpret
the Koran in the light of current thinking and circumstances.
President Sisi’s speech was not well received by conservative clerics. Some saw it as
a challenge, especially to the Salafists, the puritanical sect that is dominant in Saudi
Arabia and underpins the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist
movements. Al-Azhar made no response, but two months later signed an agreement
with the head of the British Council to step up the teaching of English to young imams
training at the university. Some hoped this would encourage younger scholars to tweet
and blog in English to rebut media-savvy messages put on social media by Isis.
A more radical and devastating critique of fundamentalism and the threat this
posed to Islam has recently been published by the main state-funded think-tank in
Abu Dhabi. Jamal al- Suwaidi, director of the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies
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and Research, says in a book called Mirage that Islamism is an illusion sold by political
and religious groups who exploit it for partisan and personal interests.
“Turning a blind eye to extremism in its early stages,” he said, “has ultimately led
to astonishing levels of violence and bloodshed at the hands of members of political
religious groups and extremist organisations in various regions of the Arab world, who
have no respect for the sanctity of life or human honour”.
More controversially, he compared Islam today to Europe in the Dark Ages, and
suggested that the religion is heading down a blind alley because of its inability to
come to terms with modernity. “Why is modernity viewed as the antithesis of reli-
giosity — an implicit rejection of religion and its teaching? Why do some groups in
Arab and Muslim societies think that talk about religion ends where talk of progress
and development begins?”
Dr Suwaidi goes further. He argues that religion must be put in its proper place
and not be associated with “backward practices, stained by ignorance” and used by
groups trying to blame outsiders for failures in their own countries, instead of asking
where they were going wrong.
He says that high levels of terrorism, bloodshed, fanaticism, violence and confu-
sion, as witnessed today, had historically occurred during periods of cultural decline,
intellectual weakness and scientific stagnation. This age-long intellectual debate was in
fact a debate between Islam and modernity. “Is there a problem in pairing between re-
ligion and the sources of modernity?” he asks. The real problem was the way political
religious groups practised absolute dictatorship, their political behaviour taking “an
overpowering totalitarian nature, based on rejecting, excluding and killing the others,
no matter who they are”.
He compared the way Islamists acted as “referee, watchman and judge” on any
alternative thought to the Inquisition in Europe, which applied the text of the Bible
according to their own narrow interpretations. In a clear attack on the prevailing puri-
tanism of the Salafists, he concluded: “This is exactly what has been and still is done
by political and religious groups in the Arab and Muslim worlds, which seek to limit
history to one version and thought to one school.”
Conservative critics will dismiss him as a western-educated academic. However, it
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is clear that the scholars arguing in Marrakesh for greater freedom and pluralism in
Islam, are determined not to yield to the blandishments of Isis or to allow the Islamists’
narrow views to win the day by default in the Muslim world.
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Riassunto in lingua Italiana
L’intero elaborato si propone di mettere in luce una delle questioni sociali più
sottostimate e meno trattate della nostra storia contemporanea: la condizione ed il
rispetto dei diritti delle minoranze religiose negli stati a maggioranza musulmana, es-
senza della Dichiarazione di Marrakesh del 2016. In particolar modo nel corso degli
ultimi decenni, le minoranze religiose sono state assassinate, intimidite e costrette
all’esilio da governi e autorità religiose di tutto il mondo. In questo clima culturale,
Sua Altezza, il Re Mohammed VI del Marocco, insieme al Ministro internazionale degli
affari islamici, Ahmed Toufiq di Rabat, e il Forum per la promozione della pace nelle
società musulmane con sede negli Emirati Arabi Uniti, ha ospitato, dal 25 al 27 gen-
naio 2016 a Marrakesh, una conferenza dal titolo ”Le minoranze religiose nelle terre
musulmane: Quadro giuridico e invito all’azione”.
Dopo varie dichiarazioni, interventi ed opinioni, la conferenza ha portato alla
nascita della Dichiarazione di Marrakesh sui diritti delle minoranze religiose nelle
comunità a maggioranza Musulmana. Molte organizzazioni e gruppi di intellettuali
hanno cooperato all’analisi di una delle questioni religiose e sociali più critiche del
nostro tempo, impegnandosi a rispettare i valori dettati dal Corano e promettendo
di lavorare insieme verso il raggiungimento del pluralismo religioso. Il contenuto
della Dichiarazione tocca diverse criticità legate sia al mondo Islamico che alla sua
percezione, comunemente distorta da stereotipi e falsi miti. La Dichiarazione si identi-
fica anche come un chiaro tentativo da parte della comunità musulmana di riportare in
vita i valori ed i principi dettati dalla Carta di Medina (VII sec.), sia da una prospettiva
legale, che dal punto di vista pratico. La dichiarazione promette quindi di diventare
simbolo e strumento di cooperazione globale fra musulmani e non così da migliorare
nettamente le condizioni delle minoranze religiose, eliminando arroganza, pregiudizi e
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violenza tra le comunità.
Studiosi, intellettuali e autorità religiose di quasi trecento diversi Paesi musulmani
e non, fra i quali gli Emirati Arabi, la Turchia, il Pakistan, l’India e l’Iran, hanno
lavorato insieme per la creazione della dichiarazione, ma il maggior contributo è stato
sicuramente offerto Re Mohammed VI, attuale Re del Marocco. Fin dall’inizio del suo
governo, Mohammed VI ha promosso politiche sociali di tolleranza e di accettazione,
partecipando attivamente alla promozione del dialogo inter religioso e del rispetto re-
ciproco tra le diverse comunità religiose, lavorando simultaneamente a diversi progetti
volti al miglioramento di questioni nazionali molto importanti come l’istruzione e la
creazione di un nuovo sistema giuridico non discriminatorio. Un secondo ruolo fonda-
mentale nel processo di elaborazione del documento è stato svolto dal Ministro degli
affari islamici, Ahmed Toufiq. Negli anni ’90 ha lavorato come professore di storia
per la facoltà di Letteratura dell’Università di Rabat, attualmente leader religioso
mondiale per l’ Eliah Interfaith Institute. Come già menzionato precedentemente, la
Dichiarazione è il risultato di un incontro tra centinaia di studiosi, intellettuali e teologi
provenienti da diverse nazioni, musulmane e non. Tuttavia, questo documento è anche
il risultato dell’ispirazione tratta da documenti giuridici sia antichi che moderni, che in
secoli o anni passati sono stati redatti con lo scopo di migliorare la condizione globale
delle minoranze religiose.
La più antica e importante fonte di ispirazione alla stesura della dichiarazione di
Marrakesh è la Carta di Medina (VII sec.). La Carta di Medina risale al tempo del
profeta Maometto, della nascita della religione e della comunità Islamica. La costi-
tuzione di Medina fu un’ accordo tra il profeta e tutti i più importanti clan di Medina,
con lo scopo di assicurare pace, fratellanza, libertà e sicurezza in quello che sarà poi
destinato a diventare il primo stato islamico pluri-religioso. La Carta di Medina trova
i suoi principi nel Corano e nella Sunna, coinvolgendo principalmente gli immigrati, i
musulmani e gli Ebrei. L’ obbiettivo della Carta era quello di fornire a Maometto un
ruolo di mediazione fra tutte le tribù di Medina, ponendo fine a tutte le lotte interne
alla città, grazie all’ausilio della sua sapiente guida. Nel documento si chiede ai musul-
mani di trattare gli ebrei e tutti gli altri non musulmani in modo equo e rispettoso,
purché essi siano disposti a mantenere rapporti pacifici e ad agire sempre secondo le
114
sacre scritture.
Altro concetto fondamentale della dottrina islamica rinnovato da Maometto nella
Carta di Medina, è quello di Ummah islamica. Nel Corano, il termine designa general-
mente la collettività di una comunità o di un gruppo di persone, unite non solo dal
sangue, ma anche dallo spirito, tuttavia il suo significato ha radici ben più profonde:
non possiede solo il significato di semplice comunità, ma di comunità guidata dalla
stessa fede e dallo stesso credo, che adora lo stesso Dio e si unifica grazie agli sforzi di
un unico profeta. Oggigiorno il termine ha assunto una connotazione esclusivamente
musulmana, anche se il concetto è nato in rappresentanza di una comunità più gen-
erale, coinvolgendo e includendo i più diversi tipi di gruppi sociali, soprattutto fra
quelli appartenenti ai cosiddetti ”popoli del libro”. Ad ogni Ummah della Terra, Dio
stesso ha inviato un messaggero o profeta, destinato a diffondere il suo piano divino
di salvezza, che ha infine ispirato Maometto e i suoi seguaci durante la creazione della
Carta di Medina.
L’ostacolo principale riscontrato dagli studiosi e dagli intellettuali, nel trovare fonti
più moderne e contemporanee legate alla Dichiarazione di Marrakesh, è rappresentato
dal fatto che negli ultimi decenni di storia del mondo islamico i riferimenti alle mi-
noranze religiose sembrano essere inesistenti o non abbastanza specifici per garantire
risultati concreti. Il primo documento proveniente dal mondo islamico che menziona
chiaramente le minoranze religiose, anche se vagamente, è la Carta araba dei diritti
umani del 1994. In generale, concreti tentativi di garantire dignità alle minoranze re-
ligiose, soprattutto in Medio Oriente, sono estremamente recenti e sicuramente degni
di nota. Il Messaggio di Amman, ad esempio, rappresenta un appello alla tolleranza e
all’unità nel mondo islamico ed è stato approvato solo il 9 novembre 2004 dal re di Gior-
dania Abd Allāh II. Un secondo grande traguardo, simbolo di rispetto ed uguaglianza
nei Paesi musulmani, è stata la Conferenza del 2010 a Mardin, nel sud-est della Turchia,
dove quindici fra i più importanti studiosi musulmani hanno dichiarato la fatwa dello
studioso del XIV secolo Ibn Taymiyya, come non più applicabile alla struttura sociale
contemporanea.
In conclusione, il vero cammino verso la dichiarazione di Marrakesh è iniziato conc-
retamente solo quattro anni prima della sua creazione, con una serie di seminari a
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Nouakchott, in Mauritania, seguiti da un grande forum a Tunisi nel 2013, dove il tema
è stato finalmente affrontato in modo pro-attivo ed in ottica internazionale.
Il secondo capitolo è interamente dedicato all’analisi del trattamento di alcune
minoranze religiose, da parte di stati a maggioranza musulmanaconsiderati problem-
atici dal punto di vista della gestione della libertà religiosa. Il primo stato ad essere
esaminato è il Marocco, stato ospitante dell’incontro inter-religioso che ha dato luce
alla dichiarazione di Marrakesh sulle minoranze religiose. Attualmente, anche grazie
al contributo del suo nuovo Re, il Marocco è considerato in prima linea per quanto
riguarda la gestione della convivenza fra musulmani e non sul suo territorio, pur es-
sendo stato teatro di alcuni spiacevoli eventi a carico delle minoranze Ebree e Cristiane.
Malgrado quindi la sua apparente modernità nel garantire libertà religiosa ad ogni cit-
tadino, il Marocco in primo luogo deve ancora compiere passi importanti prima di
potersi considerare completamente uno stato promotore della libertà di fede.
Aspetti positivi si faticano invece a trovare per quanto riguarda la libertà reli-
giosa in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turchia ed Indonesia. Questi possono definirsi gli stati
a maggioranza musulmana, dove sia per ragioni politiche o per la presenza di gruppi
estremisti sul territorio, le minoranze religiose vengono trattate in maniera discrimi-
nante rispetto ai cittadini musulmani.
Gli Yezidi, una delle più antiche comunità Curde, in Iraq sono sottoposti, special-
mente dal 2014 (anno di avvento del IS), ad odio, violenza e discriminazione, scatenati
solamente da sostanziali differenze religiose fra lo Yazidismo e la religione musulmana.
Il 3 agosto 2019 ha segnato 5 anni dal 74 ° genocidio degli yazidi in Iraq, guidato dalla
più brutale organizzazione jihadista nella storia: il Daesh, nome locale dell’ISIS. Lo
Yazidismo è riconosciuto a livello internazionale come una delle più antiche religioni
Curde in Oriente. La questione degli Yazidi esiste solo sulla base di odio e ragioni re-
ligiose, poiché, secondo il popolo di Al-Baghdadi, sono una minoranza che non merita
di vivere, a meno che non neghino la propria fede e abbraccino l’Islam. Una volta
conquistata la città di Mosul, l’ISIS diede solo agli uomini la possibilità di scegliere
tra morte e conversione, mentre le donne furono deportate, violentate, rese schiave
o vendute come merci. Durante l’attacco, morirono 3100 Yazidi e altri 6800 furono
rapiti. La tragedia ha lasciato questa minoranza sola e divisa, sia dal punto di vista
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geografico che politico, ed attualmente la loro condizione ancora non trova pace.
Le questioni relative alle minoranze in Pakistan provengono principalmente dalla
legge sulla blasfemia adottata dal paese, il che significa che legalmente, ogni atto o fede
contraria alla volontà di Maometto è considerato punibile con la morte o l’ergastolo.
Nel 1973, anno dell’ultima revisione della costituzione pakistana, l’Islam è diventato la
religione di stato ufficiale e costituzionalmente, i primi ministri possono essere solo
musulmani. Da allora, i cristiani pakistani hanno vissuto in un clima di ostilità,
classificato come ”persona non grata”, discriminato e perseguitato su tutti i fronti.
Nonostante la presenza di veri e propri villaggi cristiani sparsi su tutto il territorio,
la maggior parte della violenza nel corso dei decenni è stata contro le istituzioni cris-
tiane e dagli anni ’90 gli attacchi si sono in gran parte intensificati. In questo caso,
tuttavia, le ragioni di tutto questo odio non sono esclusivamente religiose, ma anche
politiche: alcuni giornalisti e studiosi vedono la crescente violenza come un messaggio
per i paesi musulmani che sembrano essere diventati troppo amichevoli nei confronti
dell’Occidente.
Le statistiche certe sulle minoranze religiose in Iran sono difficili da ottenere, ma
diverse fonti affermano che nel paese ci sono: 13.000 cattolici caldei, latini e armeni;
122.000 cristiani armeni, assiri e greci ortodossi; e 8.500 protestanti. In Iran, le radici
dell’odio religioso e della discriminazione possono essere classificate sotto due diverse
prospettive; il loro status giuridico da un lato e il loro effettivo trattamento dall’altro.
Gli articoli 12, 13 e 167 della Costituzione Iraniana sottointendono indirettamente
discriminazioni e odio, poiché negano legalmente ad alcuni dei principali gruppi mi-
noritari nazionali certi diritti fondamentali come la possibilità di usare la loro lingua
durante la pratica religiosa. Concretamente, questi articoli della Costituzione trattano
anche questioni quali la credibilità delle testimonianze dei non musulmani in tribunale
e l’illegalità del matrimonio fra donne musulmane e uomini non musulmani. Per quanto
deboli possano essere le misure legali iraniane a garanzia dei diritti fondamentali per
le minoranze religiose, il loro effettivo trattamento si è dimostrato ancora più brutale.
Due gruppi in particolare rimangono estremamente vulnerabili: i cristiani di origine
musulmanae i baha’i.
Per la Turchia, la minaccia di smembrare il paese dopo la prima guerra mondiale
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ha sicuramente avuto un impatto sul modo in cui trattano e hanno trattato le mino-
ranze in passato. Dall’epoca di fondazione della nazione Turca, il suo trattamento nei
confronti delle minoranze è cambiato costantemente, alternando periodi di repressione
e discriminazione con periodi di accettazione e di quasi inclusione. Per quanto riguarda
la questione delle minoranze religiose, il caso curdo rappresenta sicuramente un caso di
spicco, anche se i Curdi non sono l’unica minoranza etnica esclusa dall’idea di repub-
blica Turca. La storia del rapporto tra Curdi e Turchi in Turchia ha radici profonde e
può essere divisa in tre distinte fasi cronologiche: 1. La fase originaria di repressione
del XX secolo (principalmente a causa dall’insurrezione del PKK dal 1984), 2. La fase
del 1999, anno della candidatura della Turchia all’UE, ha indotto nuove proposte volte
ad includere i Curdi in società, 3. L’attuale fase di ostilità, presumibilmente iniziata
nel 2011, ma che ha raggiunto il suo picco dall’estate del 2015.
Per quanto concerne la condizione delle minoranze religiose in Indonesia, si può
affermare che la fonte principale di incomprensioni e discriminazione è il conflitto fra
armonia religiosa ed effettiva libertà di fede. L’armonia religiosa è una condizione
che determina che il rapporto dei seguaci religiosi si basi sulla tolleranza, la compren-
sione, il rispetto, e l’uguaglianza nella pratica degli insegnamenti religiosi; Il concetto
sottointende una cooperazione nella vita sociale e nazionale, guidata dal governo In-
donesiano e della Costituzione. Queste le parole del ministro Indonesiano per gli affari
religiosi riguardanti il concetto di armonia religiosa. Sostanzialmente, l’intero con-
cetto stabilisce come prioritaria la protezione della stabilità nazionale, piuttosto che
la creazione di una reale libertà religiosa, ed ogni elemento sociale che riguarda la
sopravvivenza dell’armonia religiosa, deve essere gestito dal governo. Il governo in-
donesiano afferma da decenni che la maggior parte dei casi di intolleranza religiosa nel
paese sono solamente conflitti innocui, tuttavia l’Istituto Wahid di libertà e tolleranza
religiosa non la vede allo stesso modo. Nella loro relazione del 2011 sulla libertà reli-
giosa, hanno scoperto che molti casi di discriminazione di fede in Indonesia riguardano
restrizioni molto più severe, come l’incitamento all’odio, le minacce violente, la con-
versione forzata, l’eresia e la blasfemia.
Il terzo capitolo si occupa prevalentemente della traduzione del documento dall’inglese
all’italiano e dell’analisi generica delle tendenze traduttive relative all’ambito legale.
118
Negli ultimi decenni il fenomeno della globalizzazione ha incrementato la richiesta nell’
ambito della traduzione di documenti legali. Il processo di traduzione dalla lingua A
alla lingua B di documentazione legale coinvolge molti aspetti linguistici e, vista la
peculiarità del testo, richiede l’uso di particolari tecniche di traduzione. Uno degli
ostacoli più importanti in campo di traduzione legale è strettamente connesso alla
diversità fra sistemi giuridici. Ogni documento posto davanti ad un traduttore sarà
inevitabilmente legato al sistema giuridico e linguistico di una specifica nazione, il che
rende il contenuto più complesso da adattare agli occhi di un lettore straniero e la
barriera culturale tra il pubblico del testo di partenza e il pubblico del testo di arrivo,
più ampia. Specialisti dello spessore di Maurizio Gotti considerano il processo più
una trasposizione che una semplice traduzione, visto il numero di elementi che hanno
necessità di essere concettualmente convertiti.
I testi giuridici presentano inoltre, caratteristiche stilistiche specifiche a seconda
del tipo di legge e del paese dal quale deriva il documento. I codici civili, ad esempio,
presentano generalmente una terminologia meno specializzata, mentre le formulazioni
giuridiche legate al diritto penale tendono ad apparire più specifiche, complesse e vin-
colanti. La tendenza dei traduttori professionisti è quella di cercare di mantenere
lo stesso atteggiamento stilistico presente nel testo di partenza anche per quello di
arrivo. Studi recenti sulla traduzione, sviluppati da esperti come Hurtado Albir e Ger-
ardo Vazquez Ayora, hanno dimostrato la differenza tra metodo, strategia e tecnica
di traduzione. Il termine metodo di traduzione si riferisce all’approccio generale con
il quale una traduzione può essere intrapresa, ovvero l’atteggiamento che il traduttore
adotta, a seconda dell’argomento, dell’obiettivo e del target del testo su cui sta lavo-
rando.
Qualunque sia il metodo scelto dal traduttore, durante il processo di traduzione si
possono incontrare diversi ostacoli linguistici, ed è in queste circostanze che egli deve
prendere in considerazione le più adatte strategie di traduzione. Per quanto riguarda
la traduzione della Dichiarazione di Marrakesh sono state utilizzate principalmente le
seguenti tecniche di traduzione:
1. Attitudine di “buona fede”: indica la generale abilità del traduttore di trovare
o se necessario creare, il miglior corrispettivo linguisico, specialmente nei casi in
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cui l’incongruenza fra lingua A e B si fa più ampia e profonda.
Fondamentale nell’atto di domesticazione del testo. Il risultato finale può definirsi
“addomesticato” nel momento in cui si inserisce perfettamente nel quadro cul-
turale della lingua di arrivo.
2. Utilizzo di frozen terms: gli accordi non scritti della traduzione legale, vengono in
aiuto al traduttore nei casi in cui è presente una ricorrenza nel modo di tradurre
una determinata espressione.
3. Creazione di un calco: sfruttando al massimo le sue conoscenze linguistiche il
traduttore può spontaneamente decidere di creare un nuovo termine, assicuran-
dosi sia comprensibile e riconoscibile dal pubblico target.
Un testo tradotto è giudicato accettabile dalla maggior parte degli editori, revisori e
lettori quando si legge in modo scorrevole e quando l’assenza di qualsiasi peculiarità
linguistica o stilistica lo rende trasparente, dando l’impressione, in altre parole, che la
traduzione non sia in realtà una traduzione, ma l’originale.
Il quarto ed ultimo capitolo si occupa interamente del rapporto che intercorre tra le
minoranze religiose ed alcuni dei più influenti mass media internazionali. Sono stati in-
oltre analizzati alcuni articoli, pubblicati da testate giornalistiche Inglesi ed Americane,
che hanno trattato la Dichiarazione di Marrakesh, poco dopo la sua pubblicazione. Le
conclusioni raggiunte evidenziano che le minoranze hanno la necessità di sviluppare
una strategia mediatica equilibrata ed efficiente, in grado di gestire sia i media a loro
interamebnte dedicati che i media nazionali tradizionali. La corretta gestione di en-
trambe le suddette risorse mediatiche è in grado di sostenere la comunità, correggendo
gli stereotipi e mantenendo le conoscenze delle minoranze circolanti e accessibili ad un
vasto pubblico. La correzione dei pregiudizi e degli stereotipi è chiaramente vitale per
le comunità che si percepiscono come escluse o travisate, poiché per un gruppo religioso
o etnico, la falsa rappresentazione può essere più pericolosa perfino dell’esclusione di-
retta e può, in alcuni casi, esacerbare o prolungare diverse forme di conflitto.
Negli ultimi decenni, un numero crescente di esperti ha espresso preoccupazione
per quanto concerne il ruolo di alcuni mainstream media nella costruzione di identità
che giudicano gruppi o fedi marginali come qualcosa di sinistro, patologico o dannoso
sia per i propri membri che per la società. A questo proposito sono stati analizzati
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degli studi, fatti sia sulla base della produzione giornalistica inglese che Americana,
che hanno cercato di inquadrare il trattamento di alcune minoranze religiose di spes-
sore, all’interno dei mass media internazionali. Entrambi gli studi hanno evidenziato
una rappresentazione più negativa della religione Mussulmana sia da parte della pro-
duzione Americana che di quella Britannica. Ulteriori analisi hanno dimostrato che
le notizie legate ai musulmani rilasciate negli Stati Uniti sono collegate a credenze
stereotipate, emozioni negative e al sostegno di ideologie politiche dannose per la mi-
noranza musulmana. Per quanto concerne lo studio relativo alla stampa Britannica
dal 2001 al 2012, il focus è stato concentrato sul tono del titolo dei diversi articoli.
L’analisi ha rilevato tre conclusioni importanti: in primo luogo, che i titoli dei titoli
britannici non ritraggono la minoranza musulmana in modo costantemente negativo,
anche se i titoli provenienti dai tabloid più letti e seguiti dalla popolazione presentano
un’ atteggiamento nettamente più negativo. Questo fatto fa sì che la maggior parte
dei lettori venga esposta a titoli in generale più discriminatori.
In conclusione, i risultati tratti dai suddetti studi dimostrano l’importanza di una
comunicazione mediatica oggettiva e libera da qualsiasi tipo di pregiudizio. Laddove il
pregiudizio dovesse essere presente, l’immagine che una grossa fetta della popolazione
mondiale crea, delle minoranze religiose od etniche, può risultare inevitabilmente cor-
rotta. La produzione mediatica elettronica e cartacea del nostro tempo, necessita di
ingaggiare veri e propri esperti full-time che si occupino delle diverse questioni religiose
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www.peacems.com/about-us/brief/
• The Marrakesh Declaration’s official website (Febbraio 2019)
www.marrakeshdeclaration.org
• The Muslim philosophy (Ottobre 2019)
www.muslimphilosophy.com/it/
• The Pew Research (Febbraio 2019)
www.pewresearch.org/
• The term Leader (Agosto 2020)
www.garzantilinguistica.it/ricerca/?q=leader




• The Times (Ottobre 2019)
www.thetimes.co.uk/static/about-us/?region=global
• The Washington Post (Ottobre 2019)
www.washingtonpost.com/policies-and standards/
• The Yazidi: definition (Ottobre 2019)
www.britannica.com/topic/Yazidi
• The Yazidis genocide (Giugno 2019)
www.undispatch.com/rem embering-the-yazidi-genocide-five-years-on/
• The Yazidi’s genocide (Ottobre 2019)
www.affarinternazionali.it/segnalazioni/genocidio-degli-yazidi-zoppellaro/
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